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CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW  
VOLUME 55 FALL 2018 NUMBER 1 
THE METAL EYE:  ETHICAL REGULATION OF  
THE STATE’S USE OF SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY AND 
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE TO OBSERVE†  
HUMANS IN CONFINEMENT 
JENNIFER A. BROBST* 
 
 
                                                          
† Surveillance is defined as “close observation, esp. of a suspected person.” 
Surveillance, THE OXFORD ENCYCLOPEDIC ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1457 (Joyce M. 
Hawkins & Robert Allen, Clarendon Press 1991).  Oddly, there is no word in English 
or French that means “the one who surveils.”  Neither spy, which presupposes an 
enemy, nor observer, which lacks the deliberate focus of surveillance, equates to 
“surveilleur”, should such a word exist.  In 1900, one of the first English language 
thesauri aptly distinguished between the words observe (the chosen word for the title 
of this article) and watch: “These terms agree in expressing the act of looking at an 
object; but to observe is not to look after so strictly as is implied by to watch; a general 
observes the motions of an enemy when they are in no particular state of activity; he 
watches the motions of an enemy when they are in a state of commotion; . . . .”  
GEORGE CRABB, ENGLISH SYNONYMES EXPLAINED 635 (New ed., Harper & Bros., 
1901) (emphasis in original). 
 * Jennifer A. Brobst, J.D., LL.M., is an Assistant Professor at Southern Illinois 
University (SIU) School of Law, cross-appointed in the SIU School of Medicine 
Department of Medical Humanities.  She was formerly a deputy prosecuting attorney 
in Indiana and legal director of a mental health center in North Carolina.  Many thanks 
to the student editors of the California Western Law Review, especially Brooke 
Raunig, Hana Willard, and Eric Clarkson.  They provided excellent editing support 
on this article, as well as confident leadership during the Second Annual Legal Ethics 
Symposium on February 17, 2018, “Artificial Intelligence – Real World Ethics.”   
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“How can we control the vast impersonal forces that now menace 
our hard-won freedoms?”  
– ALDOUS HUXLEY (1958)1 
 
“The officers of Congress may come upon you now, fortified with 
all the terrors of paramount federal authority. . . . They may, unless 
the general government be restrained by a bill of rights, or some 
similar restriction, go into your cellars and rooms, and search, 
ransack, and measure, every thing [sic] you eat, drink, and wear. 
They ought to be restrained within proper bounds.” 
- PATRICK HENRY (1788)2 
INTRODUCTION 
Law, humanity, and human nature reflect a mastery of negotiation 
between the individual’s need for both a private and a social life.  Since 
its founding, state and federal government and their legal structures in 
the United States have been designed by and for humans to thrive as 
individuals in society, which, in turn, benefits government and society.3  
                                                          
1.  ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD REVISITED 334 (Harper Perennial 
2010) (1958). 
2.  JONATHAN ELLIOT, 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, A CENTURY OF LAWMAKING FOR 
A NEW NATION: U.S. CONGRESSIONAL DOCUMENTS AND DEBATES, 1774-1875, at 
448-49 (2d ed. 1836), available at https://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage? 
collId=lled&fileName=003/lled003.db&recNum=2&itemLink=r?ammem/hlaw:@fi
eld(DOCID+@lit(ed0032))%230030003&linkText=1 (Convention of Virginia 
debate on June 14, 1788) (enter “448” in the “Turn to image” query box).  See also 
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 316 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (referring to 
this passage of Patrick Henry’s debate). 
3.  Most state constitutions in the U.S. explicitly uphold this assertion.  E.g., 
ALA. CONST. art. I, § 2 (“That all political power is inherent in the people, and all free 
governments are founded on their authority, and instituted for their benefit; and that, 
therefore, they have at all times an inalienable and indefeasible right to change their 
form of government in such manner as they may deem expedient.”); IDAHO CONST. 
art. I, § 2 (“All political power is inherent in the people.”).  See generally PRISCILLA 
3
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For example, the State Constitution of Louisiana provides that the 
purpose of government is to protect the individual, which will protect 
“the good of the whole” of society: 
All government, of right, originates with the people, is founded on 
their will alone, and is instituted to protect the rights of the individual 
and for the good of the whole. Its only legitimate ends are to secure 
justice for all, preserve peace, protect the rights, and promote the 
happiness and general welfare of the people.4 
Similarly, Patrick Henry spoke eloquently at the Convention of 
Virginia in 1788 of the need for a bill of rights and checks on federal 
government, asserting that “the power of a people in a free government 
is supposed to be paramount to the existing power.”5 
As inventors continue to design technology to supplant human 
interaction or constantly monitor human behavior, the role of the state 
in protecting individual rights to autonomy in navigating privacy and 
social interaction requires a close examination.6  Fortunately, in the 
United States, a hard-fought legal respect for the rights of the individual 
in a free society remains a steady, rational force, capable of moderating 
                                                          
M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY 27-28 (1995) (asserting that individual rights, 
including the right to privacy, are also of societal importance, as discussed by theorists 
Alan Westin and others); DAVID F. LINOWES, PRIVACY IN AMERICA: IS YOUR PRIVATE 
LIFE IN THE PUBLIC EYE? 174 (1989) (quoting Edmund Burke in support of an 
individual right to privacy – “Government is a contrivance of human wisdom to 
provide for human wants.”).  In Rousseau’s social contract, as a voluntary pact of 
individuals, “the natural law of the sovereignty of the people” proclaims that the 
government “only exists by its mandate; [government] is constantly subordinated to 
the sole legitimate sovereign: the people.”  ERNST BLOCH, NATURAL LAW AND 
HUMAN DIGNITY 62 (Dennis J. Schmidt transl., The MIT Press 1986) (1961) 
(referring to The Social Contract (1762)).  
4.  LA. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
5.  Henry, supra note 2, at 410 (June 14, 1788). 
6.  To effect the purpose of this article, determining the motives and cause of 
dramatic technological change is unnecessary.  However, it is worthy of note that over 
the last two centuries some conspiratorially have identified the human role of an “elite 
of scientists”, while others have asserted a “runaway world” of technological 
determinism spinning out of human control.  See Lawrence Quill, Technological 
Conspiracies: Comte, Technology, and Spiritual Despotism, 28 CRITICAL REV. 89 
(2016) (discussing Auguste Comte’s post-revolutionary and H.G. Well’s pre-world 
war visions of the future respectively). 
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intrusive surveillance through the common law, as well as state and 
federal constitutional jurisprudence.7 
In a mature society, the process of drawing the lines of privacy 
against state intrusion should look first to those who have the least 
power and social capital—persons confined by the state, such as prison 
inmates and those who are involuntarily committed.  As the Supreme 
Court has repeatedly affirmed: “[H]aving stripped [prisoners] of 
virtually every means of self-protection and foreclosed their access to 
outside aid, society may not simply lock away offenders and let the state 
of nature take its course.”8  Protected by common law and 
constitutionally-based duties of care to ensure a secure and safe 
environment, this population without much political power or voice is 
owed much by the State.  Nevertheless, in a technological age of 
surveillance, the State has much greater opportunity to infringe on the 
rights of confined persons than it has on persons at liberty in the public 
sphere, thereby testing the bounds of basic individual rights.  If those in 
state institutions—the most vulnerable or dangerous of us all, and 
arguably most in need of monitoring and observation—have a right to 
autonomy with respect to privacy and social interaction, then so do we 
all. 
If it were technologically possible, would the United States 
lawfully permit a residential facility—a prison, immigration detention 
center, mental hospital, or nursing home—to be run solely by remote 
technology, using artificial intelligence (AI)9 to subject confined 
                                                          
7.  See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST., NAT’L INST. OF JUST., PRIVACY AND 
INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION, SECURITY & PRIVACY ISSUE BRIEF NO. 2 (Mar. 1981) 
at 1 [hereinafter DOJ BRIEF NO. 2], available at https://www.bjs.gov/ 
content/pub/pdf/pii.pdf  (addressing efforts to regulate intelligence-gathering 
information in the United States after the Watergate scandal and other “publicity 
surrounding covert police intelligence and surveillance activities against dissident 
groups [which] has heightened public awareness of the potential threat to individual 
privacy associated with this kind of police activity”). 
8.  Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (addressing whether the state ignored the risk of prison rape).  See also 
Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1245 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (citing Farmer v. 
Brennan when examining whether solitary confinement is cruel and unusual 
punishment); Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2209 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(expressing concerns that “[p]risoners are shut away – out of sight, out of mind”). 
9.  In this article, artificial intelligence (AI) is defined using the definition of 
Margaret Boden, a research professor in cognitive science at the University of Sussex.  
That is, AI involves machine-based logical reasoning and psychological skills such as 
5
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persons to constant surveillance or completely replace human 
interaction with machine-based interaction?  Can technology enhance 
the quality of human experience in confined settings or is reliance on 
such technology merely an expedient, harmful substitute for human 
supervision and social interaction? 
These questions are not dystopian or utopian speculation.  In South 
Korea, the world’s first autonomous robotic prison guards, with AI 
capabilities that include use of surveillance technology and facial 
recognition software designed to assess a prisoner’s mental state, are 
being tested in facilities.10  In Australia, the Technological 
Incarceration Project has tested a relatively inexpensive home detention 
system with constant AI presence that monitors verbal and facial cues 
and delivers a shock if the monitored person appears to be about to 
commit a violation.11  The European Union INDECT research project 
“for the security of citizens” is conducting a feasibility design for a 
constant surveillance system for automatic threat detection in public 
spaces, compliant with current national and international privacy laws: 
The value that will be added by deployment of INDECT research 
outcomes is that existing systems would operate with less human 
intervention, which will lower the level of subjective assessment and 
the number of human mistakes. This means less staff will be required 
for supervision of surveillance activities (e.g.[,] monitoring of CCTV 
camera networks). This will result . . . in less opportunities for 
illegitimate use of such information, or for human error to result in 
violations of the rights of the individual.  There will also be economic 
                                                          
“perception, association, prediction, planning, [and] motor control” to problem-solve 
and process information.  MARGARET A. BODEN, AI: ITS NATURE AND FUTURE 1-2 
(2016).  
10.  See World’s First Robot Prison Guard, YOUTUBE: CBS (Apr. 13, 2012), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dM9BJjjLU9U&feature=player_https://www.co
rrectionsone.com/corrections/videos/7591864-Worlds-first-robot-CO/; Lena Kim, 
Meet South Korea’s New Robotic Prison Guards, DIGITAL TRENDS (Apr. 21, 2012, 
11:20 AM), https://www.digitaltrends.com/cool-tech/meet-south-koreas-new-robotic 
-prison-guards/ (discussing the robotic application of pattern recognition algorithms 
to detect safety concerns and signal the need for additional security). 
11.  Antony Funnell, Internet of Incarceration: How AI Could Put an End to 
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benefits, in terms of the reduced staffing requirements. Police 
officers could be freed up to carry out frontline policing tasks.12 
Surveillance in these contexts is linked to public security concerns, 
which must be moderated by civil liberties.  In the realm of national 
security, the AI international arms race continues to place pressure on 
democratic nations to undermine their values and recognition of civil 
rights.13  Autonomous, untethered AI technology that would be 
implemented to kill without human decision or control is already 
possible, although the Department of Defense under both Presidents 
Obama and Trump has restricted their military applications.14  The 
United Nations also continues to debate the need to restrict such 
weapons.15  In the public-private sphere, technology companies, such 
as Google, have faced pressure to opt out of continuing to contribute 
                                                          
12.  INDECT Research Project Ethics Board, Ethical Issues: INDECT 
Approach to Ethical Issues, INDECT, http://www.indect-project.eu/approach-to-
ethical-issues (last visited Dec. 3, 2018). 
13.  See Anna Varfolomeeva, Robotic Vehicles: Russia’s Quest for the Weapons 
of Future Wars, THEDEFENSEPOST BLOG (May 23, 2018), https://thedefensepost. 
com/2018/05/23/russia-robot-vehicle-ugv-uran/ (“As the artificial intelligence 
technology race unfolds, more countries, including China, France, the United 
Kingdom, other European Union members, and the United States, have become 
heavily invested in the research, which has been controversial.”). 
14.  See U.S. DEP’T. OF DEF. DIRECTIVE, AUTONOMY IN WEAPONS SYSTEMS, 
No. 3000.09 (Nov. 21, 2012, amended May 8, 2017), available at http://www.esd.whs 
.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/300009p.pdf (requiring “appropriate 
levels of human judgment over the use of force”); see also Caroline Lester, What 
Happens When Your Bomb-Defusing Robot Becomes a Weapon? Treating a 
Technology as a “Platform” has Consequences, ATLANTIC (Apr. 26, 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/04/what-happens-when-your-
bomb-defusing-robot-becomes-a-weapon/558758/; Ted Piccone, How Can 
International Law Regulate Autonomous Weapons?, BROOKINGS INST. (Apr. 10, 
2018), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/04/10/how-can-inter 
national-law-regulate-autonomous-weapons/.  
15.  See Chris Pash, The World’s Top Artificial Intelligence Companies are 
Pleading for a Ban on Killer Robots, BUS. INSIDER AUSTL. (Aug. 21, 2017, 
12:01AM), goo.gl/emD37e (reprinting the text of An Open Letter to the United 
Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, signed by 116 CEOs of AI 
research companies, including over 20 American companies).  The letter states in part: 
“Lethal autonomous weapons threaten to become the third revolution in warfare. . . . 
We therefore implore the High Contracting Parties to find a way to protect us all from 
these dangers.” Id. 
7
Brobst: The Metal Eye:  Ethical Regulation of the State’s Use of Surveill
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2019
FINAL Brobst camera ready (Do Not Delete) 1/8/2019  10:36 AM 
8 CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55 
their AI research to military purposes.16  Google’s contract with the 
U.S. Department of Defense reportedly “worked extensively to develop 
machine learning algorithms for the Pentagon, with the goal of creating 
a sophisticated system that could surveil entire cities.”17 
In the United States, state and federal departments of correction and 
mental health facilities increasingly incorporate and rely on security 
technology to maintain order and ensure the safety of confined 
prisoners and patients.  Prison guards use aerial drones to supervise and 
record the activities of prisoners.18  Psychiatrists conduct telehealth 
assessment and diagnosis of prisoners in multiple facilities from a 
single office computer.19  AI video alert systems monitor the hallways 
                                                          
16.  See Kate Conger, Google Plans Not to Renew Its Contract for Project 
Maven, a Controversial Pentagon Drone AI Imaging Program, GIZMODO (June 1, 
2018, 2:38 PM), goo.gl/JvouXn (noting that Google’s decision followed thousands of 
signatures and dozens of resignations by Google employees in protest against the 
company’s involvement in the military contract). 
17.  Id.  See also Jack Schofield, Pentagon Delays Disputed JEDI Cloud 
Contract, ZDNET (May 31, 2018, 22:47 GMT), https://www.zdnet.com/article/ 
pentagon-delays-disputed-jedi-cloud-contract/ (discussing a potential $10 billion 
cloud computing federal defense contract with Amazon and other private tech 
companies); Samuel Gibbs, Google’s AI is Being Used by US Military Drone 
Programme, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 7, 2018, 06:11 EST), https://www.theguardian. 
com/technology/2018/mar/07/google-ai-us-department-of-defense-military-drone-
project-maven-tensorflow (revealing that while Google does not currently use its 
cloud-computing technology to hold classified information for the U.S. government, 
both Amazon and Microsoft are contracted to provide such services). 
18.  See Meg Kinnard, South Carolina Plans to Use Drones to Remotely Watch 
Inmates, US NEWS (May 24, 2018, 2:16 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-
states/south-carolina/articles/2018-05-24/sc-prisons-embrace-drones-to-keep-
remote-eye-on-inmates; see generally Public Safety Drones: An Update, CTR. FOR 
THE STUDY OF THE DRONE, BARD COLLEGE (May 28, 2018), available at 
http://dronecenter.bard.edu/public-safety-drones-update/ (reporting an 82% increase 
in public safety drone acquisition in the United States from 2017 to 2018, including 
at least 910 state and local police, sheriff, fire, and emergency services agencies); cf. 
Darlene Ricker, Taking Flight: Navigating Drone Laws Has Become a Growing and 
Lucrative Legal Niche, ABA J. 56, 58 (July 2017) (reporting that as of February 2018, 
there were 49,857 commercial drone operators and 664,688 hobbyist drone operators 
registered with the Federal Aviation Administration, which represents approximately 
1.6 million drones in the private sector). 
19.  See generally U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST., REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF 
PRISONS’ USE OF RESTRICTIVE HOUSING FOR INMATES WITH MENTAL ILLNESS 46 
(July 2017) [hereinafter DOJ RESTRICTIVE HOUSING], available at https://www.over 
sight.gov/sites/default/files/oig-reports/e1705.pdf; Human Rights at Home: Mental 
8
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at night outside bedrooms in mental health facilities to identify potential 
physical assaults or self-harm.20  Several states statutorily authorize 
constant video surveillance of nursing home residents’ rooms, with 
their consent or that of their guardians.21  Many of these measures cut 
costs by reducing the need for human staffing.22 
For the public at large, privacy interests are embodied in common 
law and statutory law,23 with additional protections found in the shifting 
penumbra of constitutional rights.24  Those subject to state confinement 
                                                          
Illness in U.S. Prisons and Jails, S. Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Human 
Rights and the Law and the Committee on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 4-5 (Sept. 15, 
2009) (statement of Harley G. Lappin, Director, Federal Bur. of Prisons), available at 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/testimonies/witnesses/attach 
ments/2009/09/15/2009-09-15-bop-lappin-mental-illness.pdf. 
20.  Whether to approve a remote surveillance system in the hallways of a 
juvenile facility in lieu of a human seated near the residents’ rooms at night was an 
issue voted upon during the author’s term as Chair of the Rules Committee of the state 
administrative body, The North Carolina Commission for Mental Health, Substance 
Abuse, and Developmental Disabilities between 2008 and 2012.   
21.  See, e.g., Authorized Electronic Monitoring in Long-Term Care Facilities 
Act, Pub. L. No. 99-430, 210 ILL. COMP. STAT. 32 (effective Jan. 1, 2016) (authorizing 
resident or guardian’s consent to constant private bedroom surveillance); see also 
Nat’l Ctr. on Elder Abuse et al., Fact Sheet, Balancing Privacy and Protection: 
Surveillance Cameras in Nursing Home Residents’ Rooms, available at 
http://ltcombudsman.org/uploads/files/issues/cv-ncea-surveillance-factsheet-web.pdf  
(last visited Dec. 3, 2018) (identifying Illinois, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas, and 
Washington as states that had laws by 2017 that permit the installation of cameras in 
nursing home residents’ rooms, with their consent). 
22.  See, e.g., Nat’l Law Enforcement & Corr. Tech. Ctr., Camera System Stems 
Prison Violence, Saves $$$, TECHBEAT (Spring 2011) (opting for a new prison video 
surveillance system in Oklahoma City for $384,000 in lieu of hiring 200 additional 
prison guards at a cost of $10 million per year in wages and benefits), available at 
https://www.justnet.org/interactivetechbeat/spring_2011/camerasystem.pdf; Meera 
Narasimhan, Data Driven Decisions and Outcomes in Telepsychiatry, AM. PSYCH. 
ASS’N.: TELEPSYCHIATRY BLOG (Feb. 26, 2018), https://www.psychiatry.org/ 
psychiatrists/practice/telepsychiatry/blog/data-driven-decisions-and-outcomes-in-
telepsychiatry (noting that telepsychiatry “is the more cost-effective option”). 
23.  See generally OSCAR H. GANDY, JR., THE PANOPTIC SORT: A POLITICAL 
ECONOMY OF PERSONAL INFORMATION 184-85 (1993) (discussing the American 
development of privacy-related tort claims in the context of technology and 
surveillance, including intrusion into seclusion, false light publicity, and appropriation 
of likeness or name). 
24.  The “shadows cast by a variety of provisions in the Bill of Rights,” Whalen 
v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598 n.23 (1977), reflect what has come to be known as the zone 
9
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also have constitutional and statutory privacy rights, as well as common 
law parens patriae protections, all requiring consideration of legitimate 
governmental interests.25  Rapidly changing technologies offer greater 
facility and breadth of surveillance, while the biology of the human 
species, with its essential mental and physical needs, remains relatively 
static, evolving gradually.26  The pressures of technological change 
place a toll on humanity’s well-being, particularly when the balance of 
personal and governmental interests does not sufficiently respect the 
realities of what level of autonomy our species inherently needs to 
thrive. 
Autonomy in navigating both privacy and social interaction are 
essential to human well-being and the fulfillment of human potential.  
As Justice Douglas observed, “[p]rivacy involves the choice of the 
individual to disclose or to reveal what he believes, what he thinks, what 
he possesses.”27  Privacy and social interaction mutually reinforce each 
                                                          
of privacy in a penumbra of privacy rights in the U.S. Constitution.  See also Warden 
v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 324 (1967) (“these penumbral rights of privacy and 
repose”); Matter of Welfare of Colyer, 600 P.2d 738, 741-42 (Wash. 1983) (“The 
United States Supreme Court has identified a right of privacy emanating from the 
penumbra of the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights and from the language of the 
First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments.”). 
25.  See, e.g., Price v. Sheppard, 239 N.W.2d 905, 911 (Minn. 1976) (addressing 
the state as parens patriae in examining its authority to administer electroshock 
therapy to treat an involuntarily committed minor patient without his natural 
guardian’s consent), superseded by statute as stated in In re Civil Commitment of 
Raboin, 704 N.W. 2d 767 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005). 
26.  See generally Peter Ward, What May Become of Homo Sapiens, SCI. AM., 
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/what-may-become-of-homo-sapiens/ 
(last visited Dec. 3, 2018) (outlining the differing views of causation for continuing, 
but gradual, human evolution, including technological impact, gene drift, and genetic 
engineering); see also HUXLEY, supra note 1, at 8 (“The sciences of matter can be 
applied in such a way that they will destroy life or make the living of it impossibly 
complex and uncomfortable; but, unless used as instruments by the biologists and 
psychologists, they can do nothing to modify the natural forms and expressions of life 
itself.” (Preface to the 1946 edition)); Clive Norris et al., Algorithmic Surveillance: 
The Future of Automated Visual Surveillance, in SURVEILLANCE, CLOSED CIRCUIT 
TELEVISION AND SOCIAL CONTROL 255, 259 (Clive Norris et al. eds., 1998) (“The cost 
of autonomy and privacy lies not so much in the growth of surveillance but in its 
changing form: from the local and intimate, based on personal knowledge and 
mutuality of associations, towards the impersonal, the standardised and the 
bureaucratic.”). 
27.  Warden, 387 U.S. at 323 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
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other, allowing a person to safely choose and resist social interactions.  
As psychological research demonstrates, humans despair from too 
much of either: from loneliness and isolation, and from lack of privacy 
and difficulty in creating a self-identity.28 
Surveillance technology, including AI applications, presents new 
opportunities to undermine humanity’s basic need for autonomy, 
human social interaction, and privacy.  It is not a disruptive technology, 
a technology which inadvertently happens to cause social disruption, 
but rather it is a technology designed to disrupt.29  From a cynical 
perspective, commercial and governmental interests seek to convince 
the public that loss of privacy is inevitable because technology too 
easily invades our privacy or because this invasion is needed to protect 
society from unseen attacks.  They do so to financially profit from the 
sale and development of security technology or to better monitor and 
control individual behavior for political purposes. 
This is nothing new.  When restricting state use of eavesdropping 
devices on the public to detect crime in Berger v. New York in 1967, the 
Supreme Court implied that profit motives foster technological 
innovation in spying: “Since 1940 eavesdropping has become a big 
business. Manufacturing concerns offer complete detection systems 
which automatically record voices under almost any conditions by 
remote control.”30  More recently, sociologist Barry Glassner noted just 
prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks:  “The short answer to why Americans 
harbor so many misbegotten fears is that immense power and money 
await those who tap into our moral insecurities and supply us with 
symbolic substitutes.”31  According to Glassner, symbolic substitutes 
are the bogeymen of commercial and media alarm, manipulating 
anecdotal incidents and statistically unsupported risks to further 
powerful interests at the expense of societal interests.32  Surveillance 
                                                          
28.  See infra Part IV(A). 
29.  See generally CYRUS FARIVAR, HABEAS DATA: PRIVACY VS. THE RISE OF 
SURVEILLANCE TECH (2018) (addressing the legal history of increasing state 
surveillance on private citizens).  
30.  Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 47 (1967). 
31.  BARRY GLASSNER, THE CULTURE OF FEAR: WHY AMERICANS ARE AFRAID 
OF THE WRONG THINGS xxviii (1999). 
32.  See generally id. (providing examples of general alarm over unfounded 
perceived trends, such as road rage and violent crime despite clear evidence of low 
numbers and a decrease over time, respectively). 
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technology manufacturers admit as much:  “Every unfortunate event we 
hear about, whether it’s cyber-related or just flat out terrorism, these are 
drivers for our business. It’s unfortunate that they are and that they 
happen, but they do drive this industry and this market.”33 
If the technology industry can create invasive and intrusive 
technology, it can certainly craft technology with better privacy 
protections if properly motivated.34  In the 1800s, when privacy of 
written communications was not practically assured, public approval 
for the innovations of envelopes and locks on mail bags compelled 
Congress to enact statutory protections for the privacy of the postal 
service.35  Such efforts resulted in paper mail receiving greater legal 
privacy protections today than digital information.36  Technological 
innovation and legal privacy protections can be and have been 
compatible.  For this to occur, however, the American legal system 
must fulfill its obligation to enforce existing protections of the 
autonomy rights of individuals in the face of commercial and 
governmental interests intent on overreaching. 
To illuminate how existing legal tenets identify and enforce privacy 
rights, it is critical to examine the contexts where individual privacy 
rights are already most suppressed under American law:  the arena of 
persons in civil and criminal state confinement.  The use of technology 
to constantly monitor humans in confinement without their consent 
presupposes a legitimate purpose of public health and safety pursuant 
to state police power and other common law doctrines.37  More constant 
                                                          
33.  Tim A. Scally, State of the Market: Video Surveillance 2018, SDM MAG. 
(Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.sdmmag.com/articles/94822-state-of-the-market-video-
surveillance-2018.  
34. See, e.g., Alice Gregory, This Startup Wants to Neutralize Your Phone – And 
Un-Change the World, WIRED (Jan. 16, 2018, 06:00 AM), https://www.wired.com 
/story/free-speech-issue-yondr-smartphones/ (designing data suppressive neoprene 
bags to lock and store cellphones in hospitals, schools, and churches, and at events in 
order to limit unauthorized recording and distracting use).  
35.  REGAN, supra note 3, at 46-47. 
36.  See Matthew J. Tokson, The Content/Envelope Distinction in Internet Law, 
50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2105, 2112 (2009). 
37.  See Wiseman v. Massachusetts, 398 U.S. 960, 963 (1970) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting from denial of certiorari) (quoting with approval the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court which held that the public interest in viewing recordings of 
patient abuses at the Bridgewater State Hospital for the criminally insane “outweighs 
12
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monitoring is arguably warranted based on the lesser right to autonomy 
and privacy of persons who are subject to court-ordered confinement 
for the protection of themselves or others, but is facing a reexamination 
in the courts. 
This article begins by introducing in Section I the legal recognition 
of the basic human need for autonomy in navigating privacy and social 
interactions, including its origins in natural law, adoption in 
international human rights, and emerging statutory and regulatory 
frameworks in the United States.  Section II examines how and to what 
degree the courts have recognized the essential human and societal need 
for individual privacy and social interaction, with a focus on common 
law doctrines, as well as state and federal constitutional protections of 
the autonomy rights of persons in state confinement.  Section III 
outlines the comparative state interests when infringing on the 
individual autonomy rights of confined persons in prisons and medical 
settings, including identification of interests common to all institutional 
settings.  Finally, Section IV addresses the need for courts to realign the 
balance of these interests in light of emerging psychological research 
which reveals the continued importance of individual privacy with 
respect to technological innovation facilitating constant surveillance. 
I.  LEGAL RECOGNITION OF THE BASIC HUMAN NEED FOR AUTONOMY 
IN NAVIGATING PRIVACY AND SOCIAL CONTACT 
Privacy has a long history of legal and cultural protection and is 
deemed essential to human and social well-being.38  Apart from 
constitutional provisions, legal recognition of individual privacy 
interests arise in a myriad of state and federal contexts, such as 
privileges of confidentiality,39 cyberstalking criminal statutes,40 
                                                          
any countervailing interests of the inmates and of the Commonwealth 
(as parens patriae) in anonymity and privacy”). 
38.  See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 386 (1960) (“at the 
present time the right of privacy, in one form or another, is declared to exist by the 
overwhelming majority of the American courts”). 
39.  E.g., Paxton v. City of Dallas, 509 S.W.3d 247, 270 (Tex. 2017) (upholding 
the attorney-client privilege as well established and enduring “because the systemic 
harm from denying it is real even if it is not quantifiable”). 
40.  See generally Jennifer A. Brobst, The Modern Penny Dreadful: Public 
Prosecution and the Need for Litigation Privacy in a Digital Age, 96 NEB. L. REV. 
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invasion of privacy torts,41 informational privacy protections,42 medical 
and genetic privacy regulations,43 and exemptions to sunshine laws.44  
These privacy interests are held by all persons, whether confined in 
state institutions or living at large in society.  Among these, the primary 
focus of this article is the observational right to be let alone,45 which 
includes the right not to be touched, seen, heard, or watched without 
consent.46  This essential right has been protected since the founding of 
                                                          
281 (2017) (addressing the rise of online stalking methods and limitations on public 
prosecution to protect the privacy of victims). 
41.  E.g., McConnell v. Georgia Dept. of Labor, 814 S.E.2d 790, 799 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 2018) (public disclosure of private facts and negligent disclosure of personal 
information class action).  “[I]t may seem surprising that our legislature has so far not 
acted to establish a standard of conduct intended to protect the security of 
personal information, as some other jurisdictions have done in connection with data 
protection and data breach notification laws.”  Id.; see id. at 799 n.16 (listing 
numerous state jurisdictions that have enacted data protection privacy laws). 
42.  See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977) (“the individual interest 
in avoiding disclosure of personal matters”); Mick Mulvaney, Memorandum for the 
Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. 
PRESIDENT (Feb. 27, 2018) (explaining the cybersecurity provisions of the federal 
Modernizing Government Technology Act (signed into law Dec. 12, 2017)), available 
at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/M-18-12.pdf. See 
generally Julie E Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as 
Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373 (2000). 
43. E.g., Higgins v. Sommerville Hosp., No. 914748, 1994 WL 903009 (Mass. 
Super. Ct. 1994) (interpreting a state statute which defined as public record the 
identity of patients with some types of sexually transmitted infections but not others); 
see also Barbara Zabawa, FDA Regulation of mHealth and Wellness Devices: What 
You Need to Know, 30 ABA: THE HEALTH LAW. 38, 38 (Dec. 2017) (addressing the 
complexity of federal and state regulation, including HIPAA privacy regulations, once 
a wellness tracking personal device enters the realm of diagnosis and treatment).  
44.  E.g., Tennessean v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 485 S.W.3d 857 (Tenn. 
2016) (strictly construing the applicable public records exemption when denying 
newspaper defendants’ access to the criminal investigative case file in a sexual assault 
prosecution); MONT. CONST. art. II, § 9 (“No person shall be deprived of the right to 
examine documents . . ., except in cases in which the demand of individual privacy 
clearly exceeds the merits of public disclosure.”). 
45.  See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. 
L. REV. 193, 193 (1890) (asserting that the broadening of common law legal rights 
now includes “the right to be let alone”). 
46.  See, e.g., Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144, 145 (7th Cir. 1995) 
(distinguishing between visual and tactile inspections, and classifying both as a form 
of search under the Fourth Amendment). 
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the United States, promoting the “sanctity of a man’s home and the 
privacies of life.”47  Indeed, the Court has connected these interests to 
“the very essence of constitutional liberty and security.”48 
A.  The Ability to Respond to Intrusions on Privacy 
While the need for and interest in privacy have remained constant, 
the ease of intrusion has changed in substantial and varied ways over 
time.  In 1963, Chief Justice Warren wrote in Lopez v. United States: 
[T]he fantastic advances in the field of electronic communication 
constitute a great danger to the privacy of the individual; that 
indiscriminate use of such devices in law enforcement raises grave 
constitutional questions under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments; 
and that these considerations impose a heavier responsibility on this 
Court in its supervision of the fairness of procedures in the federal 
court system. However, I do not believe that, as a result, all uses of 
such devices should be proscribed either as unconstitutional or as 
unfair law enforcement methods.49 
Perhaps because the value of privacy has often been taken for granted, 
the Court has not consistently felt the need to express its essential value 
to humanity; yet, the increasing intrusiveness of surveillance 
technology should compel the Court to underscore more fully why 
privacy requires robust protections in the law.50 
Over time, a focus on the individual right to privacy in certain 
contexts, rather than a general right to privacy, has emerged in the 
                                                          
47.  Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (addressing Fourth 
Amendment privacy protections).  See also Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 
473 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“Ways may some day [sic] be developed by 
which the Government, without removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce 
them in court, and by which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate 
occurrences of the home.”). 
48. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630. 
49. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 441 (1963) (Warren, C.J., 
concurring). 
50.  Of course, the oft-cited 1890 law review article by Samuel Warren and 
Louis Brandeis, concerned with the emergence of photojournalism, connected 
“modern enterprise and invention” with a negative rights common law concept of 
invasion of privacy and the “right to be let alone.”  See Warren & Brandeis, supra 
note 45, at 193. 
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United States,51 as well as a new understanding that the time for 
regulatory measures has come.  U.S. Representative Greg Walden, 
Chair of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, stated in 
response to a question about regulating the technology industry: “If 
responsibility doesn’t flow, then regulation will.”52 
The European Union (“EU”) has taken the lead in moving forward 
legal strategies to protect consumer privacy in a digital age, strategies 
which may influence and further support American interest in 
individual privacy protections.  In January 2018, a tech reporter for The 
Irish Times noted that 2017 had been the year of media focus on AI, 
while 2018 would be the year of privacy: 
Thanks to widespread heavy social media use, data breaches, US 
threats to demand account passwords from travellers, concerns about 
secretive state-run surveillance, some US and EU critical court cases 
and a consequent acceleration in popular awareness, the general 
public and the business world have never been as aware of privacy 
issues as they are now.53 
On May 25, 2018, the EU rolled out its General Data Protection 
Regulation (“GDPR”), which contains more robust compliance 
enforcement provisions, including the potential for millions of euros in 
                                                          
51.  See, e.g., Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstadt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016) 
(enforcing the right to abortion against undue burdens imposed by state law); Whalen 
v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (right to individual privacy in choice on important matters 
and to informational privacy); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right to individual 
privacy and reproductive choice in abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) 
(right to individual privacy and reproductive choice in contraception); Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right to marital privacy and reproductive choice).  
See generally REGAN, supra note 3, at 39-40 (discussing the transition in American 
jurisprudence from privacy interests and civil liberties, to individual privacy rights in 
the 1960s and 1970s). 
52.  Nancy Scola, Tech Scrambles to Shape U.S. Privacy Debate as EU Rules 
Loom, POLITICO (May 25, 2018, 05:09 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018 
/05/25/tech-privacy-debate-us-eu-rules-565741. 
53.  Karlin Lillington, Privacy and Security will be the Big Tech Stories of 2018, 
THE IRISH TIMES (Jan. 4, 2018, 05:15 AM), https://www.irishtimes.com/business/ 
technology/privacy-and-security-will-be-the-big-tech-stories-of-2018-1.3344154. 
See also Scola, supra note 52; Leonid Bershidsky, Tech Underestimates Future 
Demand for Privacy, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 31, 2017, 8:07 AM), https://www.bloom 
berg.com/view/articles/2017-03-31/the-tech-industry-underestimates-the-future-
demand-for-privacy.   
16
California Western Law Review, Vol. 55 [2019], No. 1, Art. 2
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol55/iss1/2
FINAL Brobst camera ready (Do Not Delete) 1/8/2019  10:36 AM 
2018] THE METAL EYE  17 
fines for American companies that do not comply and enforcement in 
in the European Court of Justice if necessary.54 
The current efforts to regulate the intrusiveness of technology 
require a clear understanding of the interests involved.  When balancing 
state and individual interests, the U.S. Supreme Court has articulated 
the value of legal privacy protections as a means of defending against 
state tyranny, a threat articulated in the Declaration of Independence 
and founded on Locke’s ideals of the social compact.55  In a democracy, 
citizens bear the burden of self-protection from state tyranny.  The 
Declaration of Independence addresses when the people have a right 
“to provide new Guards for their future security.”56 That is, security 
against a ruling power’s “long train of abuses and usurpations.”57  In a 
modern context, addressing the legality of federal surveillance of 
domestic political organizations, the Court noted:  “Its resolution is a 
matter of national concern, requiring sensitivity both to the 
Government’s right to protect itself from unlawful subversion and 
attack and to the citizen’s right to be secure in his privacy against 
unreasonable Government intrusion.”58 
                                                          
54.  See Nancy Harris, A Practical Guide to the European Union’s GDPR for 
American Businesses, RECODE (May 16, 2018, 2:00 EDT), https://www.recode.net/ 
2018/5/16/17360944/gdpr-us-business-eu-european-union-data-protection-privacy; 
2018 Reform of EU Data Protection Rules, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, https://ec. 
europa.eu/commission/priorities/justice-and-fundamental-rights/data-protection/201 
8-reform-eu-data-protection-rules_en (last visited Dec. 3, 2018); GDPR Portal: Site 
Overview, EUGDPR.ORG, https://www.eugdpr.org/ (last visited Dec. 3, 2018).   
55.  See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 888 n.32 (2010) (referring 
to Blackstone and Locke for the proposition that one grants to the state duties of 
protection when joining civil society); Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633, 646 (1977) 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that the state must be empowered to establish 
order to protect individual liberty and freedom, as public protection “surely is at the 
core of the Lockean ‘social contract’ idea”); Texas v. United States, 300 F. Supp. 3d 
810, 841 (N.D. Tex. 2018) (addressing Locke’s and Blackstone’s concept of 
separation of powers as “not merely convenient in avoiding tyranny, but a necessary 
feature of any government ruled by laws [] not men”). 
56.  THE DECL. INDEP., para. 2 (1776).  See also id. at para. 30 (“A prince, whose 
character is thus marked by every act which may define a Tyrant, is unfit to be the 
ruler of a free people.”). 
57.  Id. at para. 2.  
58.  United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct. E. Dist. Mich., So. Div., 407 U.S. 297, 299 
(1972). 
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Some citizens have more power and skill to resist tyranny than 
others.  In 2016, after the Illinois legislature approved the optional law 
enforcement use of body cameras, the police department of Minooka 
opted in and then opted out of its use following reportedly excessive 
public information requests by suspects and their lawyers for video 
footage.59  Freedom of information laws thus helped protect privacy 
interests and served as a practical deterrent to ubiquitous surveillance 
by law enforcement when implemented by a cadre of legally 
represented individuals. 
Even single individuals may resist tyranny in the form of 
surveillance effectively.  In November 2017, Ricardo Palacios, an 
attorney and rancher in Texas happened upon a portable camera 
strapped by the government to a mesquite tree on his son’s private 
property.60  He sued the U.S. Customs and Border Protection Agency 
that threatened to arrest him after he removed their camera, accusing 
the government of trespass and “1984-style” constitutional violations.61  
The camera, one of allegedly thousands of low-cost, commercially-
available cameras placed near the border, was in constant use and 
purportedly provided information to federal, state, and local 
authorities.62  In addition to the camera, the complaint alleged that 
“Plaintiffs have encountered agents of U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP) going onto their land, at will, day and night, without 
any warrant or legal authority, without landowner consent, over 
landowners’ objection, and without exigent circumstances that would 
permit such intrusions upon private property, and roaming freely 
about.”63  One of the Plaintiff’s attorneys stated publicly the importance 
                                                          
59.  Tom Boggioni, Illinois Police Department Gives Up on Body Cameras 
Because They’re Tired of People Asking for Videos, ALTERNET (Apr. 13, 2016, 7:00 
AM), https://www.alternet.org/civil-liberties/illinois-police-department-gives-body-
cameras-because-theyre-tired-people-asking.  
60.  Cyrus Farivar, Man Removes Feds’ Spy Cam, They Demand It Back, He 
Refuses and Sues, ARS TECHNICA (Feb. 22, 2018, 3:00 AM), https://arstechnica. 
com/tech-policy/2018/02/rancher-finds-creepy-and-un-american-spy-cam-tied-to-
his-tree-sues-feds.  
61.  Id.; see Plaintiffs’ Original Complaint for General, Injunctive & 
Declaratory Judgement, Palacios v. Martinez, No. 5:17-cv-00244, 2017 WL 5903421 
(S.D. Tex. Nov. 29, 2017) (filing claims for common law and criminal trespass, as 
well as a Bivens action for Fourth Amendment violations). 
62.  Farivar, supra note 60. 
63.  Plaintiffs’ Original Complaint, supra note 61, at para. 15. 
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of protecting against government action without probable cause and 
consent:  “And if you all are going to keep doing that, you’re going to 
have to pay for it.  It’s called the right to be left alone.  That’s what the 
Fourth Amendment is all about.”64 
Confined prisoners and patients often have less capacity and fewer 
means to follow in the steps of Ricardo Palacios when asserting their 
right to observational privacy.  Legal guardians of state nursing home 
residents may wish to fight privacy intrusions on behalf of their loved 
ones, but they face enormous financial hurdles in pursuing civil 
litigation, in addition to affording residential care.65  Indigent prisoners 
may be eligible for public legal assistance, but penological interests in 
order and safety in the prison setting weigh heavily in favor of the 
state.66  In mental health institutions caring for involuntarily committed 
patients, policies addressing the best interests of patients as well as 
serious security concerns may not weigh in favor of respecting 
autonomy.67 
All of these groups of confined persons are particularly vulnerable 
to acts of tyranny.  In Wiseman v. Massachusetts, Justice Douglas 
argued in his dissent that the public interest in being informed about 
egregious patient abuses at the Bridgewater State Hospital for the 
criminally insane “outweighs any countervailing interests of the 
inmates and of the Commonwealth (as parens patriae) in anonymity and 
privacy.”68  Here, notably, the remedy for one privacy intrusion is 
another privacy intrusion.  In institutional settings, a history of accepted 
state surveillance, along with advances in surveillance technology, risk 
an even more intrusive environment for vulnerable persons than state 
efforts to surveil open spaces and the public at large, regardless of the 
prevalence of traffic cameras and business surveillance.69 
                                                          
64.  Farivar, supra note 60. 
65.  See, e.g., Kaley Johnson, The Metro-East has Some of Illinois’ Worst 
Nursing Homes, Data Says.  Here’s Why., BELLEVILLE NEWS-DEMOCRAT (May 10, 
2018, 10:48 AM), http://www.bnd.com/news/local/article209570444.html. 
66.  See infra Part III(B). 
67.  See infra Part III(C). 
68.  Wiseman v. Massachusetts, 398 U.S. 960, 962-63 (1970) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting). 
69.  Michael McCahill, Beyond Foucault: Towards a Contemporary Theory of 
Surveillance, in SURVEILLANCE, CLOSED CIRCUIT TELEVISION AND SOCIAL CONTROL 
41, 45 (Clive Norris et al. eds., 1998) (distinguishing public surveillance, which 
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In state confinement today, Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon comes 
to life.  Whether it is a prison or a mental hospital or a nursing home, 
“[t]he perfect disciplinary apparatus would make it possible for a single 
gaze to see everything constantly. . . . a perfect eye that nothing would 
escape and a centre towards which all gazes would be turned.”70 
B.  Natural Law and the Fight Against State Tyranny 
While state surveillance has solidly justifiable purposes, 
particularly in ensuring security and safety,71 arbitrary surveillance – 
surveillance run amok – is a longstanding form of tyranny.  History is 
rife with examples of nations implementing surveillance techniques to 
achieve unlawful and abhorrent political goals:  the Nazi occupation,72 
the Cold War Eastern bloc under Communist rule,73 South African 
apartheid.74  Even prior to the digital age, technology companies such 
as IBM were reportedly involved in facilitating massive data collection 
and population control through cooperative agreements with Nazi 
Germany and South Africa.75  More recently, in 2015, the Lucknow 
                                                          
observes unknown persons in an uncontrolled space, where a state reaction to 
observed misconduct is less easily responded to than surveillance in confined, 
controlled settings). 
70.  MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 
173 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995). 
71.  See infra Part III(A). 
72.  See Forum: Surveillance in German History, 34 GERMAN HISTORY 293, 
306 (2016) (providing a transcript of an academic forum on the historical complexities 
of the rise of mass surveillance in nation-state building, including its use in Nazi 
Germany as a means of terror and genocide).  
73.  See VALENTINA GLASJAR ET AL., SECRET POLICE FILES FROM THE EASTERN 
BLOC: BETWEEN SURVEILLANCE AND LIFE WRITING (2016); see also MILAN 
KUNDERA, THE UNBEARABLE LIGHTNESS OF BEING (Michael Henry Heim trans., 
1984) (addressing the 1960s Czechoslovakian police state). 
74.  Michael Kwet, Cmore: South Africa’s New Smart Policing Surveillance 
Engine, COUNTERPUNCH.ORG (Jan. 27, 2017), https://www.counterpunch.org/20 
17/01/27/cmore-south-africas-new-smart-policing-surveillance-engine/  (addressing 
cyber-policing for crowd control in post-apartheid South Africa, including “[f]acial 
recognition CCTV cameras on the streets, UAV surveillance, and vast data collections 
used for predictive policing”). 
75.  See EDWIN BLACK, IBM AND THE HOLOCAUST: THE STRATEGIC ALLIANCE 
BETWEEN NAZI GERMANY AND AMERICA’S MOST POWERFUL CORPORATION (2000); 
Michael Kwet, Apartheid in the Shadows: the USA, IBM, and South Africa’s Digital 
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police of Uttar Pradesh, India, demonstrated drones that can be used to 
pepper spray an “unruly mob,” which they asserted was “less harsh than 
a baton charge.”76 
Beneficent uses of technology, science and medicine have a way of 
being coopted, or some might say corrupted, for other purposes.  In the 
United States, the packbot, a mobile robot first designed by the 
company iRobot twenty years ago, has saved numerous lives in search 
and rescue, law enforcement, and military bomb-defusing 
applications.77  In 2016, in a police stand-off in Dallas, a similar robot 
was weaponized and used for the first government-authorized robotic 
or drone killing of a person on American soil.78 
In this digital age, Amnesty International reports on unlawful 
government surveillance as a human rights violation.  For example, it 
has decried such violations in Uzbekistan, where the government has 
spied on its own citizens both within and beyond its borders.79  The 
concern, according to the Amnesty researchers, is that “[t]he 
Uzbekistani authorities have designed a system where surveillance and 
the expectation of surveillance is not the exception, but the 
norm.”80  “It’s an environment of constant fear for Uzbekistani people, 
where every phone call, every email and every text message might not 
                                                          
Police State, COUNTERPUNCH.ORG (May 3, 2017), https://www.counterpunch.org/ 
2017/05/03/apartheid-in-the-shadows-the-usa-ibm-and-south-africas-digital-police-
state/.  
76.  India: City Police to Use Pepper-Spray Drones, BBC.COM: NEWS FROM 
ELSEWHERE (Apr. 7, 2015), https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-news-from-elsewhere-
32202466 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
77.  Lester, supra note 14 (“They were used in 9/11 search-and-rescue efforts, 
during the manhunt for Dzhokhar Tsarnaev [the Boston Bomber], and in the 
Fukushima plant [nuclear disaster], rolling around in areas with radiation levels too 
high for human engineers.”). 
78.  Id. (“But that morning, the police attached a pound of C4 explosives to the 
robot’s extended arm, and sent it down the hallway where Johnson had barricaded 
himself. The bomb killed him instantly. The machine remained functional.”). 
79.  Uzbekistan: Tentacles of Mass Surveillance Spread Across Borders, 
AMNESTY INT’L (Mar. 31, 2017, 00:01 UTC), https://www.amnesty.org/en/ 
latest/news/2017/03/uzbekistan-tentacles-of-mass-surveillance-spread-across-
borders/.  
80.  Id. 
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be private. The restrictions that this places on people’s lives and 
freedoms are unbearable and unacceptable.”81 
In parts of the world without enforced individual rights or a 
separation of powers, police states emerge more easily.  In China, for 
example, Amnesty International reported that since a 2015 government 
crackdown on dissent, hundreds of human rights lawyers and activists 
have been arrested, had their homes raided, and been subject to constant 
surveillance as well as limits on their freedom of movement.82  
Members of the public detained at a bus checkpoint, suspected of civil 
unrest on the basis of Muslim ethnicity, are regularly subject to some 
of today’s most modern surveillance tools in roadside kiosks, including 
digital fingerprinting, iris-recognition scans, and a cradle device which 
downloads the bus passengers’ cellphone contents.83 
Thus, the risk of state surveillance enables tyranny today, as it has 
in the past, when, as in Foucault’s interpretation of the panopticon,84 
the fear of being surveilled escalates.  That is, tyranny occurs when 
those surveilled know they are surveilled, and that this monitoring 
brings the potential for additional coercive or disciplinary acts by the 
state.  In state institutional facilities in the United States, constant 
surveillance may lead to physical or chemical restraints or solitary 
confinement,85 as those who are confined well know.  Even without 
such physical restraints, Foucault would warn that fear alone 
repressives freedom of action and choice.  Americans are no exception 
                                                          
81.  Id. 
82.  China: Human Rights Lawyer Released on Bail Amid Relentless 
Crackdown, AMNESTY INT’L (May 10, 2017, 14:48 UTC), https://www.amnesty. 
org/en/latest/news/2017/05/china-human-rights-lawyer-released-on-bail-amid-
relentless-crackdown/.  
83.  China has Turned Xinjiang into a Police State Like No Other, ECONOMIST 
(May 31, 2018), https://www.economist.com/briefing/2018/05/31/china-has-turned-
xinjiang-into-a-police-state-like-no-other/ (describing hundreds of thousands of 
Uighur Muslim Chinese disappearing into re-education camps in Xinjiang Province 
after violent civil unrest). 
84.  See FOUCAULT, supra note 70, at 200 (discussing the negative social 
implications of Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon, the antithesis of the hidden dungeon, 
where a prison-like structure exists with a central tower that can see all of the inmates, 
but no prisoner can communicate with the tower or others and the prisoner never 
knows when he or she is being directly observed). 
85.  See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 460.114 (2017) (authorizing chemical restraints in 
state elder care facilities). 
22
California Western Law Review, Vol. 55 [2019], No. 1, Art. 2
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol55/iss1/2
FINAL Brobst camera ready (Do Not Delete) 1/8/2019  10:36 AM 
2018] THE METAL EYE  23 
to having to fight state action that ensures “visibility is a trap,”86 a trap 
designed to reduce the power that comes from autonomy of choice in 
human interactions.87 
Among developed nations, the United States is late to the table in 
adopting data protection laws.  It is the last to create a federal agency to 
enforce those laws; yet, through its relatively functional separation of 
powers it has emerged as a strong force in avoiding some of the 
surveillance state aspects of its sister nations.88  Sweden was the first 
nation, in 1973, to enact federal data protection laws.89 Even prior to 
the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, West Germany had developed the 
most protective data privacy legislation in the Western World, a model 
for later American and Canadian legal restrictions on mass 
surveillance.90 
Depriving a prisoner of privacy without consent may reach such 
levels of degradation as to constitute an international human rights 
violation, even torture.91  It is used as a form of social control in a police 
                                                          
86. See FOUCAULT, supra note 70, at 200.  
87. See RANDOLPH LEWIS, UNDER SURVEILLANCE: BEING WATCHED IN 
MODERN AMERICA 25 (2017) (reflecting on the novel KINDRED (2004) by Octavia 
Butler, in which constant scrutiny was used as a tool to enslave the protagonist, a 
modern Black woman from Los Angeles who travels back in time to the horrors of 
the ante-bellum South). 
88.  See JAMES MICHAEL, PRIVACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INTERNATIONAL 
AND COMPARATIVE STUDY, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO DEVELOPMENTS IN 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 81 (1994) (“The United States probably produces more 
privacy case law than any other common law jurisdiction.”); Mike Maguire, 
Restraining Big Brother? The Regulation of Surveillance in England and Wales, in 
SURVEILLANCE, CLOSED CIRCUIT TELEVISION AND SOCIAL CONTROL 229, 234 (Clive 
Norris et al. eds., 1998) (outlining the slow emergence of privacy legislation in the 
United Kingdom, particularly with regard to police surveillance). 
89.  DAVID H. FLAHERTY, PROTECTING PRIVACY IN SURVEILLANCE SOCIETIES: 
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, SWEDEN, FRANCE, CANADA, AND THE UNITED 
STATES 93 (1989) (providing a comparative legislative overview of privacy 
protections). 
90.  Id. at 21. 
91.  For example, The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms states in Article 8(1): “Everyone has the right to respect 
for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.”  The United Nations 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights more generally commits in its Preamble to 
“freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want . . . as the highest 
aspiration of the common people,” rights more specifically related to privacy under 
Article 3 (right to life, liberty, personal security), Article 5 (freedom from torture and 
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state, where armed military roam the streets and invade homes to cause 
terror.92  American courts are increasingly taking notice of the risk that 
deprivation of privacy and social isolation are deliberately used by the 
state to demean, control, and terrify.93  As the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals stated in 2017, “we, too, fear the Orwellian-style surveillance 
state that could emerge from unfettered government collection of 
personal data.”94 
In the United States, the judicial branch has served as a key force 
in elucidating the privacy rights and interests of individuals, particularly 
when the other branches of government have been reluctant to regulate 
the surveillance industry or governmental use of surveillance products.  
For example, in Carpenter v. United States, in 2018, the Supreme Court 
demonstrated its willingness to support individual privacy rights under 
the Fourth Amendment against state intrusion in the face of “the seismic 
shifts in digital technology that make possible the tracking of 
[individuals] . . . for years and years.”95  Some argue that overreliance 
on the judiciary for such a task results in a stinted approach: 
                                                          
degrading treatment), and Article 12 (freedom from interference with privacy, family, 
home and correspondence), among others, as well as Article 30 (freedom from state 
or personal interference in the above rights). 
92.  See Henry, supra note 2. 
93.  See Shilpa Jindia, Secret Surveillance and the Legacy of Torture have 
Paralyzed the USS Cole Bombing Trial at Guantánamo, THE INTERCEPT (Mar. 5, 
2018, 9:18 AM), https://theintercept.com/2018/03/05/guantanamo-trials-abd-al-
rahim-al-nashiri/ (reporting that defense lawyers of detainees in the Guantánamo Bay 
American military facility in Cuba could not proceed “for fear of [American] 
government surveillance”); Denver Nicks, Government Spying Hurts Journalists and 
Lawyers, Report Says, TIME (July 28, 2014, 4:51 PM), http://time.com/3048380 
/government-spying-hurts-journalists-and-lawyers-report-says/ (reporting on U.S. 
National Security Administration efforts to weaken public cybersecurity development 
to better enable surveillance of the American public, including targeted surveillance 
of lawyers and journalists who fear for the safety of their clients and sources). 
94.  United States v. Thompson, 866 F.3d 1149, 1159 (10th Cir. 2017) 
(dismissing dicta in Supreme Court precedent that technological innovation might 
diminish expectations of privacy).  See also Richards v. County of Los Angeles, 775 
F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1184 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (holding that a state employer secretly 
videotaping employees without their knowledge or consent violated the Fourth 
Amendment and “goes against the grain of our strong anti-Orwellian traditions”). 
95.  Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219 (2018). 
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Although the courts may be a natural venue for resolving legal 
questions, they provide a poor locus for policy making about issues 
of technological change and privacy because they deal with 
individual-level disputes and because their legal analysis is likely to 
reemphasize the individual character of the rights at issue rather than 
exploring the social implications.96 
However, the individual nature of the right to privacy is where the 
importance of privacy begins, even if privacy is essential to societal 
well-being.  Natural law and its influence on the American Bill of 
Rights conceptually reflect this.  Rather than merely atomizing the need 
for privacy, the privacy discourse in case law repeatedly discusses the 
role of the individual in society and the mutually reinforcing concept 
that society’s protection of the individual is protective of society itself. 
Autonomy, privacy, and the need for human contact as a social 
species are ancient values.  Natural law suggests a common thread of 
human need that is so inextricably intertwined with the human 
experience that it is endowed with lawful authority, whether or not it is 
expressly stated in a book of laws.97  Yet natural law, much like the 
fading of the Titans,98 has been battered in the storms of time, 
eventually replaced by the sharper edges of scientific and medical 
understanding.99 
                                                          
96.  REGAN, supra note 3, at 41. 
97.  See MARY ANN GLENDON, THE FORUM AND THE TOWER: HOW SCHOLARS 
AND POLITICIANS HAVE IMAGINED THE WORLD, FROM PLATO TO ELEANOR 
ROOSEVELT 21 (2011) (explaining that Plato’s The Laws averred that there are 
“recurrent processes of human knowing by which the laws can be tested, evaluated, 
and improved, always with a view toward ‘the freedom, unity and wisdom of the 
city’”). 
98.  See Velvet Yates, The Titanic Origin of Humans: The Melian Nymphs and 
Zagreus, 44 GREEK, ROMAN & BYZANTINE STUDIES 183, 191-92 (2004) (identifying 
the role of the mythological Titans who violently created the many Greek gods from 
the one ruling deity, after which Zeus, one of the many, ultimately punished and 
destroyed the Titans by incinerating them with thunder and lightning, resulting in the 
birth of mankind “from their ashes”). 
99.  See, e.g., RONALD NIEZEN, PUBLIC JUSTICE AND THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF 
LAW 36 (2010) (inferring that the international human rights movement is a product 
of the politics of indignation, a reaction to the state as perpetrator rather than deserving 
of patriotism); Oliver Wendell Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARV. 
L. REV. 443, 452 (1918) (“The true science of the law does not consist mainly in a 
theological working out of dogma or a logical development as in mathematics, or only 
25
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The English philosopher and physician John Locke “taught that 
men establish governments to protect their natural rights to life, liberty, 
and property.”100  Globally, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
adopted Article 12 in 1948, recognized humanity’s common concerns 
with individual privacy rights, asserting that “no one shall be subjected 
to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home, or 
correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation.”101  All 
of these concepts are bound up with freedom and autonomy. As Bloch 
argued, “[t]o be free means that a person is not imposed upon from the 
outside,” or at least has a choice and a will with respect to human, 
environmental, and other causal pressures.102 
Whereas the glorified American Declaration of Independence and 
its language of inalienable rights has been criticized for its overly 
aspirational and nebulous statements,103 it does still inspire an effort in 
legal discourse to define the rights that are owed, because it assumes 
that some inalienable, inherent rights exist and that government has a 
                                                          
in a study of it as an anthropological document from the outside; an even more 
important part consists in the establishment of its postulates from within upon 
accurately measured social desires instead of tradition.”); Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. REV. 40, 41 (1918) (“The jurists who believe in natural law 
seem to me to be in that naïve state of mind that accepts what has been familiar and 
accepted by them and their neighbors as something that must be accepted by all men 
everywhere.”); Steven J. Macias, Utilitarian Constitutionalism: A Comparison of 
Bentham & Madison, N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 1028, 1050 (2018) (explaining 
Bentham’s criticism of natural law, “since there was no universally accepted authority 
on what exactly that law contained”).  
100.  GLENDON, supra note 97, at 107. 
101.  See MICHAEL, supra note 88, at 19 (discussing the context of international 
law unambiguously identifying privacy as a universal, fundamental human right). 
102.  BLOCH, supra note 3, at 154. 
103.  See, e.g., William F. Dana, The Declaration of Independence, 13 HARV. 
L. REV. 319 (1900) (asserting that the clarity of the Declaration’s language served to 
justify separation from England, whereas the ambiguity of the principles stated served 
merely as a foundation for what Congress would eventually make concrete); John 
Inazu, We Disagree on the ‘Self-Evident Truths’ in the Declaration of Independence.  
But We Always Did., WASH. POST (July 5, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost 
.com/news/acts-of-faith/wp/2016/07/05/we-disagree-on-the-self-evident-truths-in-
the-declaration-of-independence-but-we-always-did/?noredirect=on&utm_term 
=.5253cf68ee2f (arguing that fundamental disagreements regarding the meaning and 
scope of the Declaration of Independence have continued since it was first written). 
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duty to protect them.104  Even if the concepts are aspirational, they still 
present value to their skeptics.  Jurist Oliver Wendell Holmes, critical 
of natural law and deeply saddened by war, still extended hope for the 
social contract and the search for the common wants of man, “the 
chords of a harmony that breathes from the unknown.”105 
When one hears in popular culture that privacy is dead, it is as if 
individual privacy never mattered.  The legal profession knows 
better.106  Even if the source of privacy rights for the public and persons 
in confinement is under debate, the courts in the United States have 
never asserted that privacy is dead.107  The courts appear to adopt an 
anthropological approach, recognizing that cultural values are diverse 
and change with time and experience.108  Nevertheless, even 
                                                          
104.  E.g., Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 848 
n.2  (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (asserting that the Anglo-American legal tradition 
recognizes Lockean core private rights, while non-core rights are privileges created 
as a matter of public policy, and therefore should not be blithely recognized or adopted 
by the courts); Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633, 646 (1977) (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that in order to protect individual liberty and freedom, the state 
must be empowered to establish order, including the assessment of who deserves the 
death penalty where public protection is “surely at the core of the Lockean ‘social 
contract’ idea”). 
105.  Holmes, Natural Law, supra note 99, at 44. 
106.  Compare Jacob Morgan, Privacy is Completely and Utterly Dead, and We 
Killed It, FORBES (Aug. 19, 2014, 12:04 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
jacobmorgan/2014/08/19/privacy-is-completely-and-utterly-dead-and-we-killed-
it/#562959c731a7 (“It doesn’t appear that businesses or governments are going to 
protect us either, if anything there is a lack of education and no desire to educate the 
masses on these issues.”), with Neil M. Richards & Jonathan H. King, Big Data 
Ethics, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 393, 395 (2014) (“privacy (and privacy law) are 
very much alive”). 
107.  In the author’s online search of state and federal case law in the United 
States, no case includes the popular phrase privacy is dead.  See also Johnson v. 
Phelan, 69 F.3d 144, 146 (7th Cir. 1995) (“Wolfish assumed without deciding that 
prisoners retain some right of privacy under the fourth amendment” (citing Bell v. 
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979))); Hickman v. Jackson, No. 2:03CV363, 2005 WL 
1862425, at *6 n.24 (E.D. Va. Aug. 3, 2005) (explaining that federal courts have 
chosen not to clearly identify the source of precedent for a prisoner’s right to privacy, 
but that the right is consistently recognized nonetheless). 
108.  See, e.g., Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 Cal. 4th 1, 92 (1994) 
(addressing compulsory urine collection in drug testing of athletes, while stating “in 
our culture the excretory functions are shielded by more or less absolute privacy, so 
much so that situations in which this privacy is violated are experienced as extremely 
distressing, as detracting from one’s dignity and self-esteem” (quoting Skinner v. Ry. 
27
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anthropologists have asserted that when the public voice lacks clarity 
and struggles to assert its autonomy rights, “it faces a likelihood of 
becoming invisible and therefore of being subject to the will and whims 
of illegitimate power.”109  In the arena of privacy rights, the courts need 
to continue to serve as a champion of authentic reliance on past 
principles,110 particularly when the other branches of American 
government are reluctant to do so.111 
C.  Common Law Doctrines Protecting Autonomy:  Police Power and 
Parens Patriae 
Without adequate regulation of surveillance in public and private 
spaces clearly affirming an individual right to privacy, the courts are 
left to define what privacy is due and why it is important to the 
individual and society.  In addition to state and federal constitutional 
                                                          
Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 645-46 (1989))); cf. Holmes, Natural Law, 
supra note 99, at 41 (“But while one’s experience thus makes certain preferences 
dogmatic for oneself, recognition of how they came to be so leaves one able to see 
that others, poor souls, may be equally dogmatic about something else.”). 
109.  NIEZEN, supra note 99, at 15.   
110.  See NIEZEN, supra note 99, at 173 (admonishing that powerful state 
interests can manipulate historical romanticism, putting forth “plain falsehoods with 
moral defences”); WILLIAM VANDERWOLK, VICTOR HUGO IN EXILE: FROM 
HISTORICAL REPRESENTATIONS TO UTOPIAN VISTAS 47 (2006) (“The government had 
carefully constructed its own mythology, based on past glory, in order to protect its 
interests.”). 
111.  See, e.g., Frank J. Cavico, The Tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional 
Distress in the Private Employment Sector, HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 109, 111 
(2003) (internal citation omitted) (discussing the weak development of emotional 
distress claims in tort law, where “the law has been slow to accept the interest in peace 
of mind as entitled to independent legal protection, even as against intentional 
invasions”); Catherine Tucker, Empirical Research on the Economic Effects of 
Privacy Regulation, 10 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 265 (2012) (addressing the 
potential negative financial impact on businesses when internet advertising is 
regulated to protect consumer privacy); Anna Minton, CCTV Increases People’s 
Sense of Anxiety, GUARDIAN (Oct. 30, 2012, 13:00 EDT), https://www.theguardian 
.com/society/2012/oct/30/cctv-increases-peoples-sense-anxiety (describing the 
insurance industry’s commodification of fear for profit, with the “defensible space” 
concept of home and business protection promoting “purchase of security products, 
strongly backed by the insurance industry, which provides lower premiums for 
properties”).  
28
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protections,112 longstanding common law doctrines of police power and 
parens patriae provide support for individual autonomy, particularly in 
state institutional settings. 
The Supreme Court has consistently upheld common law police 
power in state and local applications: 
Throughout our history the several States have exercised their police 
powers to protect the health and safety of their citizens. Because 
these are “primarily, and historically, . . . matter[s] of local concern”, 
the “States traditionally have had great latitude under their police 
powers to legislate as to the protection of the lives, limbs, health, 
comfort, and quiet of all persons.”113 
Police power is protected by the Tenth Amendment, which reserves 
to the states powers not delegated to Congress under the Constitution.114  
With respect to use of surveillance technologies, searches, and other 
restrictive measures, such as solitary confinement, police power is often 
a source of authority for states to impose security and safety 
measures.115  In upholding the state’s exercise of police power, as 
shown in the practice of body-cavity searches, the court often defers to 
the state’s choice of action.116  Nonetheless, as a matter of public health 
law in both criminal and medical state institutions, police power has yet 
to be well defined and is often combined with a constitutional analysis 
defining the legal bounds of state restrictive measures.117  At times, 
police power and parens patriae applications are in conflict when 
                                                          
112.  See infra Part II. 
113.  Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 475 (1996) (internal citations 
omitted).   
114.  U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
115.  See, e.g., J.B. ex rel. Benjamin v. Fassnacht, 801 F.3d 336 (3d Cir. 2015) 
(permitting strip searches of juvenile detainees pursuant to state police power despite 
numerous countervailing privacy concerns).   
116.  See, e.g., Timm v. Gunter, 917 F.2d 1093, 1099 (8th Cir. 1990) (asserting 
that prison officials are owed deference in choice of restrictive measures due to their 
“exceedingly complex task” of safeguarding institutional security), cert. denied, 501 
U.S. 1209 (1991); see also infra Part IV. 
117.  See generally Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the “Old” Public Health, 
69 BROOK. L. REV. 1421, 1427 (2004) (examining the evolving scope of police power 
in the United States, with concerns that “[t]he law makes little attempt to identify 
separate headings of the police power, such as public health, that operate as limited 
exceptions to the general presumption in favor of protecting liberty and property”). 
29
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addressing privacy concerns, despite their shared purposes, perhaps 
because they are both broad in scope and highly fact sensitive.118 
The common law parens patriae doctrine also serves to create a 
governmental duty to protect the community, but particularly persons 
subject to governmental care and control.119  As the Supreme Court of 
Minnesota explained, a state which acts as parens patriae is “fulfilling 
its [common law] duty to protect the well-being of its citizens who are 
incapable of so acting for themselves.”120  Again, it may supply the 
authority for the state to impose restrictive measures, such as restraints 
on prisoners or forced medication of persons subject to involuntary 
commitment.  For example, in Bigley v. Alaska Psychiatric Institute, 
the Supreme Court of Alaska engaged in a best interest analysis, 
balancing a confined mentally ill patient’s fundamental due process 
privacy and liberty interests against the psychiatric hospital’s 
compelling state interest as parens patriae, in order to force the patient 
to receive psychotropic medications.121 
In the debate over the impact of technological surveillance on 
autonomy rights there is often a false dichotomy presented of individual 
versus state interests.  Political theorist Priscilla Regan explained:  
                                                          
118.  Compare J.B. ex rel. Benjamin v. Fassnacht, 801 F.3d 336 (3d Cir. 2015) 
(holding that a juvenile detainee has a greater privacy interest than an adult prisoner, 
but still permitting strip searches on both pursuant to state police power), with State 
ex rel. Oregonian Pub. Co. v. Deiz, 613 P.2d 23 (Ore. 1980) (upholding restrictions 
on public access to juvenile court proceedings pursuant to state action as parens 
patriae which “favored privacy because of their belief that exposing a child’s 
misdeeds to the community would reinforce the delinquent’s negative self-image and, 
therefore, impede rehabilitation.”). 
119.  See In re D.C., 4 A.3d 1004, 1021 (N.J. 2010) (restricting child visitation 
rights of parents and siblings in the interests of state parens patriae protection of the 
child); State v. J.P., 907 So. 2d 1101, 1114 (Fla. 2004) (addressing the state’s right as 
parens patriae to infringe on parental rights and fundamental liberty interests for the 
protection of children); Matter of Welfare of Colyer, 660 P.2d 738, 742 (Wash. 1983) 
(addressing the state’s statutory and common law “parens patriae responsibility to 
supervise the affairs of incompetents”); In re Angelia P., 623 P.2d 198, 202-03 (Cal. 
1981) (addressing parental custodial rights as involving “the liberty 
and privacy interest afforded to the parents, the interest of the state, as parens patriae, 
in protecting children from harm, and finally, the often silent interest of the child”). 
120.  Price v. Sheppard, 239 N.W.2d 905, 911 (Minn. 1976), superseded by 
statute, Minn. Stat. § 253B.092, as recognized in In re Civil Commitment of Raboin, 
704 N.W.2d 767 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005). 
121.  Bigley v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 208 P.3d 168, 185 (Alaska 2009). 
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“Framing privacy as a conflict between the individual and society is not 
only philosophically difficult, as Dewey suggested, but is also 
somewhat simplistic.  People are both public and private, they operate 
in both contexts, and they see both as important.”122  As the common 
law doctrines of police power and parens patriae demonstrate, both the 
individual and the state have an interest in security and safety, but they 
also have a mutual interest in preserving the privacy rights of the 
individual. 
As the Second Circuit Court of Appeals clearly stated when 
examining an application of state electronic surveillance, 
“the government as parens patriae has an interest in avoiding illegal 
invasions of its citizens’ privacy.”123  Moreover, the state’s crucial 
interest in avoiding tyranny is integral to the survival of the government 
itself.124  Therefore, judicial interpretation of the autonomy rights of 
persons in confinement find support in both common law doctrines of 
police power and parens patriae. 
II.  STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS PROTECTING THE 
PRIVACY OF PERSONS CONFINED BY THE STATE 
While state and federal courts suggest that there is no general right 
to privacy under federal constitutional law,125 they recognize privacy 
rights in special contexts such as those affiliated with bodily autonomy, 
the home, and, in a more limited way, institutional settings.126  The 
Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that privacy rights are best crafted 
by Congress and state jurisdictions, which may, in fact, create a general 
right to privacy:  “But the protection of a person’s general right to 
privacy—his right to be let alone by other people—is, like 
                                                          
122.  See REGAN, supra note 3, at 217-18. 
123.  In re United States, 10 F.3d 931, 933 (2d Cir. 1993) (addressing a Fourth 
Amendment claim related to government wiretapping and electronic surveillance in a 
criminal investigation). 
124.  See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
125.  E.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 374 (1967) (stating that there is 
no general right to privacy under the Fourth Amendment). 
126.  See United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 142 (1973) (declining to extend 
a general right to privacy to obscene material outside the home, but recognizing that 
“[t]he Constitution extends special safeguards to the privacy of the home, just as it 
protects other special privacy rights such as those of marriage, procreation, 
motherhood, child rearing, and education”). 
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the protection of his property and of his very life, left largely to the law 
of the individual States.”127 
Generally, state privacy law is not pre-empted by the federal 
government, with some exceptions, such as airspace above private 
property subject to federal regulation.128  The Ninth Amendment 
assures states that they may provide expansive protection of rights not 
carved out in the United States Constitution:  “The enumeration in the 
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or 
disparage others retained by the people.”129  As discussed above, State 
and local jurisdictions are also imbued with more extensive common 
law police power than most federal jurisdictions.130  Nevertheless, the 
penumbra of federal privacy rights found in the U.S. Constitution 
remains firm and widely applicable to both federal and state 
jurisdictions through the Fourteenth Amendment.131 
Protecting the individual’s autonomy to navigate the basic need for 
privacy and social contact from the intrusion of state surveillance 
invokes a complex overlay of constitutional issues.  As with common 
law approaches, such as police power and parens patriae doctrines, the 
constitutional analysis addressing individual autonomy interests is 
inherently fact-sensitive.  Efforts to monitor persons in confinement 
                                                          
127.  Katz, 389 U.S. at 350-51 (internal citations omitted).  See also United 
States v. Thompson, 866 F.3d 1149, 1159-60 (10th Cir. 2017) (promoting state 
adoption of enhanced privacy legislation). 
128.  See Ricker, supra note 18, at 62 (discussing Federal Aviation 
Administration regulation of drone use as a tool of private surveillance).  Generally, 
when states exercise their state authority, federal preemption is discouraged to ensure 
the proper balance between state and federal powers, unless Congress expressly enacts 
legislation to preempt state law.  See Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (2011) (enforcing 
the federal Prison Litigation Reform Act to the California state prison system); 
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991) (requiring that Congress must make 
its intention to preempt traditional state authority “unmistakably clear in the statute”).  
A thorough discussion of federal preemption is beyond the scope of this article. 
129.  U.S. CONST. amend. IX.   
130.  See supra note 113 and accompanying text. 
131.  See Canedy v. Boardman, 16 F.3d 183, 185 (7th Cir. 1994) (declaring that 
“[t]he right to privacy is now firmly ensconced among the individual liberties 
protected by our Constitution” when referring to Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 
U.S. 833, 845 (1992)); Berger v. New York., 388 U.S. 41, 53 (1967) (asserting that a 
state eavesdropping statute that did not require particularity for authorization was 
overbroad in violation of the Fourth Amendment which is made applicable to the 
states under the Fourteenth Amendment). 
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may take place from a distance or close enough to monitor minute 
bodily movements or functions.132  They may take place openly or 
secretly.  They may infringe upon a right to observational privacy as 
well as bodily autonomy.133  They may also violate First Amendment 
rights to freedom of speech, movement, association, and expression.134 
The protection of autonomy, even for those subjected to 
surveillance in state institutions, finds support in common law, the 
federal penumbra of privacy rights, and a growing number of express 
privacy provisions in state constitutions across the United States. 
A.  Express State Constitutional Rights to Privacy 
More than twenty States have taken up the mantle and asserted an 
express right to privacy greater than that afforded by the United States 
Constitution.135  The Florida Supreme Court declared that “[b]ecause 
the right to privacy is explicit in the Florida Constitution, it has been 
interpreted as giving Florida citizens more protection than the federal 
right.”136  While many of these state constitutional privacy provisions 
                                                          
132.  E.g., People v. Buell, 16 Cal. App. 5th 682, 690-91 (2017) (addressing the 
reliability of continuous remote alcohol intake monitoring as a function of GPS ankle 
bracelets in state detention). 
133.  E.g., Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Cty. of Burlington, 566 
U.S. 318, 346 (2012) (addressing the constitutionality of state-authorized body-cavity 
searches). 
134.  See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring) (arguing that government surveillance chills freedom of association and 
expression); Millard v. Rankin, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1211, 1228 (D. Colo. 2017) 
(suggesting, in Eighth Amendment and substantive due process claims, that 
publication of the sex offender registry and the requirement to register online email 
and social media accounts create a “significant incursion” on the registrant’s First 
Amendment rights by chilling speech and freedom of association). 
135.  See Privacy Protections in State Constitutions, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. 
LEGISLATURES (Nov. 7, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-
and-information-technology/privacy-protections-in-state-constitutions.aspx 
(identifying an initial eleven states with constitutional privacy provisions: Alaska, 
Arizona, California, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Montana, New Hampshire, 
South Carolina, and Washington).   
136.  State v. J.P., 907 So. 2d 1101, 1115 (Fla. 2004).  See also Valley Hosp. 
Ass’n, Inc. v. Mat-Su Coal. for Choice, 948 P.2d 963, 968 (Alaska 1997) (holding 
that the express privacy provision in the Alaska Constitution provides more 
protections than that found in the U.S. Constitution). 
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expand upon Fourth Amendment search and seizure language,137 others 
adopt narrow applications to certain state actions, such as the right of 
crime victims to privacy in legal proceedings.138  For the slight majority 
of states that have not adopted an express constitutional privacy 
protection, nearly all provide language comparable to that of the federal 
constitution in their bill or declaration of rights, such as due process 
rights with respect to life, liberty, property, and the pursuit of 
happiness.139  State courts have also maintained a right to privacy based 
on more broadly-worded provisions in the U.S. Constitution.140 
In 1972, Alaska amended its state constitution to include a broad 
and express right to privacy; the amendment in Article I, section 22 
states: “The right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be 
infringed.  The legislature shall implement this section.”141   Similarly, 
California amended the first clause of its state constitutional 
Declaration of Rights to add a specific protection of individual privacy: 
                                                          
137.  See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12 (“The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, and 
against the unreasonable interception of private communications by any means, shall 
not be violated.”); HAW. CONST. art. I, § 7 (“The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches, seizures and 
invasions of privacy shall not be violated; . . .); ILL. CONST. art. I, § 6 (“The people 
shall have the right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and other possessions 
against unreasonable searches, seizures, invasions of privacy or interceptions of 
communications by eavesdropping devices or other means. . . .”); LA. CONST. art. I, § 
5 (“Every person shall be secure in his person, property, communications, houses, 
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches, seizures or invasions of privacy. . . 
.”); S.C. CONST. art. I, § 10 (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures and 
unreasonable invasions of privacy shall not be violated, . . .”). 
138.  See infra note 149. 
139.  State constitutions that do not contain a clause expressly protecting 
“privacy” include Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, 
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, 
Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, 
Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and Wyoming.  
140.  See infra Part II(B). 
141.  ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22.  See Alaska Right of Privacy, Amendment 3 
(August 1972), BALLOTPEDIA (noting the amendment passed by over 86% of the vote), 
https:// ballotpedia.org/ Alaska_Right_of_Privacy,_Amendment_3_ (August_1972) 
(last visited Dec. 3, 2018).  See also ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 8 (adopting a broadly 
worded provision, which states “[n]o person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, 
or his home invaded, without authority of law”). 
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“All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable 
rights.  Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, 
acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and 
obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.”142  Washington also has a 
broad constitutional privacy provision, which asserts that “[n]o person 
shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without 
authority of law.”143  When a state constitutional privacy provision is 
express but broadly stated, the courts tend to grant broad privacy 
protections, inclusive of a range of interests and actions.144 
Other states have adopted more limited constitutional privacy 
rights, such as the right to a secret ballot,145 private prayer or 
contemplation in public schools,146 or granting crime victims an express 
right to privacy and dignity in the criminal justice system.147  The crime 
                                                          
142.  CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 (emphasis added).  Hawai’i also adopted a broad 
privacy rights clause which states: “The right of the people to privacy is recognized 
and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest.  The 
legislature shall take affirmative steps to implement this right.”  HAW. CONST. art. I, 
§ 6. 
143.  WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
144.  See, e.g., Kiva O. v. Alaska, Dep’t Health & Soc. Servs., 408 P.3d 1181 
(Alaska 2018) (upholding a mother’s state constitutional rights to liberty and privacy 
to prevent the state from overmedicating her child in the custody of the Office of 
Children’s Services); Bigley v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 208 P.3d 168, 185 (Alaska 
2009) (requiring due process before administration of antipsychotic medications to an 
involuntarily committed patient under the Alaskan Constitution Privacy and Liberty 
Clauses); Valley Hosp. Ass’n, Inc. v. Mat-Su Coal. for Choice, 948 P.2d 963, 969 
(Alaska 1997) (affirming reproductive privacy rights, despite arguments by the public 
hospital that the state constitutional privacy provision was to be limited to 
informational privacy); N.G. v. Super. Ct., 291 P.3d 328 (Alaska Ct. App. 2012) 
(denying defendant access to a crime victim’s mental health records pursuant to the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege and the privacy protections of the Alaska 
Constitution). 
145.  E.g., SO. DAK. CONST., art. VI, § 28 (ratified in 2010). 
146.  W. VA. CONST., art. III, § 15a (“No student of a public school may be 
denied the right to personal and private contemplation, meditation or prayer . . . .”).  
But see Walter v. W. Va. Bd. of Educ., 610 F. Supp. 1169 (S.D. W. Va. 1985) (holding 
in a declaratory judgment that W. VA. CONST., art. III, § 15a in violation of the First 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution). 
147.  See IDAHO CONST., art. I, § 22(1) (providing crime victims with a right to 
“fairness, respect, dignity and privacy throughout the criminal justice process”); ILL. 
CONST. art. I, § 8.1(a)(1) (“The right to be treated with fairness and respect for their 
dignity and privacy and to be free from harassment, intimidation, and abuse 
35
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victim rights’ movement has been particularly effective in laying a 
constitutional foundation for privacy rights for vulnerable populations, 
whereby the government becomes obligated to protect privacy, 
alongside health and safety, as a matter of state police power.148  This 
most recent adoption of state constitutional rights could support 
arguments to expand privacy protections for persons in confinement for 
many of the same reasons, as some may be victims of crime within their 
institutions.  Tennessee already specifically mandates “the humane 
treatment of prisoners” in its state constitution under article I, section 
32.149 
In addition, states have responded to the encroachment of 
surveillance in the form of online data collection by adding more 
stringent protections of informational privacy in their constitutions.  In 
2014, Missouri became the first state to adopt a constitutional 
amendment specifically protecting the privacy of electronic 
communications from unreasonable search and seizure.150  Prior to that, 
New York had adopted a similar provision with respect to earlier forms 
of technology, specifically protecting against “unreasonable 
                                                          
throughout the criminal justice system.”); MONT. CONST. art. II, § 36(1) (protecting 
the crime victim’s right to refuse investigative interviews and to protect privileged 
and confidential information from disclosure); N.M. CONST. art. II, § 24(A)(1) (“the 
right to be treated with fairness and respect for the victim’s dignity and privacy 
throughout the criminal justice system”); N. DAK. CONST. art. I, § 25(1) (protecting 
the “right to privacy”, including refusal of discovery and protection of confidentiality 
information); OHIO CONST. art. I, § 10a(A)(1) (“to be treated with fairness and respect 
for the victim’s safety, dignity and privacy”); ORE. CONST. art. I, § 42(1)(c) (including 
a crime victim’s right to protection from discovery requests, although not specifically 
using the term privacy); SO. DAK. CONST., art. I, § 29 (amending the constitution in 
2016 to provide protection from discovery requests as a “right to privacy”); WISC. 
CONST., art. I, § 9m (“This state shall treat crime victims . . . with fairness, dignity 
and respect for their privacy.”). 
148.  See generally Mary Margaret Giannini, The Procreative Power of Dignity: 
Dignity’s Evolution in the Victims’ Rights Movement, 9 DREXEL L. REV. 43, 66 (2016) 
(identifying adoption of state constitutional protections that assert a right of crime 
victims to respect, dignity and privacy as a function of the states’ protection of the 
public). 
149.  TENN. CONST., art. I, § 32 (“That the erection of safe prisons, the 
inspection of prisons, and the humane treatment of prisoners, shall be provided for.”). 
150.  See Privacy Protections in State Constitutions, supra note 135; MO. 
CONST. art. I, § 15 (“That the people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes, 
effects, and electronic communications and data, from unreasonable searches and 
seizures[.]”).  
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interception of telephone and telegraph communications.”151  In 2018, 
New Hampshire voters approved the following constitutional 
amendment focused on protecting informational privacy from 
governmental intrusion:  “An individual’s right to live free from 
governmental intrusion in private or personal information is natural, 
essential, and inherent.”152 
Among the various state constitutions with express privacy 
provisions, several focus solely on governmental intrusion.  For 
example, the Constitution of Florida, adopted in 1980, states: 
Every natural person has the right to be let alone and free from 
governmental intrusion into the person’s private life except as 
otherwise provided herein.  This section shall not be construed to 
limit the public’s right of access to public records and meetings as 
provided by law.153 
In Florida, the right to privacy survives death under Article I, section 
23; for if it did not, “[it] would render those rights hollow, chilling the 
daily operation of them on people as they navigate their lives from 
moment to moment.”154 
Finally, in contrast to the more nebulous language of the federal 
constitution, several states overtly mention the reason why privacy is 
important to members of society.  For example, the Montana 
Constitution states:  “The right of individual privacy is essential to the 
well-being of a free society and shall not be infringed without the 
                                                          
151.  N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12. 
152.  BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/New_Hampshire_Question_2,_ 
Right_to_Live_Free_from_Governmental_Intrusion_in_Private_and_Personal_Infor
mation_Amendment_(2018) (last visited Dec. 3, 2018).  See Dave Solomon, Leading 
privacy advocate lauds passage of constitutional amendment, N.H. UNION LEADER 
(Nov. 10, 2018), http://www.unionleader.com/news/politics/state/leading-privacy-
advocate-lauds-passage-of-constitutional-amendment/article_5ce333c1-68b1-5a9f-
897c-715bbd56cd76.html; see also Kevin C. McAdam & John R. Webb, Privacy: A 
Common Law and Constitutional Crossroads, 40 COLO. L. 55 (2011) (addressing 
movements to reform Colorado state rights to privacy). 
153.  FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23.  Cf. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22; Bigley v. Alaska 
Psychiatric Inst., 208 P.3d 168, 185 (Alaska 2009) (interpreting the liberty and privacy 
rights of a person confined under state mental health care pursuant to the broader 
privacy provisions in the Alaska Constitution). 
154.  See Weaver v. Myers, 229 So. 3d 1118, 1130 (Fla. 2017) (addressing 
privacy of medical information). 
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showing of a compelling state interest.”155  The California Constitution 
provides:  “All people are by nature free and independent and have 
inalienable rights.  Among these are enjoying and defending life and 
liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and 
obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.”156  Given these examples, 
Courts would find ample support to suggest that individual autonomy 
is not only an individual right, but a right which benefits both the 
individual and the state. 
Critically, states with express constitutional privacy protections 
well adapted to a modern technological age do not have to engage in 
unpacking a penumbra of privacy rights in the federal constitution or 
determining what level of scrutiny should be applied.157  A state 
constitutional privacy rights analysis is clearer and therefore more 
easily enforced against the pressures of the surveillance technology 
industry when the privacy right itself is expressly stated in the 
constitution. 
For example, in Bigley v. Alaska Psychiatric Institute, the Supreme 
Court of Alaska held that a state mental health facility violated an 
involuntarily committed patient’s state due process rights to liberty and 
privacy regarding forced psychotropic medications.158  The state court 
applied the following balancing test: “[W]e must balance the 
fundamental liberty and privacy interests of the patient against the 
compelling state interest under its parens patriae authority to protect 
the person and property of an individual who lack[s] legal age or 
capacity.”159  Moreover, “[a]lthough the state cannot intrude on a 
fundamental right where there is a less intrusive alternative, the 
alternative must actually be available, meaning that it is feasible and 
would actually satisfy the compelling state interests that justify the 
proposed state action.”160 
In contrast, for states such as Minnesota that have opted not to 
follow the suggestion of the United States Supreme Court to adopt 
                                                          
155.  MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10. 
156.  CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
157.  See supra Part II(A). 
158.  Bigley, 208 P.3d at 185. 
159.  Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
160.  Id.  Cf. State v. J.P., 907 So. 2d 1101, 1115-16 (Fla. 2004) (applying state 
constitutional privacy protections to a juvenile curfew ordinance, with an efficient 
strict scrutiny analysis). 
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state-based privacy protections, the analysis remains muddled.  The 
Supreme Court of Minnesota, in 1976, unable to rely on state 
constitutional or statutory guidance, or even on later-developed federal 
privacy rights, haltingly addressed the claim of a mental hospital patient 
who sought to resist forced tranquilizers: 
     We recognize that it is far too early in the evolution of the right 
of privacy to offer any single definition or rule of what the right 
entails. Only its broadest contours have been sketched. We do feel, 
however, because of the importance of that emerging right, it is 
appropriate for us, at this time, to set forth more than our bare 
conclusion that the right of privacy is or is not involved. 
     At the core of the privacy decisions, in our judgment, is the 
concept of personal autonomy—the notion that the Constitution 
reserves to the individual, free of governmental intrusion, certain 
fundamental decisions about how he or she will conduct his or her 
life.  Like other constitutional rights, however, this right is not an 
absolute one and must give way to certain interests of the state, the 
balance turning on the impact of the decision on the life of the 
individual. As the impact increases, so must the importance of the 
state’s interest. Some decisions, we assume, will be of little 
consequence to the individual and a showing of a legitimate state 
interest will justify its intrusion; other decisions, on the other hand, 
will be of such major consequence that only the most compelling 
state interest will justify the intrusion. 
     But once justified, the extent of the state’s intrusion is not 
unlimited. It must also appear that the means utilized to serve the 
state’s interest are necessary and reasonable, or, in other words, in 
light of alternative means, the least intrusive.161 
Before focusing on federal constitutional provisions, it is important 
to note that state decisions asserting privacy rights may be based on 
both state and federal constitutional principles, as illustrated in the case 
of the right to assisted suicide in the State of Washington.162  Federal 
                                                          
161.  Price v. Sheppard, 239 N.W.2d 905, 911 (Minn. 1976), superseded by 
statute, Civil Commitment Act, Minn. Laws ch. 282, art.2, §100, as stated in, In re 
Civil Commitment of Raboin, 704 N.W. 2d 767 (2005). 
162.  See Matter of Welfare of Colyer, 600 P.2d 738, 741-42 (Wash. 1983) 
(identifying the basis of the holding on Fourteenth Amendment due process liberty 
interests in the U.S. Constitution, supported by the Washington Constitution article I, 
section 7); James E. Dallner & D. Scott Manning, Death with Dignity in Montana, 65 
39
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constitutional principles supporting a right to privacy are perhaps more 
manifold and cumbersome than state constitutional rights, but they are 
longstanding and form a strong basis for a rights analysis.  Additionally, 
the number of state constitutional privacy provisions are growing in 
number, but still represent only a minority of states.  Therefore, the bulk 
of analysis that follows will focus on the developing reliance on federal 
jurisprudence to circumscribe the privacy rights of persons in 
confinement across the United States.  If a majority of states eventually 
and wisely adopts express privacy rights in their constitutions, they may 
emerge as the dominant influence in identifying privacy rights against 
governmental surveillance and potential tyranny. 
B.  A Penumbra of Federal Constitutional Rights for Persons in State 
Confinement 
Federal constitutional provisions key to understanding the privacy 
rights of confined persons include the Fourth Amendment, Eighth 
Amendment, and the Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest as a matter 
of substantive due process.  The applicability of these three federal 
constitutional amendments generally reaches state institutions through 
the Fourteenth Amendment, which states that “[n]o state shall make any 
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States.”163  The privacy-related claims of prison 
inmates often assert the protections of all three clauses.164  Persons 
                                                          
MONT. L. REV. 309, 329-31 (2004) (addressing the development of an express state 
constitutional right to privacy in Montana that is inclusive of observational privacy). 
163.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 53 
(1967) (asserting that a state eavesdropping statute that did not require particularity 
for authorization was overbroad in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution). 
164.  For example, cross-gender surveillance of inmates has frequently raised 
simultaneous federal Fourth Amendment, Eighth Amendment, and substantive due 
process claims.  E.g., Byrd v. Maricopa Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 845 F.3d 919 (9th 
Cir. 2017) (addressing a detainee’s Fourth Amendment claim for a violation of bodily 
privacy and Fourteenth Amendment claim for cruel and unusual punishment); 
Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144 (7th Cir. 1995) (addressing Fourth, Eighth, and 
Fourteenth Amendment claims of a prison inmate).  Cf. Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 
462, 472 (6th Cir. 2013) (“excessive force claims . . . can be raised under the Fourth, 
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments”); Bloom v. Toliver, 133 F. Supp. 3d 1314 (N.D. 
Okl. 2015) (asserting Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments claims for the 
beating of a juvenile inmate by another inmate during transport). 
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subject to civil commitment or other civil restraints may assert both 
substantive due process and Fourth Amendment claims.165  However, 
as discussed below, the courts may hold that a legally cognizable claim 
on one constitutional basis may preclude recovery on another.166 
1.  Intruding on Observational Privacy as Fourth Amendment Search 
and Seizure 
Under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
Numerous exceptions to the warrant requirement remain, such as a 
good faith reliance on a complicated arena of precedent related to 
privacy.167  Moreover, the Fourth Amendment demands a degree of 
persistence and care on the part of the defendant in asserting privacy 
rights, as shown in recent decisions related to the abandonment and 
third party doctrines, in which a person may lose existing privacy rights 
inadvertently.168 
                                                          
165.  E.g., Millard v. Rankin, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1211 (D. Colo. 2017) (addressing 
assertions of federal Fourth Amendment and substantive due process claims against 
public dissemination of state sex offender registry). 
166.  See infra Part IV(A)(4). 
167.  E.g., United States v. Katzin, 769 F.3d 163 (3d Cir. 2014) (holding that 
police officers reasonably relied on Fourth Amendment precedent prior to United 
States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) when placing GPS technology on the 
undercarriage of defendant’s car in a public place and tracking its movements for two 
days without a warrant or the owner’s consent). 
168.  E.g., Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (maintaining that 
a reasonable expectation of privacy remains in geolocation information provided to 
third parties, such as cell phone service providers); Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 
2473 (2014) (interpreting the individual’s continued assertion of an interest in privacy 
under the Fourth Amendment and the abandonment doctrine); Jones, 565 U.S. at 417 
(2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“More fundamentally, it may be necessary to 
reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
information voluntarily disclosed to third parties.”); State v. Brown, 815 S.E.2d 761 
(S.C. 2018) (applying Riley regarding a burglar’s cell phone left behind in the home 
that was burgled).  See generally FARIVAR, supra note 29, at 77. 
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The Fourth Amendment only protects persons from arbitrary and 
unreasonable search and seizure by the government.169  Its protections 
are broader than merely protecting privacy, where searches in public 
places may be unlawful in part due to public humiliation.170  The Court 
has recognized that a loss of privacy infringes on human autonomy and 
the ability to make important decisions for oneself.  For example, when 
the state reveals otherwise confidential medical information, it could 
deter patients from seeking needed healthcare treatment, despite state 
assurances that patients have a subjective and objectively reasonable 
expectation of privacy in their own medical information.171 
The Fourth Amendment has not brought about a general right to 
privacy, but instead protects against “narrowly focused intrusions into 
individual privacy during the course of criminal investigations,”172 
which may occur in any number of settings.  Moreover, defining 
reasonableness throughout the Amendment’s history has required 
consideration of changes in the tools of surveillance.173  It should have 
considered to a greater extent reasonableness with respect to 
technology’s impact on human wellbeing.  The constant and 
increasingly rapid advancement of technology, as well as resulting 
challenges associated with applying legal tests in our relatively young 
endeavor of self-governance, significantly outpace the slow process of 
human biological evolution in critical ways.174  If humanity had the 
                                                          
169.  Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989). 
170.  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 n.4 (1967) (citing Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 509 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting) for the proposition that 
“a person can be just as much, if not more, irritated, annoyed and injured by an 
unceremonious public arrest by a policeman as he is by a seizure in the privacy of his 
office or home”). 
171.  Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 78 n.14 (2001).  
172.  Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 604 n.32 (1977).   
173.  See Jones, 565 U.S. at 427 (Alito, J., concurring) (“And even if the public 
does not welcome the diminution of privacy that new technology entails, they may 
eventually reconcile themselves to this development as inevitable.”); Berger v. New 
York, 388 U.S. 41, 49 (1967) (“The law, though jealous of individual privacy, has not 
kept pace with these advances in scientific knowledge.”). 
174.  American astronaut and engineer Mae Carol Jamison commented: “People 
always think of technology as something having silicon in it. But a pencil is 
technology. Any language is technology. Technology is a tool we use to accomplish 
a particular task and when one talks about appropriate technology in developing 
countries, appropriate may mean anything from fire to solar electricity.”  Paula Lipp, 
42
California Western Law Review, Vol. 55 [2019], No. 1, Art. 2
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol55/iss1/2
FINAL Brobst camera ready (Do Not Delete) 1/8/2019  10:36 AM 
2018] THE METAL EYE  43 
capacity to adapt well to rapid changes in technology, then perhaps a 
general right to privacy would not be needed, but that has not been the 
case. 
In 1967, in Berger v. New York, the Supreme Court outlined the 
longstanding history of American law restricting government 
eavesdropping – from ancient common law addressing spying by ear as 
a public nuisance, to a California statute in 1862 restricting state use of 
telegraph interception of conversations, to similar bans on unrestricted 
wiretapping of telephone lines in the late 1800s.175  By 1967, the Court 
was compelled to accept that “[s]ophisticated electronic devices have 
now been developed (commonly known as ‘bugs’) which are capable 
of eavesdropping on anyone in most any given situation.”176 
Observational privacy was also addressed in 1967 in Katz v. United 
States.177  The decision examined what privacy rights and Fourth 
Amendment procedures were due to an individual whose conversation 
in a public telephone booth was surveilled and electronically recorded 
by the FBI’s listening device attached to the booth.178  The Court put 
forth that there is no general express right to privacy in the Constitution, 
but constitutional interests in privacy from government invasions do 
arise from the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution under limited circumstances.179 
Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, stated that the Fourth 
Amendment protects people, not places; thus, what a person “seeks to 
preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be 
constitutionally protected.”180  According to Justice Harlan, in his 
concurring opinion, a federal invasion into a constitutionally protected 
area has long been held to be “presumptively unreasonable in the 
absence of a search warrant” if the person has a subjective and 
                                                          
A Space to Call Her Own, GRADUATING ENGINEER + COMPUTER CAREERS (Sept. 29, 
1999), http://www.graduatingengineer.com/articles/19990929/A-Space-to-Call-Her-
Own.  
175.  Berger, 388 U.S. at 45-49 (holding a state eavesdropping statute to be 
overbroad in violation of an individual’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment right to 
privacy). 
176.  Id. at 46-47. 
177.  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-51 (1967). 
178.  Id. at 348-49. 
179.  Id. at 350. 
180.  Id. at 351. 
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objectively reasonable expectation of privacy.181  This approach asserts 
respect for individual choice directing the scope of one’s privacy, such 
as the deliberate use of a whisper to preserve confidentiality when one 
knows one is under surveillance.182 
Yet, Justice Black in his dissent in Katz questioned the application 
of the Fourth Amendment to new surveillance technologies.  He 
suggested that eavesdropping is an ancient practice that the Framers 
chose to leave out of the protections of the Fourth Amendment, 
protections that specifically address the search and seizure of tangible 
persons and things: 
Tapping telephone wires, of course, was an unknown possibility at 
the time the Fourth Amendment was adopted. But eavesdropping 
(and wiretapping is nothing more than eavesdropping by telephone) 
was, as even the majority opinion in Berger, supra, recognized, “an 
ancient practice which at common law was condemned as a nuisance. 
IV Blackstone, Commentaries s 168. In those days the eavesdropper 
listened by naked ear under the eaves of houses or their windows, or 
beyond their walls seeking out private discourse.”183 
Noting that the Bill of Rights should be given a liberal construction, 
Justice Black does not assert that privacy is unimportant, but rather 
suggests that the other branches of government should carve out privacy 
rights against state surveillance.184  Indeed, in the same year as Katz, 
Justice Black, dissenting in Berger v. New York, admonished that 
privacy deserves protection in a technological age: 
The law, though jealous of individual privacy, has not kept pace with 
these advances in scientific knowledge. This is not to say that 
individual privacy has been relegated to a second-class position for 
                                                          
181.  Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
182.  See, e.g., United States v. Llufrio, 237 F. Supp. 3d 735 (N.D. Ill. 2017) 
(finding a subjective and reasonable expectation of privacy regarding a man in 
custody who mumbled softly to himself, believing that the interview room was 
monitored remotely by police). 
183.  Katz, 389 U.S. at 366 (Black, J., dissenting) (citing Berger v. New York, 
388 U.S. 41, 45 (1967)). 
184.  Id. at 365-66 (Black, J., dissenting). 
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it has been held since Lord Camden’s day that intrusions into it are 
“subversive of all the comforts of society.”185 
Thus, Justice Black resisted carving out judicial privacy doctrines in 
Katz because he believed that the Framers left the control of privacy 
interests to Congress and the states: 
No general right is created by the Amendment so as to give this Court 
the unlimited power to hold unconstitutional everything which 
affects privacy. Certainly the Framers, well acquainted as they were 
with the excesses of governmental power, did not intend to grant this 
Court such omnipotent lawmaking authority as that. The history of 
governments proves that it is dangerous to freedom to repose such 
powers in courts.186 
Since Katz and Berger, and despite Justice Black’s reservations, 
Fourth Amendment precedent has consistently affirmed a relatively 
narrow right to privacy, including adoption of the exclusionary rule.187  
However, interpretation of privacy rights is qualified by the concurring 
view of Justice Harlan, requiring a reasonable expectation of privacy.188  
Reasonableness is a nebulous concept, but the Court has reiterated that 
the expectation of privacy “has a source outside of the Fourth 
Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal property 
law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by 
society.”189  The concept that autonomy in directing one’s private life 
                                                          
185.  Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 49 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting).  Cf. 
Weaver v. Myers, 229 So. 3d 1118, 1130-31 (Fla. 2017) (“in Florida, the [state 
constitutional] right to privacy is no less fundamental than those other rights and is 
even more closely guarded in some respects”).  
186.  Katz, 389 U.S. at 374. 
187.  See, e.g., Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 139 (2009) (applying the 
exclusionary rule to support Fourth Amendment protections by excluding evidence of 
drugs and a gun); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (applying the federal judicially-
created exclusionary rule in state courts under the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments). But see Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1678 (2018) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (“As federal common law, however, the exclusionary rule cannot bind the 
States.”). 
188.  Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).  
189.  United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 (2012) (quoting Minnesota v. 
Carver, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998)).  See also O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 715 
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is a basic need is almost too obvious to define well in law.  This is 
shown by a long history of continuous efforts to do so, as in natural law 
and common law doctrines protecting the individual. 
The home is granted significant protection from state surveillance 
under the Fourth Amendment, which naturally supports an argument 
for the privacy rights of confined persons who reside under state care.  
As stated by the Court in Georgia v. Randolph: 
Since we hold to the centuries-old principle of respect for the privacy 
of the home, it is beyond dispute that the home is entitled to special 
protection as the center of the private lives of our people.  We have, 
after all, lived our whole national history with an understanding of 
the ancient adage that a man’s house is his castle [to the point that 
t]he poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the forces of 
the Crown.190 
In 2018, in Collins v. Virginia, Justice Sotomayor defined a home’s 
curtilage to include portions of an open driveway, basing her 
interpretation on the longstanding principle that “at the [Fourth] 
Amendment’s very core stands the right of a man to retreat into his own 
home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.”191  
The home is humanity’s affirmatively private space, in contrast to 
deliberate movement in public spaces. 
Nevertheless, with regard to Fifth Amendment Miranda rights in 
custodial interrogation, the Court has held that a guard questioning an 
inmate in prison may be deemed non-custodial, as the prison setting is 
familiar and less shocking or coercive than a police department 
interrogation of an arrestee unaccustomed to confinement.192  Thus, in 
                                                          
(1987) (“[There is] no talisman that determines in all cases those privacy expectations 
that society is prepared to accept as reasonable.”). 
190.  Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 115 (2006) (internal quotation marks 
and citations omitted).   
191.  Collins, 138 S. Ct. at 1670 (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted). 
192.  Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 511 (2012).  See also United States v. 
Conley, 779 F.2d 970, 973 (4th Cir. 1985) (suggesting a need for “more than the usual 
restraint on a prisoner’s liberty to depart” in order to find that questioning of an inmate 
requires Miranda warnings); Jennifer A. Brobst, Miranda in Mental Health: Court 
Ordered Confessions and Therapeutic Injustice for Young Offenders, 40 NOVA L. 
REV. 387 (2016) (discussing Fifth Amendment Miranda rights during court-ordered 
mental health treatment in confinement). 
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one breath the Court acknowledges that prison is the de facto residence 
of an inmate, but in another it suggests that there is little if any 
expectation of privacy in a prison cell.  While state interests may 
supersede those of persons in institutions under certain circumstances, 
the individual right to privacy remains.  For example, in a case of first 
impression, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that an 
involuntarily and civilly committed person retains the right to be free 
from unreasonable searches, yet found that the state hospital’s policy of 
regular body-cavity searches for contraband cell phones was 
justified.193 
In 1983, Justice Burger in Hudson v. Palmer definitively stated that 
“[a] right of privacy in traditional Fourth Amendment terms is 
fundamentally incompatible with the close and 
continual surveillance of inmates and their cells required to ensure 
institutional security and internal order.”194  Thus, in effect, search and 
seizure of prisoners are both protected and constrained by Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence by balancing the interests of prisoner 
autonomy with the need to establish order and maintain security.  In 
addition, Fourth Amendment protection is often more limited for 
convicted inmates than for pre-trial detainees.195  Nevertheless, 
subsequent decisions have determined that while a prisoner may not 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy to his or her personal effects 
in a cell search,196 “a right to privacy in one’s own body . . . is not 
fundamentally inconsistent with imprisonment and is so fundamental 
that society would recognize it as reasonable even in the prison 
context.”197 
                                                          
193.  Serna v. Goodno, 567 F.3d 944, 953 (8th Cir. 2009) (arguing that prisons 
and mental hospitals for sexually dangerous patients have comparable security risks). 
194.  Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 528 (1984).  With respect to pre-trial 
detainees, there was initially a presumption that they had retained at least a 
“diminished expectation of privacy.”  Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 557 (1979). 
195.  See Lopez v. Youngblood, 609 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1141 (E.D. Cal. 2009) 
(finding under an equal protection analysis that pre-arraignment arrestees for 
relatively minor offenses were not similarly situated to post-arraignment detainees, 
justifying greater privacy for strip searches and body-cavity searches for the former, 
notwithstanding the contention that both groups had an equal interest in maintaining 
bodily privacy).  
196.  See Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139 (1962). 
197.  Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 325 (3d Cir. 2016).  
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That is, Hudson should not be interpreted to provide state prisons 
with carte blanche to exact any form of privacy intrusion, eliminating 
the requisite balance of interests.198  The Court in Hudson expressly 
stated that the opinion does not create a “bright line rule” or an “iron 
curtain” separating prisons from the reach of the Constitution.199  Thus, 
in 1995, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Johnson v. Phelan 
overstated the holding when it determined that Hudson stood for the 
proposition that “privacy is the thing most surely extinguished by a 
judgment committing someone to prison. Guards take control of where 
and how prisoners live; they do not retain any right of seclusion or 
secrecy against their captors, who are entitled to watch and regulate 
every detail of daily life.”200  Essentially, the Seventh Circuit attempted 
to foreclose all federal Fourth Amendment privacy claims for inmates, 
leaving only the more challenging Eighth Amendment analysis that 
requires proof of malicious intent on the part of the state.201  This 
holding conflicted with the Ninth Circuit, which held that strip searches 
of prisoners could violate the Fourth Amendment reasonableness 
standard if they are “excessive, vindictive, harassing, or unrelated to 
                                                          
198.  See State v. Howard, 728 A.2d 1178 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1998) (finding an 
objectively reasonable expectation of privacy for a couple in a police interview room 
when the state failed to present evidence of a justifiable purpose for the hidden video 
surveillance and recording). 
199.  Hudson, 468 U.S. at 523.  See also United States v. Llufrio, 237 F. Supp. 
3d 735, 745 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (following Hudson by requiring a balancing of interests 
to determine whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists in a police interview 
room); Gilmore v. Jeffes, 675 F. Supp. 219, 221 (M.D. Pa. 1987) (interpreting Hudson 
in holding that prisoners “enjoy no privacy right within their cells and that cell 
searches do not implicate the Fourth Amendment”). But see Somers v. Thurman, 109 
F.3d 614, 618 (9th Cir. 1997) (“Therefore, it is unclear from the dicta 
in Hudson whether prisoners retain any rights cognizable under the Fourth 
Amendment against searches qua searches of their bodies, or whether the only 
safeguard against assertedly egregious searches in prison is the Eighth Amendment.”).   
200.  Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144, 146 (7th Cir. 1995).  Other courts have 
followed suit, such as Aranda v. Meyers, which relied on Hudson to find without 
analysis that electronic surveillance in prison does not support a Fourth Amendment 
claim. Aranda v. Meyers, 369 F. App’x. 874 (9th Cir. 2010) (unpublished 
memorandum opinion) (noting in addition that the prisoner’s assertions of a state 
conspiracy to poison his coffee were unsupported).  
201.  See infra Part II(B)(2); Johnson, 69 F.3d at 147 (relegating prisoner 
privacy claims solely to acts of “calculated harassment unrelated to prison needs”). 
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any legitimate penological interest,”202 as well as the Third Circuit,203 
and even the Seventh Circuit itself.204 
The Hudson Court reinforced the position that inmates should be 
afforded all constitutional rights not “fundamentally inconsistent with 
imprisonment itself or incompatible with the objectives of 
incarceration,” including freedom from racial discrimination and the 
protection of religious freedom.205  The Court has never stated that 
privacy is a lesser constitutional right, nor has it stated that privacy is 
inconsequential to the well-being of confined persons.  However, the 
Court in Turner v. Safley held that judicial review of regulatory 
restraints on prisoners’ constitutional rights is only subject to a low 
rational basis standard of review; that is, “when a prison regulation 
impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is 
reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.”206  This standard 
is fairly deferential to the state. 
While courts have certainly asserted that privacy rights are 
outweighed by other interests at times, no court has argued effectively 
that some persons have a right while others have no right at all.  The 
critical question under the Fourth Amendment is whether one has a 
subjective and reasonable expectation of privacy under the 
circumstances.  This raises an interesting issue regarding state 
surveillance at a time when technology facilitates not only constant 
surveillance but surveillance in minute detail.  Justice Scalia, writing 
for the majority in United States v. Jones in 2012, stated in dicta that 
public surveillance may still be an unconstitutional invasion of 
privacy.207  In Jones, Justice Alito spoke directly in his concurrence 
                                                          
202.  Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 332 (9th Cir. 1988). 
203.  Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 325 (3d Cir. 2016) (“We conclude that 
a right to privacy in one’s own body, unlike a right to maintain private spaces for 
possessions, is not fundamentally inconsistent with imprisonment and is so 
fundamental that society would recognize it as reasonable even in the prison 
context.”). 
204.  Canedy v. Boardman, 16 F.3d 183 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding a Fourth 
Amendment constitutional privacy right violation when a male inmate was regularly 
strip searched by female guards). 
205.  Hudson, 468 U.S. at 523. 
206.  Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (addressing the privacy interests 
of inmates with respect to inmate-to-inmate correspondence and the right to marry). 
207.  United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 412 (2012) (citing Kyllo v. United 
States, 533 U.S. 27, 31-32 (2001)). 
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regarding the potential impact of technological change on reasonable 
expectations of privacy: 
But technology can change those expectations. Dramatic 
technological change may lead to periods in which popular 
expectations are in flux and may ultimately produce significant 
changes in popular attitudes. New technology may provide increased 
convenience or security at the expense of privacy, and many people 
may find the tradeoff worthwhile. And even if the public does not 
welcome the diminution of privacy that new technology entails, they 
may eventually reconcile themselves to this development as 
inevitable.208 
Justice Alito is musing here for it is far from clear whether society will 
eventually concede its right to privacy. 
Justice Sotomayor, also concurring in Jones, directly opposed 
Justice Alito’s supposition: 
I for one doubt that people would accept without complaint the 
warrantless disclosure to the Government of a list of every Web site 
they had visited in the last week, or month, or year. But whatever the 
societal expectations, they can attain constitutionally protected status 
only if our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence ceases to treat secrecy 
as a prerequisite for privacy. I would not assume that all information 
voluntarily disclosed to some member of the public for a limited 
purpose is, for that reason alone, disentitled to Fourth Amendment 
protection.209 
Today, a reasonable expectation of privacy for detainees remains 
in flux.  For example, one court may find that a person’s mere presence 
in a law enforcement building or vehicle should justify severe 
curtailment of an expectation of privacy.210  In 2017, the Seventh 
Circuit held that a paddy wagon with a separate compartment for 
                                                          
208.  Id. at 427 (Alito, J., concurring). 
209.  Id. at 418 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
210.  E.g., State v. Howard, 728 A.2d 1178 (Del. Super. Ct. 1998) (suggesting 
that although there is usually no reasonable expectation of privacy in a police 
interview room, a married couple in a police interview room post-arrest had a 
subjective and objectively reasonable expectation of privacy to marital 
communications where video cameras were hidden from view and the state never 
proved its interest use of the cameras). 
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detainees created no reasonable expectation of privacy, even in the 
absence of apparent signs of surveillance and in spite of the fact that 
detainees made a concerted effort to speak quietly out of earshot.  The 
Seventh Circuit argued: 
[G]iven the increasing presence of unobtrusive, if not invisible, audio 
and video surveillance in all manner of places, public and private, 
one wonders how much of a reminder a detainee needs that he might 
be under surveillance—particularly in a marked police vehicle—or 
that this might be so regardless of whether he can see any obvious 
signs of surveillance devices.211 
By contrast, in the same year, a federal district court came to quite 
a different result.  The court held that a post-arrest detainee, alone in a 
police interview room, who suspected federal investigators were 
filming him, had a subjective and reasonable expectation of privacy 
when he deliberately mumbled to himself to maintain his composure 
out of earshot of the camera.212 
As the Fourth Amendment protects the person from the state, rather 
than protecting specific places or things,213 the courts should value and 
protect personal privacy assiduously in the face of technological 
innovation.  Justice Sotomayor has warned of multiple constitutional 
rights vulnerable to infringement because of the technological ease of 
surveillance and data analytics:  “Awareness that the Government may 
be watching chills associational and expressive freedoms. And the 
Government’s unrestrained power to assemble data that reveal private 
aspects of identity is susceptible to abuse.”214  The heightened interest 
in preserving American life without fear of general state surveillance in 
a digital and technological age has caught the attention of the Court. 
                                                          
211.  United States v. Paxton, 848 F.3d 803, 812 (7th Cir. 2017) (internal 
citation omitted) (relying in part on two law review articles discussing surveillance 
technology, rather than empirical evidence of commonly held beliefs about the 
presence of surveillance, to arrive at a reasonableness measure). 
212.  United States v. Llufrio, 237 F. Supp. 3d 735 (N.D. Ill. 2017). 
213.  Jones, 565 U.S. at 406 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 
(1967)). 
214.  Id. at 416 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  Cf. NAACP v. Alabama, 
357 U.S. 449 (1958) (upholding the right to associational privacy against mandates 
for a private organization to disclose names and addresses of its members). 
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2.  Privacy Intrusions and Deprivations of Social Contact as Cruel 
and Unusual Punishment under the Eighth Amendment 
The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment, 
including torture as punishment.215  The Amendment does not apply 
unless the state action in question is deemed a form of punishment, 
which takes into account both subjective and objective factors.  That is, 
to succeed in a claim for violation of the Eighth Amendment a prisoner 
must be able to show that (1) “objectively, the deprivation of a basic 
human need was sufficiently serious” based on “contemporary 
standards of decency,”216 posing a “substantial risk of serious harm”217; 
and (2) that subjectively the prison officials “acted with a sufficiently 
culpable state of mind,” which addresses both excessive punishment 
and deliberate indifference to inhumane conditions.218 
The Seventh Circuit has explained that “[e]ven where prison 
authorities are able to identify a valid correctional justification for [a] 
search, it may still violate the Eighth Amendment if ‘conducted in a 
harassing manner intended to humiliate and cause psychological 
pain.’”219  Strip searches, body-cavity searches, and being “paraded in 
a see-through jumpsuit” by prison guards have all supported a claim of 
cruel and unusual punishment when they are found to be unnecessary 
and not serving a legitimate penological purpose.220 
Also, under the Eighth Amendment, a prisoner has a right to 
adequate medical and mental health care, where deprivation of such 
care would constitute cruel and unusual punishment.221  Courts have 
                                                          
215.  See In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890) (“Punishments are cruel 
when they involve torture or a lingering death[.]”); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 
136 (1879) (“[I]t is safe to affirm that punishments of torture . . . and all others in the 
same line of unnecessary cruelty, are forbidden by that amendment[.]”).   
216.  Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 
429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976)). 
217.  Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). 
218.  See Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir. 1996); see also 
Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991). 
219.  King v. McCarty, 781 F.3d 889, 897 (7th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). 
220.  See, e.g., id. 
221.  See Mintun v. Corizon Med. Serv., No. 1:16-cv-00367-DCN, 2018 WL 
1040088 (D. Idaho Feb. 22, 2018) (addressing a claim for lack of adequate mental 
health services to a prisoner on the autism spectrum); Braggs v. Dunn, 257 F. Supp. 
3d 1171 (M.D. Ala. 2017) (failing to provide mentally ill prisoners with adequate 
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taken care to limit this protection to serious medical needs, where 
“routine discomfort that is part of the penalty that criminal offenders 
pay for their offenses against society” does not constitute a serious 
medical need.222  While this represents an expansion of Eighth 
Amendment protection beyond use of physical force and historically 
barbarous forms of punishment, the analysis does not extend more 
broadly to violations based on a totality of conditions of confinement.223 
In civil confinement, the harsh impact of certain state actions may 
render the action punitive.  Therefore, while Eighth Amendment 
constitutional protection would usually serve those confined by the 
criminal justice system, rather than in civil confinement settings, 
occasionally in hybrid settings evoking criminal and civil purposes the 
amendment may apply.  For example, a sex offender registry may be 
intended by the legislature to create a civil, regulatory remedy, but state 
and federal courts have found some to be so restrictive or so arbitrarily 
applied that they exert a punitive impact akin to banishment or public 
shaming, historically deemed cruel and unusual punishment.224  
Whether such registries are deemed civil or criminal, in effect they are 
a form of mass public surveillance with lifelong consequences.225  
Internet transparency has also complicated the question, where the 
potential social stigma of mass surveillance is exacerbated as sex 
offender status can be checked in seconds.  As one justice of the Ohio 
Supreme Court envisioned:  “In this age of instant Internet chat rooms, 
imagine the future for his children when the mothers’ network alerts all 
the grade-school children to avoid anyone who lives at 123 Elm Street. 
                                                          
mental health care exhibited deliberate indifference and cruel and unusual 
punishment). 
222.  Mintun, 2018 WL 1040088, at *4.  See also Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 
337, 349 (1981) (finding the Constitution “does not mandate comfortable prisons”); 
Ashann-Ra v. Virginia, 112 F. Supp. 2d 559 (W.D. Va. 2000) (asserting that providing 
ill-fitting shoes to a prisoner does not equate to cruel and unusual punishment). 
223.  Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1246 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (“Nothing 
so amorphous as overall conditions can rise to the level of cruel and unusual 
punishment when no specific deprivation of a single human need exists[.]”) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
224.  Millard v. Rankin, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1211, 1226-27 (D. Colo. 2017). 
225.  See, e.g., State v. Blankenship, 48 N.E.3d 516, 525 (2015) (O’Donnell, J., 
concurring) (arguing that a lifetime sex offender registry is civil and non-punitive, but 
concurring in the judgment). 
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These requirements fall directly within the definition of the phrase 
‘cruel and unusual.’”226 
Nevertheless, harsh conditions are often deemed a legitimate part 
of the punishment imposed by the state.  Thus, to constitute cruel and 
unusual punishment the deprivation must be so serious that it is 
essentially a denial of the “minimal civilized measure of life’s 
necessities.”227  To be civilized requires a respect for humanity.  Thus, 
a sentencing program like that reported in Australia, with constant AI-
surveillance of persons in home detention, electrically shocking them 
before they violate conditions of detention,228 should not withstand 
constitutional scrutiny in the United States.  Treating inmates like 
animals or “less than human” is identified as cruel and unusual 
punishment in the United States and against the standards of human 
decency.229  Even zoo animals have received consideration by the 
courts in abuse cases as having a basic need for privacy from constant 
observation by patrons of the zoo, as well as the need for socialization 
with other animals.230 
Constant governmental surveillance may be a designated form of 
punishment in many societies.231  In the U.S., cruel and unusual 
punishment may include purely psychological punishment,232 as well 
                                                          
226.  Id. at 534 (O’Neill, J., dissenting). 
227.  Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). 
228.  See supra note 11. 
229.  See Morris v. Zefferi, 601 F.3d 805 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding that 
transporting a prisoner in a dog cage constitutes cruel and unusual punishment); Spain 
v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 200 (9th Cir. 1979) (maintaining that under the Eighth 
Amendment, “prisoners are not to be treated as less than human beings”). 
230.  See People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Tri-State 
Zoological Park of W. Md., Inc., Civil Action No. MJG-17-2148, 2018 WL 434229 
(D. Md. Jan. 16, 2018) (denying a motion to dismiss a claim based on the federal 
Animal Welfare Act). 
231.  For example, the Chinese criminal code adopted in the 1980s included a 
punishment translated as “public surveillance,” in which petty offenders are not 
imprisoned, but are subject to labor under mass surveillance along with regular 
reporting requirements.  MICHAEL, supra note 88, at 126.   
232.  See Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144, 153 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, J., 
concurring and dissenting) (identifying numerous cases that hold that “purely 
psychological punishments can sometimes be deemed cruel and unusual”).  Article I 
of the 1987 United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment states in part: “[T]he term ‘torture’ means any 
act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally 
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as permanent constant surveillance for life.233  As the Court 
acknowledged in Weems v. United States, when expanding the scope of 
the Eighth Amendment to reach state actions outside the bounds of 
traditional categories of barbarity, the guiding policy is that “cruelty 
might become an instrument of tyranny; of zeal for a purpose, either 
honest or sinister.”234  Justice White, dissenting in Weems, invoked 
natural law and an originalist interpretation to the amendment, arguing 
cruel and unusual punishment should be defined by the odious practices 
of past monarchies from which the United States broke free.235  Today, 
the focus has shifted to proportionality in sentencing, including an 
added recognition of the particular vulnerabilities of certain prisoners, 
such as juveniles and those with mental illness or intellectual 
disabilities.236 
Finding state surveillance to infringe on autonomy rights to such an 
extent that the monitoring becomes unconstitutionally punitive is not an 
easily reached conclusion, particularly when searches and surveillance 
are key to institutional security.  For example, a claim of cruel and 
unusual punishment based on visual body-cavity searches in prison, one 
of the most intrusive forms of state surveillance, was initially dismissed 
                                                          
inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person 
information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has 
committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a 
third person[.]” 
233. See, e.g., In re C.P., 967 N.E.2d 729 (Ohio 2012) (holding lifelong sex 
offender registration and notification requirements for juvenile convictions violate the 
Eighth Amendment); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 366 (1910) (“His prison 
bars and chains are removed, it is true, after twelve years, but he goes from them to a 
perpetual limitation of his liberty.”).  But see State v. Blankenship, 48 N.E.3d 516 
(Ohio 2015) (upholding, in a divided opinion, lifetime sex offender registration for a 
21-year-old adult statutory rape offender against a cruel and unusual punishment 
claim). 
234. Weems, 217 U.S. at 373. 
235. Id. at 406 (White, J., dissenting) (asserting that drowning, 
disembowelment, boiling in oil, and other forms of torture are prohibited under the 
Eighth Amendment and are “not warranted by the laws of nature or society”). 
236.  See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding the death penalty as 
punishment for a person with an intellectual disability to be cruel and unusual); In re 
C.P., 967 N.E.2d 729 (Ohio 2012) (following U.S. Supreme Court precedent 
regarding juvenile sentencing and the death penalty when recognizing that juveniles 
are less culpable and more capable of rehabilitation than adult offenders, thus 
removing them from lifetime sex offender registry status). 
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by a federal district court because “the conditions did not constitute a 
denial of basic human needs, and the defendants were not personally 
involved in creating the conditions.”237  However, surveillance may 
also serve to protect persons in confinement from other forms of 
degradation, for example, by deterring physical or sexual abuse, or 
identifying medical neglect.  Therefore, under an Eighth Amendment 
analysis, prisoners have claimed to be subject to too much surveillance, 
as well as too little.238 
Currently, an Eighth Amendment analysis is more deferential to the 
state for its use of surveillance monitoring than it is for its use of 
technology to facilitate removal of all human contact, as would be 
possible by remote AI surveillance.  In cases addressing solitary 
confinement, the Court has shown a longstanding recognition of the 
terrible toll of social isolation on prisoners, while the prison system 
openly admits to the risk of psychological harm.239  In 1890, the Court 
asserted that solitary confinement serves “as an additional punishment 
of such a severe kind that it is spoken of . . . as ‘a further terror and 
peculiar mark of infamy.’”240  There, the Court found a Colorado death 
penalty statute violated ex post facto prohibitions by adding the 
additional punishment of keeping all prisoners subject to execution in 
solitary confinement ignorant of their date of hanging.241 
                                                          
237.  Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 323 (3d Cir. 2016) (reversing the district 
court’s ruling on a Fourth Amendment basis). 
238.  E.g., Lyons v. Wall, C.A. No. 08-498-M, 2012 WL 3682983, at *4 (D. 
R.I. Aug. 24, 2012) (unreported) (finding, with respect to plaintiff’s section 1983 
claim, that a prison psychologist who took a prisoner “off camera” against his will 
(i.e., to a prison cell without a camera), did not inflict cruel and unusual punishment, 
despite the prisoner’s claim that he could more easily attempt to commit suicide). 
239.  See DOJ RESTRICTIVE HOUSING, supra note 19, at i (“[A]ccording to 
recent research and reports, as well as the [Federal Bureau of Prisons’] own policy, 
confinement in [restrictive housing units], even for relatively short periods of time, 
can adversely affect inmates’ mental health and can be particularly harmful for 
inmates with mental illness.”); cf. Nearly 20 Percent of Prison and Jail Inmates Spent 
Time in Segregation or Solitary Confinement in 2011-12, BUR. OF JUST. STAT., U.S. 
DEPT. OF JUST. (Oct. 23, 2015, 9:00 AM), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/press/ 
urhuspj1112pr.cfm (claiming that “[r]ates of SPD [serious psychological distress] did 
not increase with the length of time inmates had been in restrictive housing”).  
240.  In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 170 (1890) (granting prisoner’s petition for 
habeas corpus). 
241.  Id. at 172. 
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The importance of judicial attitudes towards solitary confinement 
cannot be understated, when technology has transformed state 
institutions allowing for significantly reduced human staffing and 
permanent solitary confinement in the United States.242  One federal 
court described a maximum security prison, facing claims of excessive 
force and permanent solitary confinement, a modernized “prison of the 
future.”243 
Regarding the earliest known practices of solitary confinement in 
the 1700s, the Supreme Court notes that the practice was initially an 
experiment connected to hospital care when “public attention was 
[subsequently] called to the evils of congregating persons in masses 
without employment [in prison].”244  Having been banned as a 
punishment in Great Britain, public outcry in the United States also 
quickly emerged regarding the use of solitary confinement after it was 
revealed that: 
[a] considerable number of the prisoners fell, after even a short 
confinement, into a semi-fatuous condition, from which it was next 
to impossible to arouse them, and others became violently insane; 
others still, committed suicide; while those who stood the ordeal 
better were not generally reformed, and in most cases did not recover 
sufficient mental activity to be of any subsequent service to the 
community.245 
Today, the United States is the only nation in the developed world 
that permits extended solitary confinement as a form of punishment.246  
In 2015, the Supreme Court in Davis v. Ayala averred that “years on 
end of near-total isolation exact a terrible price,” addressing the solitary 
confinement of a prisoner with an intellectual disability who had been 
confined awaiting execution for over 40 years.247  After decades of an 
                                                          
242.  See infra Part III(B). 
243.  Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1155 (N.D. Cal. 1995). 
244.  Medley, 134 U.S. at 167. 
245.  Id. at 169. 
246.  Brandon Keim, Solitary Confinement: The Invisible Torture, WIRED 
(April 29, 2009, 8:30 PM), https://www.wired.com/2009/04/solitaryconfinement/.  
247.  Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2210 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
See also Ruiz v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1246, 1247 (2017) (Breyer, J., dissenting from a 
denial of application for stay of execution of sentence of death) (describing the nature 
of the human toll on the prisoner awaiting execution for 22 years, including 
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equivocal stance toward the imposition of solitary confinement,248 the 
lower federal courts are finally beginning to address its psychological 
impact more fully,249 with special emphasis on the vulnerabilities of 
mentally ill prisoners in isolation.250 
In 2018, in Porter v. Clarke, the federal district court considered 
the conditions of death row inmates in a Virginia state prison who were 
housed in single cells that did not permit any communication between 
cells, where inmates were granted an hour of outdoor recreation every 
five days, cell phone use on request, and the use of books, television, 
and compact disk (CD) players in their cell for entertainment.251  The 
case provides a prescient nod to an understanding of the potential risks 
and benefits of an AI or remotely-run prison and whether machine 
substitutions for human contact carry serious psychological risks of 
social deprivation, particularly under constant surveillance. 
As litigation began against the Virginia prison, social contact was 
ultimately allowed between death row inmates and outdoor recreation 
time was increased.252  Nevertheless, the case proceeded and 
specifically analyzed “whether the deprivation of human contact and 
stimulation was an extreme deprivation—that is, whether it caused a 
serious or significant physical or emotional injury or the substantial risk 
of such an injury.”253  Repeatedly, the court cites longstanding 
precedent establishing that deprivation of all human contact and 
                                                          
“symptoms long associated with solitary confinement, namely severe anxiety and 
depression, suicidal thoughts, hallucinations, disorientation, memory loss, and sleep 
difficulty”). 
248.  See, e.g., Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995) (finding segregated 
confinement for 30 days as discipline did not implicate a due process liberty interest 
when it did not extend the length of sentence).   
249.  See Porter v. Clarke, 290 F. Supp. 3d 518 (E.D. Va. 2018), appeal filed, 
Case No. 18-6257 (4th Cir. 2018); see also Colleen Murphy, Comment, The Solitary 
Confinement of Girls in the United States: International Law and the Eighth 
Amendment, 92 TUL. L. REV. 697 (2018). 
250.  See Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209 (3d Cir. 2017) (finding deliberate 
indifference to the needs of a mentally ill prisoner who committed suicide in solitary 
confinement). 
251.  Porter, 290 F. Supp. 3d at 522-23. 
252.  Id. at 524. 
253.  Id. at 527 (internal quotations omitted). 
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“complete isolation of the prisoner from all human society” is a serious 
deprivation.254 
Importantly, the state argued that access to television and other 
entertainment decreased the inmates’ social isolation.255  The federal 
district court was not persuaded, opining that: 
The limited communication, stimulation, and contact provided to 
plaintiffs before 2015 does not overcome plaintiffs’ showing that the 
vast majority of their time—almost every hour of the day—was spent 
alone, in a small, practically windowless, cell. When they were 
outdoors for five hours a week, they remained alone in an outdoor 
cage. Although they had access to television, music, and books, they 
had no access to congregate religious, educational, or social 
programming.256 
The court in Porter expressly stated that human interaction is a basic 
human need, despite the defendants’ assertion that this claim was too 
amorphous because basic human needs under an Eighth Amendment 
analysis are more concrete, such as exercise or food.257  Other courts 
have identified concrete “minimum essentials” under the Eighth 
Amendment to include shelter, clothing, medical care, sanitation, 
warmth, and security.258 
In 2018, with more psychological research available than in 
decades past, the Porter court turned to psychological expert testimony 
on the impact of social isolation: 
In particular, prolonged isolation has “led to clinical levels of 
depression that include dysphoric mood, constricted affect, 
hopelessness, feelings of worthlessness, anhedonia (loss of 
enjoyment in even basic pleasures), anergia (a low level or lack of 
energy), and suicidal ideation.”  Moreover, the restrictive 
confinement has caused a substantial reduction in plaintiffs’ 
“initiative and motivation to maintain contact with family members 
and other loved ones”; reduced plaintiffs’ “initiative and motivation 
to maintain a healthy physical condition”; and “created a profound 
                                                          
254.  See id.  
255.  Id. 
256.  Id.  
257.  Id. at 528. 
258.  See Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1245-46 (N.D. Cal. 1995). 
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disturbance in sleep patterns and” quantities. . . . [P]laintiffs have 
found “creative use[s] of the limited items available to them” and 
have devised “ways of distracting themselves from boredom by 
relying on forms of self-entertainment.”  Although these coping 
mechanisms allow plaintiffs to deal with the negative effects of their 
restrictive confinement on a day-to-day basis, the cruel irony is that, 
over time, they “thwart basic desire for human interaction” by 
making plaintiffs reliant on “internal resources that have no 
connection with meaningful social interaction with others.”  As a 
result, the coping mechanisms “have ultimately deprived [plaintiffs] 
of a core element of what it means to be human” in a “lasting” way 
that Dr. Hendricks compared to the effects of war on soldiers’ mental 
health.259 
This case is currently pending appeal to Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, and it remains to be seen whether such expert testimony is 
persuasive enough to tip the balance of interests in favor of the social 
rights of prisoners.  The psychological evidence of harm certainly 
presents a stark contrast to what, in 1890, In re Medley, the court could 
only describe using terms like “semi-fatuous.”260 
3.  Fourteenth Amendment Substantive Due Process and the Liberty  
and Privacy Interests 
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, a state shall not “deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”261  
There is no affirmative right to State protection against harms by third 
parties, but the constitutional provision limits state action that may 
cause harm, with more protection owed to persons in state-controlled 
settings.262  While the Eighth Amendment may not be available to most 
                                                          
259.  Porter, at 529-30 (internal citations omitted and emphasis added) (quoting 
from the psychologist’s expert report). 
260.  In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 168 (1890). 
261.  U.S. CONST. amend. 14, § 1. 
262.  See Castle Rock v. Gonzalez, 545 U.S. 748 (2005) (holding there is no 
state duty to enforce a domestic violence protective order in the face of risks of harm 
from private individuals); DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dept. of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 
189, 196-98 (1989) (noting that special duties do not arise merely from state care, but 
from state control).  Cf. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 n.8 (1976) (holding that 
a state’s deprivation of medical care for a prisoner in custody may violate the Eighth 
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persons in civil confinement, the Fourteenth Amendment, in tandem 
with parens patriae duties,263 has served as a critical protection for the 
individual rights of persons in institutions such as nursing homes and 
hospitals for the mentally ill.  While levels of scrutiny and a balance of 
interests are discussed in greater depth below,264 the recognition of a 
liberty interest related to freedom from state surveillance in institutional 
settings will be briefly outlined in this section. 
Typically, a substantive due process claim related to state 
observation or social isolation will address a deprivation of liberty.265  
As with claims based on an Eighth Amendment violation, the person 
confined may argue that the state’s level of monitoring and observation 
of residents is either excessive or insufficient.266  Claims for deliberate 
indifference to serious medical needs in state institutions may ask why 
the state did not surveil the persons in state care more to ensure the 
resident’s right to personal security and protection from abuse.267  “And 
that right [to protection] is not extinguished by lawful confinement, 
even for penal purposes,” as the Court stated in Youngberg v. Romeo.268 
Traditionally, in substantive due process cases involving 
confinement, the Court has tended to focus on the governmental duty 
to avoid risks to physical health, but more recently the Court hints at a 
willingness to consider duties with respect to the mental health of 
persons in state care.  This is important, for the impact of a deprivation 
of a fundamental liberty interest related to exercising autonomy over 
privacy and social contact interests is often psychological.  For 
example, in cases of involuntary commitment, the Fourteenth 
Amendment liberty interest has included “a right to adequate food, 
                                                          
Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment where standards of adequate 
care are regulated by the state).  
263.  See supra Part I(B). 
264.  See infra Part IV(B). 
265.  See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315, 324 (1982) (upholding the 
liberty interest of an involuntarily committed patient with an intellectual disability 
whose arm was broken while in confinement, including a right to be free from bodily 
restraint and to be safely confined). 
266.  See supra note 238. 
267.  See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977) (asserting the “historic” 
right to personal safety and security as a due process liberty interest with respect to 
corporal punishment in public schools). 
268.  Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 315. 
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shelter, clothing, and medical care,” safety, freedom of movement, and 
habilitative training.269  In Vitek v. Jones, the Court explained that state 
authority must comply with minimum due process requirements when 
imposing unusual or severe conditions on confinement that impact such 
interests.270 Later courts relied on Vitek to include within the purview 
of a liberty interest analysis conditions such as involuntary 
administration of antipsychotic medications, a form of physical 
restraint psychologically imposed.271 
The liberty interest invites a broad interpretation, where the Court 
has incorporated the right “generally to enjoy those privileges long 
recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of 
happiness by free men,”272 clearly protecting more than mere physical 
health.  Such claims are met with a measure of restraint, where, for 
example, withholding television access from a prisoner has been 
deemed too minor to implicate a liberty interest.273 
In more recent decisions examining solitary confinement, members 
of the Court have sought to extend this protection, contemplating that 
segregation as a form of non-physical restraint is legally actionable with 
evidence of a negative mental health impact, particularly if the state law 
carves out a right to avoid the state action.274  Justice Breyer, dissenting 
in Sandin v. Conner, argued that the majority should have given more 
weight to the significant change in circumstances of state prison 
confinement, if not the length of confinement, to find a liberty interest: 
In the absence of the punishment, Conner, like other inmates in 
Halawa’s general prison population would have left his cell and 
worked, taken classes, or mingled with others for eight hours each 
day. As a result of disciplinary segregation, however, Conner, for 30 
days, had to spend his entire time alone in his cell (with the exception 
                                                          
269.  Id. at 315, 324. 
270.  Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491 (1980). 
271.  See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221 (1990); Youngberg, 457 
U.S. at 313. 
272.  Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 673 (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 
(1923)). 
273.  Lyon v. Farrier, 727 F.2d 766, 768 (8th Cir. 1984). 
274.  See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 493 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(citing Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 471-72 (1983), which found a prisoner’s liberty 
interest to be created by state regulations “requiring . . . that administrative 
segregation will not occur absent specified substantive predicates”). 
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of 50 minutes each day on average for brief exercise and shower 
periods, during which he nonetheless remained isolated from other 
inmates and was constrained by leg irons and waist chains).275 
The majority in Sandin did note, however, that while liberty interests 
generally have been related to freedom from restraint, such cases may 
also include an extension of a prison sentence or state action which 
“imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to 
the ordinary incidents of prison life.”276 
If the severity of the intrusion is common to general prison 
practices, such as regular body-cavity searches of prisoners to detect 
contraband, courts may not find a liberty interest to be violated.277  The 
Court has been deferential to the exercise of administrative discretion 
in prisons, where discipline for misconduct becomes necessary to 
maintain order and requires a flexible approach.278  Nevertheless, due 
process rights of persons in confinement remain at the forefront of the 
analysis and are required to be taken into account even in highly 
restrictive settings.279 
The Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest provides protections 
from government action when such action is arbitrary and imposed 
without due process.280  In Pennsylvania, inmates kept on death row for 
years after their death sentences were commuted raised cognizable 
substantive due process claims for a violation of their liberty interest, 
reliant in part on the “scientific consensus” of a significantly harmful 
psychological impact.281  Constant surveillance in confined settings is 
                                                          
275.  Id. at 494 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original, internal citation 
omitted). 
276.  Id. at 483-84 (finding no liberty interest violated from 30 days’ solitary 
confinement in state prison). 
277.  Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 323 (3d Cir. 2016). 
278.  Sandin, 515 U.S. at 485. 
279.  See, e.g., Greene v. Edwards, 263 S.E.2d 661 (W.Va. 1980) (holding that 
a tuberculosis carrier detained by the state should have at least the rights of persons 
subject to incarceration or involuntary commitment). 
280.  Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315 (1982).  See also Smith v. Dist. 
of Columbia, 306 F. Supp. 3d 223, 243-44 (D.D.C. 2018) (“the touchstone of due 
process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government”). 
281.  Williams v. Sec’y Pa. Dept. of Corr., 848 F.3d 549, 574 (3d Cir. 2017) 
(noting research data on the impact of solitary confinement on “mental well-being and 
one’s sense of self”). 
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arbitrary if the technology is imposed without adequate human controls, 
but it has thus far not been deemed an atypical or sufficiently severe 
restraint in the courts under the Due Process Clause. 
AI left to evolve in its decisionmaking capacity in an uncontrolled 
state also potentially creates the risk of unacceptable arbitrariness. That 
lack of control would emerge most likely if an AI singularity occurs, 
generally defined as “an artificial general intelligence, a self-teaching 
system that can outperform humans across a wide range of 
disciplines.”282  Concern with the hypothetical singularity is justified in 
one sense because AI has focused on intelligence,283 and intelligence 
without emotion or empathy is akin to handing over control to a 
psychopath.284  As stated by cognitive researcher Margaret Boden, 
“[n]on-mathematical simplifying assumptions in AI are legion – and 
often unspoken.  One is the (tacit) assumption that problems can be 
defined and solved without taking emotions into account . . . .”285  
Hyperbolic alarm about singularity, however, fearing the end of 
                                                          
282.  Stephen Talty, Be(a)ware, SMITHSONIAN 34 (Apr. 2018). 
283.  See BODEN, supra note 9, at 10-28 (outlining the historical development 
of AI research which focused on technological and scientific problem-solving with 
overly heuristic and simplistic assumptions about learning, such as the use of logic 
gates random associations). 
284.  “Psychopathy is defined as a mental (antisocial) disorder in which an 
individual manifests amoral and antisocial behavior, shows a lack of ability to love or 
establish meaningful personal relationships, expresses extreme egocentricity, and 
demonstrates a failure to learn from experience and other behaviors associated with 
the condition.” HENRY R. HERMANN, DOMINANCE AND AGGRESSION IN HUMAN AND 
OTHER ANIMALS: THE GREAT GAME OF LIFE (2017), available at https://www.science 
direct.com/topics/neuroscience/psychopathy. See also Charlie Osborne, Meet 
Norman, the World’s First ‘Psychopathic’ AI, ZDNet (June 7, 2018, 10:06 GMT), 
https://www.zdnet.com/article/meet-norman-the-worlds-first-psychopathic-ai/ 
(describing an AI which adapts to psychopathic choices based on data input by MIT 
researchers); Chris Draper, AI Robot that Learns New Words in Real-Time Tells 
Human Creators It will Keep Them in a “People Zoo”, GLITCH.NEWS (Aug. 27, 
2015), http://glitch.news/2015-08-27-ai-robot-that-learns-new-words-in-real-time-
tells-human-creators-it-will-keep-them-in-a-people-zoo.html.  
285.  BODEN, supra note 9, at 29.  See also Chris Frith & Geraint Rees, A Brief 
History of the Scientific Approach to the Study of Consciousness, in THE BLACKWELL 
COMPANION TO CONSCIOUSNESS 9, 15-16 (Susan Schneider & Max Velmans eds., 
2007) (discussing the challenges of researching unconscious human processes, 
including emotions and subjective interpretation). 
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humanity’s reign, is unnecessary, and more akin to eschatological 
fervor during times of war and crisis.286 
Importantly, federal and state courts have yet to consider, as an 
integrated concept, the intersectionality of surveillance and 
confinement.  The framework for analysis would permit this, however, 
as one court noted with respect to violations of cruel and unusual 
punishment:  “courts may consider conditions in combination ‘when 
they have a mutually enforcing effect that produces the deprivation of 
a single, identifiable human need’[.]”287  As the mental health impact 
of a loss of privacy becomes known and recognized, better arguments 
will be made for a substantive due process right to freedom from 
arbitrary surveillance, particularly when cases also involve AI social 
substitutes enabling deprivations of human social contact.288  All of the 
various legal protections of individual autonomy to navigate private and 
social aspects of human life—state and federal constitutional 
provisions, common law doctrines, and regulatory measures—would 
work well together to better face the impact of surveillance technology, 
including AI.  The modern reality is that in state institutions technology 
enables the panopticon’s constant surveillance, the metal eye of the 
state, where the barely seen man in the central tower may not be man, 
but machine. 
                                                          
286.  See John Markoff, Misconception: Computers will Outstrip Human 
Capabilities Within Many of Our Lifetimes, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/07/science/artificial-intelligence-when-is-the-
singularity.html (“[T]he basic mechanisms for biological intelligence are still not 
completely understood, and as a result there is not a good model of human intelligence 
for computers to simulate[.]”); BODEN, supra note 9, at 154 (asserting that 
“intellectual rationality” is not enough to make AI reach humanity’s capabilities); see 
also PAUL BOYER, WHEN TIME SHALL BE NO MORE 147 (1992) (describing 
evangelical Americans who believe in the end-of-days and accept the intensity of 
devastating national security measures, where those killed are viewed only as 
“eschatological zombies, signposts marking another stage in a sequence of familiar 
[Biblical] events” rather than “flesh-and-blood human beings”). 
287.  Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1246 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (internal 
citation omitted). 
288.  See supra Part II(B)(2). 
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III.  INTRUDING ON THE AUTONOMY OF CONFINED PERSONS: THE 
STATE’S INTEREST 
In a balance of interests, the individual right to privacy under the 
U.S. and several state constitutions reflects a basic need for 
autonomy,289 which may be limited or overridden by justifiable 
government intrusion.290  As the Court asserted in 1972, balancing 
security interests with the right of public protest: 
The price of lawful public dissent must not be a dread of subjection 
to an unchecked surveillance power. Nor must the fear of 
unauthorized official eavesdropping deter vigorous citizen dissent 
and discussion of Government action in private conversation. For 
private dissent, no less than open public discourse, is essential to our 
free society.291 
Framing the right to privacy as a stand-alone right does not 
adequately take into account its close relationship to rights to 
expression or social contact or resistance to tyranny.  They all link 
together conceptually in a right to autonomy to navigate the course of 
private and social lives.  For persons in state confinement, potentially 
subject to constant surveillance, chemical restraint, and solitary 
confinement, the various legal claims asserting infringement on 
autonomy-related rights reveal the legitimacy of the state’s rationales 
for imposing such substantial restrictive measures. 
When the state’s interest and that of the individual align, the 
balance is made easier.  Outside of confined settings, the public expects 
greater individual freedom and the state recognizes that a free society 
is imperative to the survival of a democratically-elected government.292  
Individuals exercise their rights of autonomy to make the choice of 
                                                          
289.  See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219 (2018) 
(upholding Fourth Amendment individual rights against unlawful state surveillance 
despite “the seismic shifts in digital technology”). 
290.  See, e.g., Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014) (holding that a 
warrantless search of for cell phone data violates the Fourth Amendment warrant 
requirement); United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct. E. Dist. Mich., So. Div., 407 U.S. 297, 
313 (1972) (requiring warrant protections before domestic telephonic surveillance of 
community organizations may begin in the interest of national security). 
291.  U.S. Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. at 314. 
292.  See supra Part I(B). 
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when to enter public space and engage in activities where they may be 
observed by others.  Therefore, state surveillance by aerial drones in 
public places would not necessarily invade privacy interests where 
comparable inspection by humans as state agents could have 
occurred.293  Courts have held that surreptitious recording may be 
lawful, where individuals have already consented to in-person 
disclosure of information to a state agent.294  Thus, for the public at 
large, arguably an undercover officer may record a conversation with a 
willing drug dealer, and a Transportation Security Administration 
(“TSA”) agent may record a scanned image of a passenger’s body 
without violating the Fourth Amendment. 
Statutory authorization for intrusions on autonomy are not without 
limitation.  In the public space of airport security, warrantless airport 
searches are lawful if narrowly tailored to legitimate security 
purposes.295  Yet “even with the grave threat posed by airborne terrorist 
attacks, the vital and hallowed strictures of the Fourth Amendment still 
apply: these searches must be reasonable to comport with the 
Constitution.”296  The implementation of full body scanners at TSA 
checks that use advanced imaging technology was met with public 
outcry, decried as an invasive practice because of the enhanced view of 
passengers’ breasts and genitalia observed by a human security guard 
in real time.297  This outcry led to stronger regulatory and policy 
                                                          
293.  See Ricker, supra note 18, at 58 (noting the cost and safety advantages of 
drone inspection of dangerous locations, such as those used by firefighters, oil and 
gas exploration, and search and rescue).  But see Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics 
in Wash. v. U.S. D.O.J., 160 F. Supp. 3d 226 (D.D.C. 2016) (upholding a national 
security exemption from the Freedom of Information Act when denying public access 
to government records on FBI domestic drone use, such as that used in rescue 
operations). 
294.  See Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 439 (1963) (“The Government 
did not use an electronic device to listen in on conversations it could not otherwise 
have heard.”). 
295.  See United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 962 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) 
(permitting random, suspicionless, and warrantless searches of passengers and 
luggage by the government in airports). 
296.  United States v. Marquez, 410 F.3d 612, 618 (9th Cir. 2005). 
297.  Julian Mark Kheel, How Can I Opt Out of the TSA Body Scanners?, 
POINTS GUY (Mar. 13, 2017), https://thepointsguy.com/2017/03/opt-out-tsa-body-
scanners/ (“I’m not sure why you wouldn’t enjoy spending quality time inside a full-
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protections, whereby TSA purportedly no longer stores or prints the 
images, the security guard viewing the image is in a separate area and 
cannot see the passenger directly, and software is being developed to 
provide a more stylized rather than realistic image.298  Current TSA 
policies provide: 
TSA has strict privacy standards when using advanced imaging 
technology to protect your privacy. Advanced imaging technology 
uses automated target recognition software that eliminates 
passenger-specific images and instead auto-detects potential threats 
by indicating their location on a generic outline of a person. The 
generic outline is identical for all passengers.299 
Privacy policies and standard practices are more malleable, of 
course, than statutory mandates.  But a member of the public arguably 
can choose to avoid flying or speaking with those selling illegal 
substances. 
As with observational privacy, informational privacy is subject to 
the exercise of individual autonomy in navigating whether to disclose 
information or to keep it private.  When the balance of state and 
individual interests are not aligned, the state’s purpose is more heavily 
scrutinized to ensure that it is necessary and warranted.  For example, 
with respect to a statutorily-mandated disclosure of patient drug 
prescriptions, the Court in Whalen v. Roe held that the state interest 
                                                          
body scanner machine that’s beaming radiation directly into your body in order to see 
underneath your clothing.”). 
298.  Submission to Screening and Inspection, 49 C.F.R. § 1540.107 (2018) 
(2016) (amending civil regulation security measures in response to public comment 
on privacy concerns).  See also The Associated Press, Just What Can They See?!  Your 
Full Body Scanner Questions Answered, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Dec. 31, 2009, 9:42 
AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/money/full-body-scanner-questions-
answered-article-1.434194.   
299.  Security Screening, TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., https://www.tsa.gov/travel/ 
security-screening (expand the “Security Technology” tab under “Security 
Screening”) (last visited Dec. 3, 2018).  See also Tim Devaney, TSA Sets Rules for 
Full-Body Scanners, HILL (Mar. 2, 2016, 12:42 PM), http://thehill.com/regulation 
/transportation/271490-tsa-floats-full-body-scanner-rules (outlining the introduction 
of full body scanners in 2008 to the full regulatory approval in 2016). 
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justified disclosure,300 but still strongly emphasized the informational 
privacy interest at stake: 
The right to collect and use such data for public purposes is typically 
accompanied by a concomitant statutory or regulatory duty to avoid 
unwarranted disclosures. Recognizing that in some circumstances 
that duty arguably has its roots in the Constitution, nevertheless New 
York’s statutory scheme, and its implementing administrative 
procedures, evidence a proper concern with, and protection of, the 
individual’s interest in privacy.301  
In each of these examples, the judiciary serves as a check by 
ensuring that state interests do not unduly infringe on the privacy 
interests of individuals who remain at liberty in society, acknowledging 
that the interests may be in alignment where the state is also bound to 
protect individual autonomy.  When the autonomy rights of the 
individual are increasingly limited without consent, however, the state 
interest must support the intrusion with an increasingly valid purpose.  
Because an inmate or confined patient is mandated to reside in the state 
facility without consent, the state interest in restrictive measures should 
be weighty.  Therefore, in a time of rapid innovation in surveillance 
technology and autonomous AI that facilitates human isolation, often 
first implemented in institutional settings out of the public eye, it is 
imperative that courts carefully review the importance of the state 
interest involved. 
 
A.  Common State Interests to Intrude on Privacy:  Safety, Security, 
Efficiency, and Cost 
Some state interests are common to most institutional settings, 
whether housing prison inmates, patients in a mental hospital, or 
nursing home residents.  Security and safety are perhaps the most 
important of these common concerns, interests also shared by both the 
individual confined and the state.  The common law doctrines of state 
                                                          
300.  Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 607 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring) 
(“[T]he State’s carefully designed program includes numerous safeguards intended to 
forestall the danger of indiscriminate disclosure”). 
301.  Id. at 605 (emphasis added). 
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police power and the state as parens patriae reinforce the duty of the 
government to ensure the safety of persons in their care and custody.302 
Yet enhanced surveillance technology in facilities both promotes 
and runs afoul of the parens patriae and public health goals of 
promoting the safety and well-being of the individual in a complex 
determination of how the individual functions in society.  For example, 
among persons with mental illness, constant surveillance may increase 
paranoia and fear of state discipline or it may bring comfort and a sense 
of security.  Technology may isolate humans from social contact or it 
may decrease the stigma of human observation if persons are able to 
adjust to an increased degree of surveillance. 
Clearly an important security interest is the duty of prison officials 
“to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners.”303  
Hudson v. Palmer is commonly cited for describing penological 
interests that may justifiably invade a prisoner’s right to privacy, “chief 
among which is internal security.”304  Confined persons may 
specifically request isolation or surveillance to avoid these risks.305  
Advances in surveillance technology may facilitate deterrence of abuse 
perpetrated not only by other inmates and residents, but by state 
employees, as institutional abuse remains a serious concern for the 
involuntarily committed patient, the nursing home patient, and the 
inmate.306  Surveillance and restrictive confinement also serves an 
                                                          
302.  See supra Part I(C).  
303.  Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994). 
304.  Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 523 (1984). See also Parkell v. Danberg, 
833 F.3d 313, 325 (3d Cir. 2016). 
305.  E.g., Lyons v. Wall, C.A. No. 08-498-M, 2012 WL 3682983 (D. R.I. 2012) 
(objecting to prison’s denial of suicidal prisoner’s request for “on camera” 
surveillance); YouTube Channel for The Nat’l Consumer Voice for Quality Long-
Term Care, Balancing Privacy and Protection: Surveillance Cameras in Nursing 
Home Residents’ Rooms (Sept. 12, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j0n 
FXI7UoB8 (presenting options for patients and their guardians to consent to constant 
video surveillance in residential facilities to deter and identify elder abuse). 
306.  See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) (applying an Eighth 
Amendment analysis in requiring a conscious disregard of an excessive risk to inmate 
health or safety, as opposed to criminal negligence, when holding that prison staff 
members’ disregard of prison rape constitutes punishment under the Eighth 
Amendment); The Nat’l Consumer Voice, supra note 305. 
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important function in preventing suicide and other forms of self-
harm.307 
New technology also poses new security concerns.  For example, 
prison administrators currently struggle with the risk of prisoners 
illicitly receiving cell phones and other contraband by drone delivery 
over prison walls.308  Whether such a risk causes a need for additional 
searches, including visual body-cavity searches of prisoners, remains to 
be seen.  Thus, security risks and how security is achieved may vary 
significantly, impacting the balance of interests. 
At times, the interest in security has been stated in absolutist terms.  
In Johnson v. Phelan, in 1995, the Seventh Circuit argued:  “Inter-
prisoner violence is endemic, so constant vigilance without regard to 
the state of the prisoners’ dress is essential. Vigilance over showers, 
vigilance over cells—vigilance everywhere, which means that guards 
gaze upon naked inmates.”309  Few courts have endowed the state’s 
security interest with such weight, applying a balancing test analysis 
which is highly fact-sensitive and subject to evolving standards of 
decency.310  Indeed, the Ninth Circuit recently held that female guard 
observation of a male detainee using toilet and shower facilities raised 
a cognizable Fourth Amendment claim.311 
                                                          
307.  See Nat’l Comm’n on Corr. Health Care, Position Statement, Prevention 
of Juvenile Suicide in Correctional Settings 3 (Oct. 2012), available at 
https://www.ncchc.org/filebin/Positions/Prevention-of-Juvenile-Suicide-in-
Correctional-Settings.pdf (identifying three levels of required medical observation for 
confined juveniles who may be suicidal).  
308.  See Josh Saul, Prisoners Use Smuggled Phones and Drones, But Justice 
Department Plans to Jam Airways, NEWSWEEK (Jan. 8, 2018, 1:53 PM), 
http://www.newsweek.com/prison-cell-phone-drone-jam-justice-department-
rosenstein-774330; Devin Coldewey, Federal Prisons Seek Methods to Shut Down 
Contraband-Toting Drones, CORRECTIONSONE (Nov. 6, 2015),  https://www.correct 
ionsone.com/prison-technology/articles/38440187-Federal-prisons-seek-methods-to-
shut-down-contraband-toting-drones/.  
309.  Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144, 146 (7th Cir. 1995). 
310.  See Patchette v. Nix, 952 F.2d 158, 163 (8th Cir. 1991) (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted) (stating that the Eighth Amendment “draw[s] its meaning 
from the evolving standards of decency that mark the process of a maturing society”); 
see also infra note 458 (addressing cross-gender surveillance of inmates). 
311.  See Byrd v. Maricopa Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 845 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 
2017). 
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Unfortunately, state surveillance bears the concomitant risk of 
placing the confined in an even more vulnerable state.  These persons 
are already more likely to be subject to the lawful use of force by the 
government, such as body cavity searches, physical or medical restraint, 
or forced movement, practices which are largely self-regulated by the 
facility officials.312  Unlawful use of force or medical neglect is more 
easily concealed when the surveillance records are controlled by the 
same agency monitoring the confined person.313 
The modern government facility system holds millions of 
individuals in confinement who themselves constitute a major sector of 
the public.314  Their selection for confinement, punishment and/or 
treatment is continually challenged on due process grounds, and 
occasionally equal protection grounds, enhancing concern over the 
disparate impact of advanced surveillance technology in facilities.315  
Thus, a key state interest is that its use of technology in confinement 
exemplify standards of fairness and equity, considering not only levels 
of need to ensure security, but levels of impact based on demographics, 
such as race, gender, sexual orientation, age, disability, and other 
important forms of identity.316 
                                                          
312.  E.g., J.B. ex rel. Benjamin v. Fassnacht, 801 F.3d 336, 342 (3d Cir. 2015) 
(upholding strip search with body cavity inspection of juvenile detainee as a lawful 
exercise of parens patriae authority where it promoted penological interests in facility 
safety, and inspection of the detainee for evidence of parental abuse of the child); 
Bigley v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 208 P.3d 168, 185 (Alaska 2009) (balancing the 
patient’s fundamental due process privacy and liberty interests against the hospital’s 
compelling state interest under its parens patriae authority to force administration of 
psychotropic medications in the best interests of a patient with limited capacity). 
313.  See Mary D. Fan, Missing Police Body Camera Videos: Remedies, 
Evidentiary Fairness, and Automatic Activation, 52 GA. L. REV. 57 (2017) (revealing 
that most police departments do not adequately enforce body camera use and have no 
procedures to do so).  
314.  See generally Reuben Jonathan Miller & Amanda Alexander, The Price 
of Carceral Citizenship: Punishment, Surveillance, and Social Welfare Policy in an 
Age of Carceral Expansion, 21 MICH. J. RACE & L. 291 (2016). 
315.  E.g., Smith v. Ryan, 137 S. Ct. 1283 (2017) (Breyer, J.) (commenting, in 
a denial of certiorari, on the “terrible price” of long-term solitary confinement while 
awaiting the death penalty with regard to a prisoner whose intellectual disability the 
Ninth Circuit had been struggling to assess). 
316.  See infra note 497 and accompanying text. 
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Finally, in terms of efficiency and cost, state and commercial 
interests may align, but state and individual interests may not. 317  Cost 
and efficiency are legitimate state interests in privacy claims, interests 
which the courts consider closely in a feasibility analysis of restrictive 
means.318  Advocates for those confined suggest that the government is 
lured by the surveillance technology industry to purchase ever more 
intrusive products for its state institutions, such as AI-based hallway 
cameras or drones hovering over recreational areas in facilities.319 
The state may argue that cost savings justify the elimination of 
human staff and any negative impact on those confined.  Indeed, 
institutional funding is a persistent concern, where courts may construe 
efforts to accommodate constitutional rights, such as remodeling a 
facility to ensure greater privacy, to be too costly to be a reasonable 
accommodation.320  Where over half of the operating costs of a prison 
are attributed to human labor,321 replacement of human staff with 
remote constant surveillance is cost-effective, but not necessarily 
                                                          
317.  See generally Quill, supra note 6, at 89 (“But today’s technologists are 
different from Comte’s [early 1800s] techno-spiritual elite in that they often operate 
at the head of corporations that provide services and products for a fee, many of which 
owe their success as much to marketing as to their contributions to the general 
welfare.”). 
318.  See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring) (noting the dangerous temptation of less costly surveillance technology 
that risks greater infringement on privacy rights). “And because GPS monitoring 
is cheap in comparison to conventional surveillance techniques and, by design, 
proceeds surreptitiously, it evades the ordinary checks that constrain abusive law 
enforcement practices: ‘limited police resources and community hostility.’” Id. 
(quoting Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 426 (2004)).  See also Teague v. Schimel, 
896 N.W.2d 286, 310 (Wis. 2017) (holding that the Wisconsin statutory procedure to 
correct inaccurate criminal record information in a large state database with digital 
fingerprint identifiers was inadequate to safeguard the claimant’s liberty interest, and 
criticizing the procedures and technology as “quick, cheap, and easy”).   
319.  See TIM WU, THE ATTENTION MERCHANTS: THE EPIC SCRAMBLE TO GET 
INSIDE OUR HEADS 344 (2016) (“[T]he goals of the attention merchants are generally 
at odds with ours[.]”). 
320.  Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 333 (9th Cir. 1988) (addressing 
remodeling of facilities to ensure privacy during strip searches and body-cavity 
searches). 
321.  ALAN ELSNER, GATES OF INJUSTICE: THE CRISIS IN AMERICA’S PRISONS 
211 (2d ed. 2006). 
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justifiable when considering the basic human need for privacy and 
social contact. 
Safety, security, efficiency, and cost, as well as fairness in 
application, are thus all common legitimate concerns for state 
institutions when designing and implementing restrictive measures.  
Not all persons in confinement, however, bear the same levels of 
concerns or the same needs, as will be discussed below in 
differentiating state interests in penal and civil state institutions from a 
historical perspective. 
B.  The State Interest to Intrude on Prisoner Autonomy 
Simply put, while the confinement may feel quite similar at times 
for those confined, the primary difference between confinement of 
criminals and patients is the goal of punishment in criminal settings and 
treatment in medical settings.  For prisoners, “[t]he limitations on the 
exercise of constitutional rights arise both from the fact of incarceration 
and from valid penological objectives—including deterrence of crime, 
rehabilitation of prisoners, and institutional security.”322  Inmates pose 
particular challenges in ensuring safe confinement because they may 
have a demonstrated tendency towards violence or deception. 
In 1984, in Hudson v. Palmer, the Court posited that “in traditional 
Fourth Amendment terms [a privacy right] is fundamentally 
incompatible with the close and continual surveillance of inmates and 
their cells required to ensure institutional security and internal 
order.”323  In addition to security, restraint on individual rights also may 
be justified, according to the Court, on practical grounds and as 
“reminders that, under our system of justice, deterrence and retribution 
are factors in addition to correction.”324 
Identifying the intentions behind the state’s restrictive measures 
presupposes that prison itself is a legitimate enterprise.  Historically, 
punishment through prison confinement was considered a softer 
approach than the death penalty, torture, and public humiliation that 
preceded it.325  Foucault explains that in the early 1800s, the arrival of 
                                                          
322.  O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987). 
323.  Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 527-28 (1984). 
324.  Id. at 524. 
325.  See Pieter Spierenburg, Four Centuries of Prison History: Punishment, 
Suffering, the Body, and Power, in INSTITUTIONS OF CONFINEMENT: HOSPITALS, 
74
California Western Law Review, Vol. 55 [2019], No. 1, Art. 2
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol55/iss1/2
FINAL Brobst camera ready (Do Not Delete) 1/8/2019  10:36 AM 
2018] THE METAL EYE  75 
penal institutions “[made] it possible to substitute for force or other 
violent constraints the gentle efficiency of total surveillance; of 
ordering space according to the recent humanization of the codes and 
the new penitentiary theory.”326  Prison itself was a substantial and 
civilized reform of the penological system, allowing for redemption and 
reform of the prisoners within the prison walls.327 
In Jeremy Bentham’s influential 18th century Panopticon, 
proposing an architectural structure with a central observational tower 
designed for constant surveillance over the confined surrounding the 
tower, Bentham saw a more humane form of state control, applicable 
not only to prisons, but to work-houses, mad-houses, poor houses, 
hospitals, and schools.328  He wrote that the panopticon’s success lay 
not in absolute perfect surveillance, which would be practically 
impossible at the time; rather, “that, at every instant, seeing reason to 
believe as much, and not being able to satisfy himself to the contrary, 
[the prisoner] should conceive himself to be so [surveilled].”329  
Benthamites would acknowledge that “all punishment is evil”, but 
suggest that prison confinement as a form of punishment, is justifiable 
under utilitarian principles if it “promises to exclude some greater 
evil.”330  In effect, Bentham argues that punishment should be 
                                                          
ASYLUMS, AND PRISONS IN WESTERN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA, 1500-1950 17, 
22 (Norbert Finzsch & Robert Jütte eds., 1996). 
326.  FOUCAULT, supra note 70, at 249. 
327.  In Medieval times in the 1500s, Henry VIII of England had 72,000 
“vagabonds” hanged, a time when police and investigative services were first 
instituted.  BLOCH, supra note 3, at 245.  See also FOUCAULT, supra note 70, at 11. 
(“From being an art of unbearable sensations punishment has become an economy of 
suspended rights”). “In short, penal imprisonment, from the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, covered both the deprivation of liberty and the technical 
transformation of individuals.”  Id. at 233. 
328.  See Jeremy Bentham, Panopticon; or, The Inspection-House: Containing 
the Idea of a New Principle of Construction Applicable to Any Sort of Establishment, 
in which Persons of Any Description are to be Kept Under Inspection; and in 
Particular to Penitentiary-Houses (1787), in JEREMY BENTHAM, THE WORKS OF 
JEREMY BENTHAM, vol. 4 (John Bowring ed., William Tait, 1843), available at 
http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/bentham-the-works-of-jeremy-bentham-vol-4.  
329.  Id. (providing a detailed description of the panopticon’s structure in Letter 
I “Idea of the Inspection Principle” and Letter II). 
330.  JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 
AND LEGISLATION 158 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., Clarendon Press 1996) (1780). 
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efficacious for reform and deterrence, and proportionate to the severity 
of the offense.331 
Reform was to be achieved through work and industriousness, but 
prison was to be more than a factory of communal workers.332  It was 
also meant to separate and awaken criminals, keeping them in solitude, 
away from each other’s vices, while granting them the opportunity to 
rediscover in their conscience “the voice of good.”333  In a confined 
setting, for Foucault, heavily influenced by Bentham’s Panopticon, 
“the prison became a sort of permanent observatory”334 allowing for 
effective distribution of persons, experimentation, fear and control.335  
When one is aware of being constantly observed, it reduces the need for 
physical control and promotes self-subjugation.336 
In American prisons today, the use of electronic video surveillance 
achieves the same purpose:  “Some cameras are so well hidden, they 
are not suspected by inmates to be present.  On the other hand, rumors 
abound among inmates that there are cameras where none exist.”337  
One federal district court quoted with approval the justifications of 
wardens and guards for this electronic surveillance system: 
“[i]t is a significant advantage to have inmates uncertain as to what 
is being monitored, what is recorded, and what is in the field of 
view. . . . Prison surveillance cameras provide staff and officials a 
steady and valuable stream of intelligence information which is used 
in prison investigations and is often used to support prison infractions 
and/or criminal prosecutions.”338 
                                                          
331.  Id. at 176. 
332.  FOUCAULT, supra note 70, at 122. 
333.  Id. 
334.  Id. at 126. 
335.  Id. at 203 (describing Bentham’s Panopticon as a laboratory for human 
social and behavioral experimentation).  But see Macias, supra note 99, at 1030 n.3 
(identifying the scholarship of Bentham’s Panopticon beyond Foucault, which focuses 
on both positive and negative effects of state surveillance). 
336.  FOUCAULT, supra note 70, at 203.  
337.  Florer v. Schrum, No. C11–5135 BHS/KLS, 2012 WL 2995071, at *2 
(W.D. Wash. June 23, 2012) (denying prisoners, in the interests of security, a 
discovery motion for physical possession of video surveillance tapes, but permitting 
viewing the content of the tapes). 
338.  Id. at *2-*3. 
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Judge Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit in Johnson v. Phelan, also 
supported the state’s use of surveillance: “Anonymous visual 
inspections from afar are considerably less intrusive and carry less 
potential for ‘the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’” of bodily 
searches under an Eighth Amendment analysis.339 
While Bentham saw the panopticon as a utilitarian good, he still 
considered discomfort part of that good.  In recommending that the 
panopticon include for each prisoner a raised iron bed with bedding, he 
noted that its purpose was not comfort, which would “gain[] 
nothing”.340  Courts today agree that prison conditions may be 
“restrictive and even harsh,” but they may not be inhumane.341  It is a 
fine line to be drawn.  For Bentham, approved punishments would be 
inhumane if they caused the physical injury of torture or death, 
recommending the following instead:  “Outrageous clamour may be 
subdued and punished by gagging; manual violence, by the strait 
waistcoat; refusal to work, by a denial of food till the task is done.”342  
Today, surveillance in penal institutions is meant to keep order and 
thereby protect the inmates from abuse by each other or by staff, with 
some lawsuits indicating a need for more surveillance.343  The softer 
approach of the prison as a modern form of punishment is not the 
                                                          
339.  Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144, 148 (7th Cir. 1995). 
340.  Bentham, Panopticon, supra note 328 (Postscript Part I, Section VIII 
“Bedding”). 
341.  See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994) (internal citations and 
quotation marks omitted) (“Prison conditions may be restrictive and even harsh, but 
gratuitously allowing the beating or rape of one prisoner by another serves no 
legitimate penological objectiv[e], any more than it squares with evolving standards 
of decency[.]”). 
342.  Bentham, Panopticon, supra note 328 (Postscript Part I, Section XIV “Of 
Punishments”). 
343.  E.g., Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 520 (2011) (finding an Eighth 
Amendment violation in part due to “CRAMPED conditions [that] promote unrest 
and violence, making it difficult for prison officials to monitor and control the prison 
population”) (all caps in original); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) (holding 
that prison staff may be found deliberately indifferent to transsexual prisoners’ risk of 
rape when placed in the general prison population in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause); Ferreira v. Arpaio, No. CV-15-
01845-PHX-JAT, 2017 WL 6554674, at *8 (D. Ariz. Dec. 22, 2017) (addressing a 
section 1983 claim by the mother of an inmate beaten to death by his cell mate, 
specifically claiming a violation of the due process right to be free from violence from 
other inmates).   
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experience for some, where incarceration is “a question of survival, 
nothing more.”344 
Arguably, AI could potentially provide a physically safer and more 
neutral institutional environment than that seen in the nightmare realm 
of supermax prisons, but it would potentially be devoid of real human 
contact, bearing a risk of psychological harm.  Supermax prisons, which 
arose in the 1990s, used surveillance and isolation strategies at their 
most extreme level.345  Some supermax cells where prisoners were 
isolated for years were reportedly constantly illuminated and deprived 
prisoners of any outdoor recreation or visual contact with staff or other 
inmates.346  This level of social isolation in combination with constant 
surveillance has reportedly led to suicidality and other serious mental 
health impacts.347  Although designed to address the most vicious 
offenders, supermax prisons frequently house mentally ill inmates who 
are considered disruptive to the general prison population.348  
Nationally, the highest rates of restrictive housing and solitary 
                                                          
344.  RICHARD W. HARDING, PRIVATE PRISONS AND PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY 
130 (1997) (assessing the rise of private prisons, particularly for less violent offenders, 
when public prisons faced overcrowding, gang culture, and racial tensions and “the 
prison experience [became] a question of survival, nothing more”). 
345.  ELSNER, supra note 321, at 158. 
346.  Id. at 156 (noting that in person visitation with legal counsel was 
permitted). 
347.  See, e.g., Valle v. Florida, 564 U.S. 1067 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting 
from denial of stay of execution) (identifying, with respect to an Eighth Amendment 
claim, studies that show a high rate of suicide attempts among prisoners on death row, 
with the national wait for execution averaging 15 years); Brown, 563 U.S. at 520 
(finding that California’s overcrowded prisons had an 80% higher suicide rate than 
the national average, where “[b]ecause of a shortage of treatment beds, suicidal 
inmates may be held for prolonged periods in telephone-booth-sized cages without 
toilets”).  But see Christopher J. Mumola, Suicide and Homicide in State Prisons and 
Local Jails, NCJ 210036, BUR. OF JUST. STAT., U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE (Aug. 21, 2005) 
(finding a sharp overall decline in rates of suicide in prison, with higher rates in 
smaller institutions, among the youngest and oldest inmates, and during the first week 
of incarceration).  Note that the latter BJS study did not differentiate the impact on 
prisoners in solitary confinement and isolation.   
348.  ELSNER, supra note 321, at 156-58.  See also Documentary Examines Life 
Inside America’s Supermax Prisons, CBS News (Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.cbs 
news.com/video/documentary-examines-life-inside-americas-supermax-prisons/ 
(stating that approximately 40 supermax prisons are currently in operation in the 
U.S.). 
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confinement are currently found among prisoners convicted of violent 
crime, prisoners with serious mental health diagnoses, young prisoners, 
and lesbian, gay, or bisexual prisoners.349 
Persons with mental illness are now overrepresented in prison 
institutions as a result of the now infamous American movement to de-
institutionalize mental hospitals.350 With this movement, which began 
in the 1960s, mentally ill patients were often released without the state 
providing them with adequate community support.351  By 2001, 40 
states had been sued for inadequate mental health treatment in jails and 
prisons, often after an inmate committed suicide.352  Today, the criminal 
justice system has become the number one provider of mental health 
services in the country.353  Accordingly, prison staff face greater 
struggles as they manage the serious mental health needs of inmates.  
As the Executive Director of the National Sheriff’s Association stated: 
The problem continues to escalate.  It is a major quality-of-life issue 
for severely mentally ill patients, because they are more likely to be 
beaten, victimized or commit suicide than those who are sick.  The 
                                                          
349.  Nearly 20 Percent of Prison and Jail Inmates, supra note 239. 
350.  ELSNER, supra note 321, at 92. 
351.  Id. (noting that released mental patients increasingly faced lack of 
treatment, homelessness, and addiction, eventually breaking the law, which resulted 
in “U.S. prisons [being] turned into de facto insane asylums”).  See also Lappin, supra 
note 19, at 1 (“Inmates with mental health problems present a host of challenges and 
often need staff-intensive services.  Over the past several years these challenges have 
become particularly difficult – the number of inmates with mental illness continues to 
increase and our agency operates within constrained budgets.”). 
352.  ELSNER, supra note 321, at 96. 
353.  E. FULLER TORREY ET AL., THE TREATMENT OF PERSONS WITH MENTAL 
ILLNESS IN PRISONS AND JAILS: A STATE SURVEY, TREATMENT ADVOCACY CTR., at 
37 (2014), http://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/storage/documents/treatment-
behind-bars/treatment-behind-bars.pdf. (finding that in the District of Columbia and 
forty-four out of fifty states, at least one jail or prison in the state holds more persons 
with serious mental illness than the largest psychiatric hospital operated by the state); 
Thomas Insel, Post by Former NIMH Director Thomas Insel: A Misfortune Not a 
Crime, NIH.GOV: NIMH (Apr. 11, 2014), http://www.nimh.nih.gov/about/director/ 
2014/a-misfortune-not-a-crime.shtml (“Our current system, if these new numbers are 
accurate, treats mental illness for many, not as a misfortune but a crime with little 
promise of recovery.”). 
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handling and control of these inmates pose a serious safety threat to 
staff.354 
That the state contributed to the source of enhanced security problems 
faced by prison institutions is inherently problematic, particularly when 
the state has a clear parens patriae duty of care in both mental 
institutions and prisons. 
While security and order are legitimate state interests well 
recognized in nearly all contexts of civil and penal state confinement, 
the Court has yet to clearly assert that surveillance and a loss of privacy 
promote a legitimate punitive goal. However, courts do recognize that 
certain uses of surveillance are a form of cruel and unusual 
punishment.355  Thus, when imposing surveillance as a restrictive 
measure, the state would do well to argue an interest in security or 
deterrence, rather than an interest in punishment. 
This is not to suggest that imprisonment for the purpose of 
retributivism is not a proper goal of sentencing, as that has remained a 
long-established goal according to the Court: “The infliction of 
punishment is a deliberate act intended to chastise or deter. This is what 
the word means today; it is what it meant in the eighteenth century . . . 
.”356  To chastise promotes a purpose of correction, to train or curb 
behavior, and is not merely a deliberate imposition of suffering.357 
In the 1980s, surveillance capabilities were limited, including time-
lapse VHS, early CCTV cameras, and the first multi-camera 
recorders,358 thus the Hudson Court’s assessment of what constitutes an 
                                                          
354.  ELSNER, supra note 321, at 95. 
355.  See supra Part II(B)(2). 
356.  Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 300 (1991) (quoting Judge Posner in 
Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 652 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 816 
(1986)). 
357.  See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 661 (1977); Bloom v. Toliver, 133 
F. Supp. 3d 1314, 1332 n.8 (N.D. Okl. 2015). 
358.  See generally April White, A Brief History of Surveillance in America, 
SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Apr. 2018), available at https://www.smithsonianmag.com/ 
history/brief-history-surveillance-america-180968399/ (asserting that today “we’re 
talking about a scale of surveillance that scarcely seems fathomable from the 
perspective of the 1960s, 1970s, or even the 1980s”). Compare The History of 
Surveillance: The 1980s, IFSEC GLOBAL, https://www.ifsecglobal.com/history-
surveillance-1980s/ (last visited Dec. 3, 2018) (providing examples of iconic 1980s 
surveillance technology), and DOJ BRIEF NO. 2, supra note 7, at 2 (“the advent of 
80
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expectation of privacy in a prison cell cannot compare to current 
surveillance technology.  In Hudson, the Court examined regular 
searches for contraband via a guard’s shake-down of an inmate’s cell, 
rather than constant observation with remote technology.359  The Third 
Circuit Court of Appeals distinguished Hudson’s more minor privacy 
intrusion when applying a Fourth Amendment analysis to a right to 
bodily privacy in body-cavity searches:  “We conclude that a right to 
privacy in one’s own body, unlike a right to maintain private spaces for 
possessions, is not fundamentally inconsistent with imprisonment and 
is so fundamental that society would recognize it as reasonable even in 
the prison context.”360  Thus, a revisiting of Hudson and the necessity 
of the state’s interest may be warranted, should a cell be subject to far 
more intrusive surveillance than a physical cell search. 
Courts will consider not only the expressed state interest, such as 
security generally or the benefit of a specific type of restrictive measure, 
but also how the measure is implemented.  In Parkell v. Danberg, the 
Third Circuit applied a Hudson incompatibility analysis and found that 
body-cavity searches in prison are subject to Fourth Amendment 
protections of a reasonable expectation of bodily privacy.361  The case 
addressed an allegedly excessive security practice involving a Delaware 
state prison inmate:  “[t]hree times per day officers ‘strip searche[d]’ 
him, visually inspecting his anus and genitals while he ’was forced to 
squat naked and cough loudly.’”362  Similarly, in Canady v. Boardman, 
the Seventh Circuit asserted that “all forced observations or inspections 
                                                          
computers and other automated data handling equipment raises new issues about the 
security of intelligence data”), with Ron Alalouff, IDIS to Promote Video Surveillance 
System Convenience at IFSEC International 2018, IFSEC GLOBAL (May 24, 2018), 
https://www.ifsecglobal.com/idis-promote-video-system-convenience-ifsec-
international-2018/ (listing new products that offer motion detection and image 
analysis from 200 meters away in the dark, use of a centralized single monitor for a 
myriad of video surveillance applications, and enhanced smartphone cameras), and 
Scally, supra note 33 (identifying new trends such as improved body camera 
surveillance and deep learning analytics from visuals). 
359.  Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984).  See generally supra note 
323 and accompanying text discussing Hudson.   
360.  Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 325 (3d Cir. 2016). 
361.  Id. 
362.  Id. at 321. 
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of the naked body implicate a privacy concern,” in a case involving strip 
searches of a male prisoner by female guards.363 
In each case, the necessity of the restrictive measure chosen was 
carefully scrutinized, when other means could effectuate the same 
protective result without infringing on the prisoner’s individual rights 
to the same degree.  As discussed in Part IV below, ideally 
improvements in prison management will be developed considering the 
state’s interest in achieving a proper balance of security and protection 
of individual rights; such improvements, depending on the confinement 
needs, may incorporate new innovative technology or no technology at 
all. 
C.  The State Interest to Intrude on Patient Autonomy 
As with prisons, confinement of medical and mental health patients 
have notorious origins.  While treatment, rehabilitation, and 
compassionate care have emerged as duties of care for state institutions, 
along with the commonly held goals of security, safety, and cost-
efficiency,364 this was not originally the case.  Early hospitals in 
America, as late as the 1900s, were scrutinized publicly with “grave 
reservations,” in that the institutional setting was accompanied by a 
legacy of “memories of the pesthouse and the almshouse, of poverty 
and death.”365 
Yet before the creation of these institutions, medical care could be 
an exercise of even greater depravity for those without means.  In 
describing the French enslavement of Protestants on galley ships in the 
early 1700s, the Reverend Bion recounts:  “The stench is most 
intolerable, insomuch as that there is no slave, though ever so weak, but 
will rather choose to tug at his oar, and expire under his chain, than to 
retire to this loathsome hospital.”366  The hospital he describes was a 
                                                          
363. Canedy v. Boardman, 16 F.3d 183, 185 (7th Cir. 1994). 
364. See supra Part III(A). 
365. Morris J. Vogel, The Transformation of the American Hospital, in 
INSTITUTIONS OF CONFINEMENT: HOSPITALS, ASYLUMS, AND PRISONS IN WESTERN 
EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA, 1500-1950 39, 48-49 (Norbert Finzsch & Robert Jütte 
eds., 1997). 
366.  Rev. J. Bion, An Account of the Torments, The French Protestants Endure 
Aboard the Galleys (1708), in AN ENGLISH GARNER, SOCIAL ENGLAND ILLUSTRATED: 
A COLLECTION OF XVIITH CENTURY TRACTS 433, 445 (Thomas Seccombe ed., E.P. 
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dark closet below deck, where persons were segregated from the rest of 
the crew for medical and disciplinary purposes.367 
As medicine developed, middle-class patients came to expect 
individualized care and the privacy of house calls.368  Foucault 
identified the gradually emerging administrative structure of the 
hospital facility as one registering and monitoring individuals, 
separating them by disease and diagnosis, until, “[o]ut of discipline, a 
medically useful space was born.”369  Foucault also famously addressed 
the origins of the insane asylum, where “[f]ear appears as an essential 
presence,”370 eventually replacing repression and restraint with 
authority and surveillance.371  By the Twentieth Century, state-funded 
medical care through major social programs such as Medicare, 
Medicaid, and the Veterans Administration, became more readily 
available, but consistently reimbursed at a lower rate than private care, 
resulting in greater risks of low quality care.372 
Surveillance in civil institutions is key to safety and security, 
particularly when addressing mental illness and aggression or 
suicidality.373  In such dire cases, the state has both an interest and a 
duty as parens patriae to engage in observation to avoid the danger of 
                                                          
Dutton & Co.) (excluding a publication date as a reprint and revision of the eight 
volume collection of letters and essays comprising the original English Garner by 
Prof. Edward Arber (circa 1909)). 
367.  Id. 
368.  See Vogel, supra note 365, at 49 (“hospital medicine had been second-
class medicine”). 
369.  FOUCAULT, supra note 70, at 144. 
370.  MICHEL FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION: A HISTORY OF 
INSANITY IN THE AGE OF REASON 245 (Richard Howard trans., Tavistock 
Publications, 1967) (1961). 
371.  Id. at 251. 
372.  See Johnson, supra note 66 (providing an alarming exposé of the health 
and safety impact of underfunding Illinois state nursing homes); Scott Bronstein & 
Drew Griffin, A Fatal Wait: Veterans Languish and Die on a VA Hospital’s Secret 
List, CNN (Apr. 23, 2014, 07:22), https://www.cnn.com/2014/04/23/health/veterans-
dying-health-care-delays/index.html (reporting that approximately 1,500 veterans 
were forced to wait months to see a doctor at a Veterans Administration hospital in 
Phoenix); Vogel, supra note 365, at 53. 
373.  See Nat’l Comm’n on Corr. Health Care, supra note 307 and 
accompanying text. 
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harm to those in its care.374  Nevertheless, in civil institutions with less 
urgent needs, state statutes tend to respect the rights of autonomy of 
institutional residents; for example, by permitting constant video 
surveillance in nursing home bedrooms only with the prior written 
consent of the patient or guardian.375  Unlike prisons, medical and 
mental health institutions do not serve a population of persons with only 
criminal records. 
Therefore, perhaps more than security, in the United States today 
cost-efficiency parallels the state interest in quality of care in medical 
and mental health institutions.  Even with quality care, the demands 
placed on staff may be great.  Some long-term care patients require 
constant and intensive monitoring to avoid dangers to themselves or 
others, such as aggressive Alzheimer’s patients or persons with 
traumatic brain injury; or they may present elopement risks, seeking to 
leave the facility without notice.376  When such monitoring is provided 
in person by staff serving only one patient, it is effective but costly.377  
Thus, facility administration may resort to constant internal and 
external remote video surveillance in order to reduce staff costs, while 
still serving as an aid in locating patients in crisis.378 
Here, the combination of human assessment and expanded 
technological tools appears to be working well in the interests of the 
state.  According to hospital safety management experts, “many 
hospitals take a multi-layered, integrated approach where access 
control, video surveillance, RFID [radio frequency identification 
tracking wristbands] and motion sensors all work together.”379  As far 
as the impact on patient’s rights, integrating RFID technology with 
                                                          
374.  E.g., Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 223-24 (3d Cir. 2017) (addressing 
the state’s duty to prevent suicide in prison confinement). 
375.  See supra note 21. 
376.  Robin Hattersley, Preparing for the Silver Tsunami Part 2: Responding to 
Elderly Patient Wandering & Elopement, CAMPUS SAFETY MAG., April/May 2018, at 
28. 
377.  Id.  See also Cost of Dementia Care at Home, in Adult Day Care, Assisted 
Living or in Nursing Homes, DEMENTIA CARE CENTRAL, https://www.dementiacare 
central.com/assisted-living-home-care-costs/ (last visited Dec. 3, 2018) (stating the 
average national cost of assisted living with memory care in the United States in 2018 
as $4,500/month, with nursing home care in more advanced cases ranging from 
$150/day to over $300/day). 
378.  See generally Hattersley, supra note 376, at 30. 
379.  Id. 
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software that allows for remote surveillance decreases the privacy of 
the patient, but permits greater freedom of movement in safe areas 
while alerting staff when the patient enters unsafe areas.380  Thus, 
surveillance can potentially contribute to greater protection of 
individual autonomy. 
In mental institutions confining those subject to involuntary 
commitment, the state interest requires closer examination.  These 
settings reflect hybrid state purposes, according to the courts, 
particularly when patients were committed as criminal defendants or 
when the dangers they pose to the institutional community mirror those 
found in prison settings.381  For example, forced psychotropic 
medication may be warranted not only for the purpose of treatment, as 
in medical settings, but for the purpose of restraint and the protection 
of others in the facility.  The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals recently 
held that regular body-cavity searches of sex offenders committed to 
involuntary commitment are warranted, despite an existing right to 
bodily privacy, because of the patients’ greater risk of obtaining cell 
phones as contraband.382 
Regardless of the level of risk, in general, a state medical or mental 
health facility as parens patriae may justify intrusion into autonomy 
rights for patient protection, with substantial discretion given to the 
views of medical providers.383  Such deference may heighten the risk 
of state abuse of power by ignoring the inherent punitive nature of 
restrictive measures in civil confinement, thus leading to an increase in 
claims for Eighth Amendment protection of the individual rights of 
persons in civil involuntary commitment.384 
                                                          
380.  Id. 
381.  See generally Brobst, Miranda, supra note 192 (addressing the legal risks 
in criminal-civil hybrid institutions with respect to the privilege against self-
incrimination and court-ordered disclosures in mental health treatment of juvenile 
inmates); Benjamin J. Bogos, On the Legal Standard for Evaluating Free Exercise 
Claims in the Context of Sex Offender Civil Commitment, 11 AVE MARIA L. REV. 443 
(2013) (analyzing the tension between treatment and penological goals for involuntary 
civil commitment of convicted sexual offenders creating a lack of uniformity in lower 
court interpretation of prisoner/patient claims). 
382.  Serna v. Goodno, 567 F.3d 944, 953 (8th Cir. 2009) (arguing that prisons 
and mental hospitals for sexually dangerous patients have comparable security risks). 
383.  Bigley v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 208 P.3d 168, 185 (Alaska 2009). 
384.  See generally supra notes 218-20 and accompanying text. 
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Courts examining the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination highlight the risk of coercion and abuse of power in 
hybrid settings of confinement such as custodial interrogation of 
prisoners by prison mental health providers, or law enforcement 
interrogation of patients in medical or mental health institution.385  
Justice Douglas stated in his concurring opinion in McNeil v. Director, 
Patuxent Institution: 
Whatever the Patuxent procedures may be called—whether civil or 
criminal—the result under the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment is the same.  As we said in In re Gault, there is the threat 
of self-incrimination whenever there is ‘a deprivation of liberty;’ and 
there is such a deprivation whatever the name of the institution, if a 
person is held against his will.386 
In a key decision in 2017, explicating the policy concerns of hybrid 
settings, the federal district court in Hallford examined the Fifth 
Amendment claim of a patient involuntarily committed in a local 
psychiatric hospital. 387  The patient was questioned by Secret Service 
agents regarding involvement in a protest march, which revealed 
enough information to later convict him of a federal weapons charge.388  
Finding that the patient, Hallford, was unlawfully coerced by the state, 
the court highlighted the facts of the case:  at the time of questioning, 
Hallford was tired, ill, naked, and shivering; the psychiatric nurse told 
him he had to speak with the agents; he was denied an attorney; and he 
was never Mirandized.389  The district court emphatically stated that the 
institutional setting for this patient was not home. 
                                                          
385.  See Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981) (holding that admission at trial 
of in-custody pre-trial statements, made without Miranda warnings in a court-ordered 
competency examination, violated the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled 
self-incrimination); United States v. Robinson, 439 F.2d 553, 560 (D.C. Cir. 1970) 
(arguing that being held in custody without an attorney at a psychiatric facility is 
“even more conducive to compulsion than Miranda’s [setting]”). 
386.  McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Inst., 407 U.S. 245, 256 (1972) (Douglas, J., 
concurring) (internal citation omitted). 
387.  United States v. Hallford, 280 F. Supp. 3d 170 (D.D.C. 2017), appeal filed, 
No. 17-3093 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
388.  Id. at 179-182. 
389. Id. 
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He had just suffered a serious and painful medical episode that 
required immediate attention at a hospital. After arriving at the 
hospital and displaying signs of mental instability, he was 
involuntarily committed to the hospital and told that he could not go 
home.390 
The court recognized that there is potential for an unlawfully coercive 
environment in all state institutions, including use of isolation, 
surveillance, and other significant losses of privacy and autonomy.  
Therefore, state interests in restrictive measures in confinement may 
appear legitimate and range from security to medical treatment to cost-
efficiency, but must be balanced against the individual rights of those 
persons confined. 
IV.  ALIGNING THE BALANCE OF INTERESTS TO ENSURE 
REASONABLENESS IN THE USE OF TECHNOLOGY TO MONITOR AND 
CONTROL CONFINED PERSONS 
 
Individual autonomy in controlling one’s privacy is a core right, 
derived from natural law concepts of autonomy, common law police 
power and parens patriae, as well as state and federal constitutions.  The 
Supreme Court of Minnesota aptly stated in 1976, without the benefit 
of the array of federal privacy jurisprudence which was to follow in the 
next several decades:  “At the core of the privacy decisions, in our 
judgment, is the concept of personal autonomy—the notion that the 
Constitution reserves to the individual, free of governmental intrusion, 
certain fundamental decisions about how he or she will conduct his or 
her life.”391 
Determining how the right is impacted by emerging surveillance 
capabilities requires vigilance in the courts and other branches of 
government.392  Justice Black noted the challenges of defining the 
                                                          
390. Id. at 183 (“At the time of his involuntary commitment, Hallford was 
hundreds of miles from home in an unfamiliar city.”).   
391.  Price v. Sheppard, 239 N.W.2d 905, 909-10 (Minn. 1976), superseded by 
statute, Civil Commitment Act, Minn. Laws ch. 282, art.2, §100, as stated in In re 
Civil Commitment of Raboin, 704 N.W.2d 767 (Min. App. 2005). 
392.  See generally Mark Fenwick et al., Regulation Tomorrow: What Happens 
When Technology is Faster than the Law?, 6 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 561 (2017) 
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concept, where “‘[p]rivacy’ is a broad, abstract and ambiguous concept 
which can easily be shrunken in meaning but which can also, on the 
other hand, easily be interpreted as a constitutional ban against many 
things other than searches and seizures.”393  Similarly, in 1963, the 
Court applied a broadly defined test in holding that under the Fourth 
Amendment, the trial court should make its determination of 
reasonableness “from the facts and circumstances of the case and in the 
light of the ‘fundamental criteria’ laid down by the Fourth Amendment 
and in opinions of this Court applying that Amendment.”394 
In order to refine the standards of analysis to address emerging 
technology, the courts should consider applicable balancing test factors 
in a modern light.  The former assertion by the Court skeptically calling 
efforts to better delineate the reasonableness test in privacy cases a 
“Procrustean application” to be avoided,395 is now outmoded.  Today’s 
vastly enhanced surveillance capabilities require much greater judicial 
guidance regarding available common law and constitutional privacy 
protections.  While the courts recognize changing times,396 they do not 
follow an Orwellian prophecy that if the state simply takes all privacy 
away, then humans will no longer expect, want, or need privacy.397 
Some concepts of constitutional analysis are solidly in force 
without serious debate.  For example, consent to surveillance should 
only be acceptable if it is based on meaningful choice.398  When a 
                                                          
(asserting that greater effort is needed by lawmakers to reasonably regulate emerging 
disruptive technologies in order to facilitate the market and protect the public). 
393.  Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 509 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting). 
394.  Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 33 (1963). 
395.  Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 53 (1967) (quoting Ker v. California, 
374 U.S. 23, 33 (1963)). 
396.  Martin v. City of Struthers, Ohio, 319 U.S. 141, 152-53 (1943) 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“The lack of privacy and the hazards to peace of mind 
and body caused by people living not in individual houses but crowded together in 
large human beehives, as they so widely do, are facts of modern [industrialized] living 
which cannot be ignored.”). 
397.  See Robinson v. Super. Ct. of Sacramento Cty., 164 Cal. Rptr. 389, 394 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1980), hearing granted and opinion on rehearing not for publication 
(1984) (rejecting “a subjective measure of privacy which contains the Orwellian 
flaw,” where judges should not “merely recite the expectations and risks without 
examining the desirability of saddling them upon society”). 
398.  A stark and somewhat odd example of modern consent to constant 
surveillance is the spectacle of reality television, where, in the interests of celebrity, 
88
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nursing home resident signs a contract to permit constant video 
surveillance of the resident’s bedroom, one must wonder whether the 
facility has already cut staff; thus, would not signing the consent form 
result in an absence of necessary monitoring or a breach of care?399  In 
fact-sensitive analyses, it would benefit the courts to expressly carve 
out established and emerging factors of interest, many of which have 
been gathered and discussed in Sections B and C below. 
Other developing approaches to balancing interests in institutional 
settings reflect an internal tension, even if the relevant factors and 
interests are clearly outlined.  For example, in high risk institutional 
settings where security administration is “inordinately difficult,” courts 
generally take a pragmatic approach and accord a higher degree of 
deference to supervisory authorities when choosing restrictive 
measures.400  In contrast, even recent decisions suggest in broad terms 
that privacy in the home is “a protection of families and personal 
privacy”401 and that the state may not invade the “sanctity of the 
home.”402  If the right to privacy of the home includes a nursing home 
patient’s bedroom, an involuntarily committed patient’s hospital room, 
or a prison cell, then deference to the state’s interest in security should 
not be taken for granted. 
Regulation of the state’s use of technology as a restrictive measure 
in confinement must be human-centered.  Therefore, implementing 
surveillance technology as a punitive measure for the purpose of 
humiliation must not be permitted by the courts.  Nor should the courts 
permit intrusive restrictive measures, adopted for no purpose other than 
expediency and cost-efficiency, without regard to the impact on those 
confined.  Of course, in any balance of interests related to surveillance 
                                                          
the ordinary person consents to exposing his or her domestic life as visual 
entertainment.  See WU, supra note 319, at 245.   
399.  See supra note 21. 
400.  See Klinger v. Dept. of Corr., 31 F.3d 727, 732 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. 
denied, 513 U.S. 1185; J.H. Coverdale et al., Respecting the Autonomy of Chronic 
Mentally Ill Women in Decisions About Contraception, 44(7) HOSP. CMTY. 
PSYCHIATRY 671 (1993), available at https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/ 
8354506 (addressing the complex ethical issues for institutions working with patients 
with serious mental illness who make privacy decisions, such as consenting to 
contraceptive implants, when they are delusional and when they are not). 
401.  Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1670 (2018). 
402.  Id. at 1672. 
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of confined persons, it is important to consider that the state and 
individual interests are frequently in alignment.403  Acting as parens 
patriae and under constitutional principles, the state has a duty to protect 
not merely the physical health, but the well-being of those it has 
confined. 
The discussion below first comparatively examines the specific 
legal balancing tests applied to the most common constitutional claims 
for a deprivation of autonomy in confined settings.  Subsequent sections 
then address specific factors to balance in an age of surveillance 
technology, with a special emphasis on the growing scientific and 
medical research elucidating its human impact. 
A.  Levels of Scrutiny and Overlapping Federal Constitutional Claims 
Whether institutional methods and use of technology to restrict 
privacy rights of confined persons must be the least restrictive, the best 
alternative, reasonable, or merely one of a number of available means 
differs according to the legal basis under which the right is asserted.  
Claims addressed herein include those supported by the Fourth, Eighth, 
and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.404  Each 
legal approach benefits from incorporating new research-based 
understandings of the importance of privacy to human well-being, but 
some require reinterpretation of the legal meaning of surveillance and 
observation. 
In Turner v. Safley, the Court held that violations of the 
constitutional rights of prison inmates are subject to rational basis 
review, and the Ninth Circuit summarized the application of relevant 
factors as follows: 
The Court provided four factors to guide reviewing courts in 
applying this test: 1) the existence of a valid, rational connection 
between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental 
interest put forward to justify it; 2) the existence of alternative means 
of exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates; 3) the 
                                                          
403.  See supra Part III. 
404.  As discussed above in Part II(A), state constitutions may offer additional 
and even more robust protections of individual privacy and autonomy.  However, in 
the interests of brevity, and for reasons noted above, a federal analysis is the primary 
focus of this section. 
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impact that accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will 
have on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison 
resources generally; and 4) the absence of ready alternatives as 
evidence of the reasonableness of the regulation (the presence of 
obvious easy alternatives may evidence the opposite).405  
Each constitutional basis for addressing restrictions on autonomy 
through surveillance and AI in state institutions will be addressed 
separately, followed by a discussion of commonly overlapping claims. 
1.  Fourth Amendment Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 
While Turner v. Safley only addresses prison incarceration, the 
Fourth Amendment remains a vital source of protection from 
unreasonable surveillance of persons confined in both civil and penal 
state institutions.406  Generally, the Fourth Amendment prohibits the 
state from engaging in unreasonable searches and seizures, which 
require both a subjective and objectively reasonable expectation of 
privacy on the part of the person searched.407  While the sanctity of the 
home is traditionally protected, in Hudson v. Palmer, the Court held 
that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in prison cells from 
shake-down searches of property by guards.408  More broadly, “[a] right 
of privacy in traditional Fourth Amendment terms is fundamentally 
incompatible with the close and continual surveillance of inmates and 
their cells required to ensure institutional security and internal 
order.”409  This decision was limited in part to its facts, where, for 
example, observational body-cavity searches have not been subject to 
                                                          
405.  Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 331 (9th Cir. 1988) (addressing 
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987)). 
406.  See, e.g., Serna v. Goodno, 567 F.3d 944, 953 (8th Cir. 2009) (applying a 
Fourth Amendment rights analysis in mental hospital body-cavity search).  See supra 
Part II(B)(1). 
407.  See supra Part II(B)(1) (outlining the historical development of the Fourth 
Amendment constitutional analysis).  
408.  Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 527-28 (1983). 
409.  Id. at 528.  With respect to pre-trial detainees, there was initially a 
presumption that they had retained at least a “diminished expectation of privacy.”  
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 557 (1979). 
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the restrictions of Hudson and a reasonable expectation of bodily 
privacy is upheld.410 
After 35 years, with new surveillance technology necessitating 
more evolved decisions, the Court may revisit the reasonableness of 
other forms of “close and continual surveillance,” such as truly constant 
remote surveillance of prison cells with capabilities assessing a 
prisoner’s mood, alcohol intake, and other physiological characteristics 
such as heart rate.  In 2018, in Carpenter v. United States, the Supreme 
Court demonstrated readiness to support individual privacy rights under 
the Fourth Amendment against ever more intrusive technology.411  The 
Court upheld informational privacy rights in private cell phone data 
against state intrusion, recognizing “the seismic shifts in digital 
technology that make possible the tracking of [individuals] . . . for years 
and years.”412 
However, under a Fourth Amendment analysis in the prison setting, 
employing the least restrictive means of engaging in a search or seizure 
is not required of the state, suggesting an approach deferential to 
governmental interests in security.  “Less-restrictive-alternative 
arguments are too powerful: a prison always can do something, at some 
cost, to make prisons more habitable, but if courts assess and compare 
these costs and benefits then judges rather than wardens are the real 
prison administrators.”413  The state also faces new security challenges 
where prisoners make creative use of technology to obtain contraband, 
such as drone drop-offs over prison walls.414  Thus state institutions 
might well counter the privacy arguments of prisoners with assertions 
of a heightened need for restrictive security measures of their own. 
Nevertheless, when upholding state surveillance measures that 
would equate to a search, the Turner elements do require an 
examination of necessity and the “ready instruments” the Constitution 
                                                          
410.  Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 325 (3d Cir. 2016) (“We conclude that 
a right to privacy in one’s own body, unlike a right to maintain private spaces for 
possessions, is not fundamentally inconsistent with imprisonment and is so 
fundamental that society would recognize it as reasonable even in the prison 
context.”). 
411.  Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
412.  Id. at 2219 (denying application of the third party doctrine). 
413.  Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144, 145 (7th Cir. 1995) (relying on Bell v. 
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559-60 (1979) and Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995)). 
414.  See supra note 308. 
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provides for an assessment of the impact on individual rights.415  For 
example, the highly invasive practice of strip searches in group settings 
requires some showing of necessity, although the courts remain 
unsettled on how particular prison policies must be in determining 
levels of risk among prisoners warranting such routine searches.416  In 
a hospital setting housing civilly committed sex offenders, courts have 
been willing to uphold routine body-cavity searches in the interests of 
security and detection of contraband.417  Perhaps technology will 
improve the privacy rights of prisoners from invasive searches, as new 
innovative means to detect contraband are developed. 
2.  Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
Under the Eighth Amendment, a prisoner must be able to show that 
(1) “objectively, the deprivation of a basic human need was sufficiently 
serious” based on “contemporary standards of decency,”418 posing a 
“substantial risk of serious harm”;419 and (2) that subjectively the prison 
officials “acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind,” which 
addresses both excessive punishment and deliberate indifference to 
inhumane conditions.420  An Eighth Amendment claim is arguably 
more difficult to prove, where an added culpable mental state is 
required, as seen in the wanton and deliberate indifference elements of 
the analysis.421 
                                                          
415.  See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 843 (2006); Zurcher v. Stanford 
Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 578 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Warden v. Hayden, 387 
U.S. 294, 325 (1967); see also Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1683 (2018) 
(Alito, J., dissenting) (suggesting a need to consider the “real effect” of the intrusion). 
416.  See, e.g., Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Cty. of Burlington, 566 
U.S. 318 (2012). 
417.  See, e.g., Serna v. Goodno, 567 F.3d 944 (8th Cir. 2009). 
418.  Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 
429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976)). 
419.  Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). 
420.  See Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir. 1996); see also 
Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991). 
421.  See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8 (requiring an objective deprivation of a basic 
human need that is sufficiently serious based on “contemporary standards of 
decency”); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991) (requiring a subjective intent 
of deliberate indifference on the part of state actors imposing the punishment). 
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In determining the culpable state of malice regarding a claim of 
cruel and unusual punishment, a fact-sensitive inquiry may consider:  
(1) the extent of the injury suffered; (2) the need for the application of 
force; (3) the relationship between that need and the amount of force 
used; (4) the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials; 
and (5) any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful 
response.422  As already discussed, restrictive security measures, such 
as excessive solitary confinement or harassing strip searches, may 
satisfy the court that the state’s action is an added punishment, both 
cruel and unusual.  While blanket surveillance may assist the state in 
defending against an Eighth Amendment claim requiring malicious 
intent, the application of new technologies may cause concern if they 
result in detrimental psychological harm. 
Many of the recent non-physical cases of cruel and unusual 
punishment have addressed excessively harsh conditions in solitary 
confinement, made possible in part by new surveillance technologies 
and facilities that remove most human contact.423  Therefore, claims 
under the Eighth Amendment for privacy and social isolation 
deprivations may particularly benefit from new research into the 
psychological impact of technology on persons in confinement.424  
Ideally, this will enable the courts to place particular emphasis on 
realigning the balance of interests in hybrid criminal-civil institutional 
settings, permitting proper recognition of the punitive nature of privacy 
violations under civil order so that such patients may assert claims 
under the Eighth Amendment.425 
3.  Substantive Due Process Deprivation of Liberty 
A substantive due process claim on the basis of a state deprivation 
unlawfully infringing on a person’s liberty interest may face varying 
                                                          
422.  See Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 223-24 (3d Cir. 2017) (addressing 
a claim of cruel and unusual punishment for the solitary confinement of a mentally ill 
inmate); Romano v. Howarth, 998 F.2d 101, 105 (2d Cir. 1993) (examining an 
excessive force claim for the forced medication of an inmate in a prison mental health 
unit). 
423.  See, e.g., Palakovic, 854 F.3d. at 223-24; see also supra note 345 and 
accompanying text (addressing supermax prisons). 
424.  See infra Part IV(B). 
425.  See supra note 381 and accompanying text. 
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levels of scrutiny.  As stated above, in prison settings, a low rational-
basis standard of review has been applied, such as reviewing prison 
mail and marriage regulations in Turner v. Safley – “when a prison 
regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is 
valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.”426  
In civil settings, this may not be the case.  The state has an affirmative 
duty to persons it holds in care or custody to ensure their personal 
security and protection from abuse and other forms of harm, supported 
in part by parens patriae duties of care.427  Identifying liberty as freedom 
from restraint may be interpreted in numerous ways, particularly when 
the Court has also referenced the pursuit of happiness in the liberty 
context.428  Thus, the Amendment is relatively flexible in addressing 
technology-related infringements on autonomy in both civil and 
criminal institutions.  In addition, innovative technology could reduce 
the need for some substantive due process claims if reasonable 
electronic surveillance prevented other deprivations of liberty, such as 
deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.429 
While the Court in Turner expressly declined to adopt a least 
restrictive means test for prisoners’ constitutional claims, the Court did 
assert that “the existence of obvious, easy alternatives may be evidence 
that the regulation is not reasonable, but is an ‘exaggerated response’ to 
prison concerns.”430  Therefore, as new technologies are adopted in 
institutions of confinement, if they are imposed arbitrarily without due 
process and involve intrusive surveillance, they could clearly implicate 
a liberty interest and violate a fundamental right to privacy owed to 
those in confinement. 
                                                          
426.  Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-90 (1987) (addressing the privacy 
interests of inmates with respect to inmate-to-inmate correspondence and the right to 
marry). 
427.  See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491 (1980); see also supra note 270 and 
accompanying text discussing Vitek. 
428.  See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977) (asserting that the 
Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest incorporates “the right generally to enjoy 
those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of 
happiness by free men”); supra note 267. 
429.  See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315 (1982). 
430.  Turner, 482 U.S. at 90. 
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4.  Overlapping Constitutional Claims 
The Court has been hesitant to expand the scope of Fourteenth 
Amendment substantive due process protections for fear of implying a 
general right to privacy in all aspects of life.  That is, due process claims 
may not serve as a catch-all privacy right.431  Specifically, if other 
substantive claims are more expressly applicable, the Court may 
determine that the Fourteenth Amendment claim is not available.  
Although persons in civil confinement, such as nursing home residents 
or mental hospital patients, may more readily assert a Fourteenth 
Amendment claim as they have less of a risk of an overlap:  the Eighth 
Amendment relates to the criminal justice system, and the heightened 
security concerns of prisons would more likely create Fourth 
Amendment concerns. 
Whether a liberty interest due process claim is foreclosed by other 
constitutional claims requires a somewhat nuanced interpretation.432  If 
a more substantive, directly applicable claim is available, then the due 
process claim is purportedly not viable; but if the claims address 
different interests regarding the same act both may state a claim.433  
                                                          
431.  See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 266 (1994) (plurality opinion) 
(following Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)); Evans v. Chalmers, 703 
F.3d 636, 646 n.2 (4th Cir. 2012) (asserting that a Fourth Amendment specific 
application forecloses a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim); Bratton-Bey v. 
Straughan, Civil Action No. DKC 13-1964, 2015 WL 434142, at *4 (D. Md. Feb. 2, 
2015) (following Evans, 703 F.3d 636, for the proposition that the Substantive Due 
Process Clause is not a “catch-all” remedy for state harms); Norwood v. Thompson, 
No. 2:05-CV-0904, 2006 WL 840384, at *8 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 30, 2006) (following 
Graham, 490 U.S. 386, when stating, “the substantive due process clause is not a 
‘catch-all’ clause under which constitutional claims of any nature can be asserted”). 
432.  Compare County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998) 
(addressing a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim, asserting that 
Graham does not require a Fourth or Eighth Amendment analysis, but if either clause 
is directly applicable then a Fourteenth Amendment claim is foreclosed), with 
Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 (1989) (holding that an “explicit textual source of 
constitutional protection” will foreclose a more generalized substantive due process 
claim), and Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144, 146 (7th Cir. 1995) (“[S]ubstantive due 
process is not an appropriate substitute for analysis under provisions of the 
Constitution that address a subject directly, and in particular does not trump the fourth 
amendment.”). 
433.  Smith v. County of Los Angeles, No. CV 11-10666, 2015 WL 12731913, 
at *4 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2015) (“Failure to institute procedural safeguards to prevent 
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Courts have not uniformly applied this limitation, as recent federal 
decisions have found viable substantive due process and Eighth 
Amendment claims for some privacy intrusions,434 but not in cases of 
excessive force.435  Judge Easterbrook posited for the majority in 
Phelan v. Johnson that: 
Any practice allowed under the due process analysis of Turner is 
acceptable under the eighth amendment too—not only because the 
objective component of cruel and unusual punishment is more 
tolerant toward wardens, but also because the eighth amendment has 
a demanding mental-state component. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 
825, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994), holds that the standard 
is criminal recklessness. The guard or warden must want to injure the 
prisoner or must know of and disregard a substantial risk that harm 
will befall the prisoner.436 
However, the Third Circuit more recently compared the two balancing 
tests with regard to suicide in solitary confinement, asserting that there 
is little difference between the analyses: 
[W]hen a plaintiff seeks to hold a prison official liable for failing to 
prevent a detainee’s suicide, a pre-trial detainee may bring a claim 
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment that is 
essentially equivalent to the claim that a prisoner may bring under 
                                                          
the deprivation of liberty can, itself, be a Fourteenth Amendment violation, separate 
from the Fourth Amendment particularity inquiry.”). 
434.  E.g., Millard v. Rankin, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1211 (D. Colo. 2017) (providing 
injunctive relief on the basis of both federal Eighth Amendment and substantive due 
process claims for punitive privacy violations relating to the sex offender registry in 
Colorado).  But see Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986) (asserting that 
Substantive Due Process is not a distinct, overlapping source of constitutional 
protection in excessive force cases in prison, where the clause provides no greater 
protection than the Eighth Amendment, but withholding interpretation of whether 
overlapping protections could be available to detainees or persons with “unrestricted 
liberty”). 
435.  See Bieros v. Nicola, 860 F. Supp. 226, 230-32 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (asserting 
that the Fourth Amendment no longer applies in excessive force cases once a person 
is arrested and becomes a pre-trial detainee, nor does the Eighth Amendment apply 
until the person is convicted and sentenced, but that excessive force claims for pre-
trial detainees would invoke the Fourteenth Amendment to provide substantive due 
process protections). 
436.  Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144, 149 (7th Cir. 1995).  
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the Eighth Amendment. Thus, whether a pre-trial detainee or a 
convicted prisoner, a plaintiff must show: (1) that the individual had 
a particular vulnerability to suicide, meaning that there was a ”strong 
likelihood, rather than a mere possibility,” that a suicide would be 
attempted; (2) that the prison official knew or should have known of 
the individual’s particular vulnerability; and (3) that the official acted 
with reckless or deliberate indifference, meaning something beyond 
mere negligence, to the individual’s particular vulnerability.437 
More clarity from the courts regarding the relationship between the 
Fourteenth Amendment and other constitutional claims would be 
beneficial as liberty interests face new challenges to privacy with 
expansive surveillance technology, and existing balancing tests in 
institutional settings are often deferential to the state. 
As Patrick Henry stated to the members of the congressional 
convention when arguing for a Bill of Rights to be added to the 
Constitution: 
If you will, like the Virginia government, give them knowledge of 
the extent of the rights retained by the people, and the powers of 
themselves, they will, if they be honest men, thank you for it.  Will 
they not wish to go on sure grounds?  But if you leave them 
otherwise, they will not know how to proceed; and, being in a state 
of uncertainty, they will assume rather than give up powers by 
implication.438 
The tremendous power differential between those in power in state 
institutions and the most vulnerable persons they house calls for public 
knowledge of the extent of rights retained, as Henry warned, and a well 
informed understanding of why those rights are essential.  Today, 
advances in scientific and medical research on the impact of 
technological surveillance on human well-being shed light on how best 
to balance the interests between the state and the individual rights to 
privacy, autonomy, and social contact. 
                                                          
437.  Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 223-24 (3d Cir. 2017). 
438.  Henry, supra note 2, at 448. 
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B.  Incorporating Scientific and Medical Research When Evaluating 
the Impact of Technology on Human Well-Being in State Institutions 
Modern research in psychology, sociology, and evolutionary 
biology provide greater support for what the Founders and the Court 
have intuitively understood to be true about the human species.439  That 
is, invasions of privacy that infringe on autonomy rights negatively 
impact human well-being by reducing a sense of security and safety, 
confidence, trust, mutual respect, freedom, and enjoyment of life. 
That dual aspect of privacy means that the individual should have the 
freedom to select for himself the time and circumstances when he 
will share his secrets with others and decide the extent of that 
sharing. This is his prerogative not the States’. The Framers, who 
were as knowledgeable as we, knew what police surveillance meant 
and how the practice of rummaging through one’s personal effects 
could destroy freedom.440 
In a modern framework, invasions of privacy and ubiquitous 
surveillance tend to produce in humanity a sense of fear, paranoia, 
suspicion, distrust, isolation, insecurity, conformity, and depression.441  
As the Fifth Circuit stated in 1987, “indiscriminate video surveillance 
raises the specter of the Orwellian state.”442 
                                                          
439.  See, e.g., MICHAEL, supra note 88, at 3 (identifying common themes of a 
human need for privacy in (a) anthropological research, (b) developmental 
psychology which demonstrates that control over privacy facilitates self-identity in 
infants, and (c) evolutionary biology which establishes that “a balance between 
privacy and participation is one of the basic features of [higher forms of ] animal 
life”).  
440.  Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 323-24 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
441.  See, e.g., McCahill, supra note 69, at 60 (identifying the fear of crime and 
terrorism as a political incentive and justification for public CCTV systems in Britain, 
systems which then contribute to a “universally shared and overwhelming sensation 
of insecurity”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); GANDY, JR., supra note 
23, at 230 (“[G]rowing mistrust leads to expanded surveillance, and each cycle pushes 
us further from the democratic ideal[.]”); see also GLASSNER, supra note 31, at xvii 
(arguing that given the paucity of credible data of largescale abuses, 1990s electronic 
surveillance systems “were implemented to protect children from fiends who reside 
primarily in the imaginations of adults”). 
442.  See United States v. Cuevas-Sanchez, 821 F.2d 248, 251 (5th Cir. 1987). 
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The public’s paranoia and distrust is not always rational, which 
may be the point of commodifying fear.  For example, incentivized by 
the insurance industry, consumers have reportedly purchased more 
home security systems in recent years, despite the fact that burglary 
rates have already fallen by more than 25% in the last decade.443  
Historical use of surveillance and segregation as a form of state police 
power in public health contexts have, at times, demonstrated existing 
societal prejudices and unlawful deprivations of liberty rights.444  Thus, 
historical moments of heightened fear or crisis enable the government 
to override individual privacy interests more easily.  Fortunately, the 
courts serve as a particularly useful check on this exercise of emergency 
power. 
When defining the basic human needs of confined persons, the 
courts evince an increased willingness to consider advances in scientific 
and medical research in producing evolving standards of humane 
treatment.  For example, in holding that social isolation in solitary 
confinement bears a terrible toll on the psychological well-being of 
prisoners, one district court found that “there is a large and growing 
body of literature—both academic and legal—discussing the 
potentially devastating effects of prolonged periods of 
isolation.”445  This expanded understanding is taking hold amongst 
policy makers outside of the judicial system as well.  The National 
Commission on Correctional Health Care adopted new standards for 
solitary confinement in 2016, which include the principle that “[a]dults 
and juveniles in solitary confinement should have as much human 
                                                          
443.  Ronda Kaysen, Do Security Systems Make Your Home Safer?, N.Y. 
TIMES: RIGHT AT HOME (Dec. 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/22/ 
realestate/do-security-systems-make-your-home-safer.html.  
444.  E.g., Jew Ho v. Williamson, 103 F. 10 (N.D. Ca. 1900) (finding a local 
health ordinance limiting mandatory quarantine against bubonic plague to a single 
district of over 15,000 Chinese American residents in San Francisco to be an exercise 
of authority with an “evil eye and unequal hand”); Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. 419, 
443-44 (1827) (asserting that state police power provides the authority to address 
public health emergencies), abrogation on other grounds recognized by Oklahoma 
Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 180 (1995). 
445.  Porter v. Clarke, 290 F. Supp. 3d 518, 532 (E.D. Va. 2018), appeal filed, 
Case No. 18-6257 (4th Cir. 2018).  See also Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 225 
(3d Cir. 2017) (“[W]e first acknowledge the robust body of legal and scientific 
authority recognizing the devastating mental health consequences caused by long-
term isolation in solitary confinement[.]”).   
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contact as possible with people from outside the facility and with 
custodial, educational, religious and medical staff.”446 
Perhaps the most basic question is why do humans as a species care 
about being watched?  Psychologists and cognitive researchers suggest 
an evolutionary benefit when a species is capable of knowing it is being 
watched, as it permits communication and an identification of 
threats.447  Biologists, in turn, suggest that human eyes, like many 
predatory species, have larger, whiter sclera that “vastly improved our 
ability to communicate with others – the same reason our complex 
language capacities evolved.”448  Neurologists have identified the 
brain’s amygdala as a center that manages facial recognition, as well as 
a sense of fear and the need for fight or flight. 449  This function is found 
in humans as young as four months old, subconsciously detecting the 
visual cue of being watched by even an averted side gaze.450 
Observing others and being observed is also important 
developmentally in forming social relationships.  There is comfort in 
being watched, in vulnerable or intimate moments, but a reticence and 
wariness in being watched by strangers, particularly when it is one-
sided.451  Developmental psychologists note the importance of learning 
when to trust human interactions, in order to learn “what is good and 
safe, and what to fear and avoid by ‘emotional referencing’.”452  It 
follows that some of the highest needs for privacy and autonomy are 
                                                          
446.  Nat’l Comm’n on Corr. Health Care, Solitary Confinement (Isolation) 
(2016), https://www.ncchc.org/solitary-confinement (Principle 15). 
447.  See Susie Nielson, The Psychological Explanation for When You Feel Like 
You’re Being Watched, N.Y. MAG.: THECUT (July 18, 2017), https://www.thecut.com 
/article/the-psychology-of-feeling-like-youre-being-watched.htm. 
448.  Ilan Shrira, How You Know Eyes are Watching You, PSYCHOL. TODAY: 
THE NARCISSUS IN ALL OF US (Feb. 16, 2011), https://www.psychologytoday 
.com/us/blog/the-narcissus-in-all-us/201102/how-you-know-eyes-are-watching-you. 
449.  David Nield, Ever Feel Like You’re Being Watched?  It’s Not Just You, 
SCIENCE ALERT (May 19, 2017), https://www.sciencealert.com/the-science-behind-
why-you-think-you-re-being-watched.  
450.  Id.  
451.  See Colwyn Trevarthen & Vasudevi Reddy, Consciousness in Infants , in 
THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO CONSCIOUSNESS 42, 49-50 (Max Velmans & Susan 
Schneider eds., 2007) (discussing the development of human consciousness in infants 
and the importance of human social relationships to learn “what is good and safe, and 
what to fear and avoid by ‘emotional referencing’”). 
452.  Id.  
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found among persons in confinement – those most likely to be 
constantly surveilled at all times by strangers who have the power to 
determine whether to assist the person or whether to impose 
disciplinary measures or additional restraints. 
Research on the need for human socialization spans the breadth of 
developmental and behavioral psychology, which the courts regularly 
draw on in determining the best interests of the child in abuse and 
dependency cases.453  Furthermore, the fact that courts are willing to 
consider the basic need for socialization in other animals, based on a 
growing body of research, suggests that humans in confinement deserve 
even better.  For example, in addressing allegations of violations of the 
federal Animal Welfare Act against a zoo in Maryland, the court 
highlighted some of the same psychologically stressful conditions other 
courts have considered with respect to prison inmates: “Lions are highly 
social, live in prides, and require enriching environments . . . . The lion 
at the Tri-State Zoo is confined to a barren enclosure in social isolation 
with no visual privacy from the public.”454 
One psychologist who studies the impact of solitary confinement 
on humans in prison noted that: 
Over a long period of time, solitary confinement undermines one’s 
sense of self. It undermines your ability to register and regulate 
emotion. The appropriateness of what you’re thinking and feeling is 
difficult to index, because we’re so dependent on contact with others 
for that feedback. And for some people, it becomes a struggle to 
maintain sanity.455 
Of course, the impact of conditions of confinement may vary and some 
suggest that restrictive measures should be tailored to certain categories 
                                                          
453.  See, e.g., Nat’l Child Traumatic Stress Network, Fact Sheet, Children with 
Traumatic Separation: Information for Professionals, NCTSN.ORG (2016), available 
at https://www.nctsn.org/sites/default/files/resources//children_with_traumatic_ 
separation_professionals.pdf (addressing the occurrence of posttraumatic stress 
among children who are separated from caregivers or isolated from other social 
contact, including, for example, removal from the home by child protective services). 
454.  People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Tri-State Zoological 
Park of W. Md., Inc., No. MJG-17-2148, 2018 WL 434229, at *1 (D. Md. Jan. 16, 
2018) (denying a motion to dismiss a claim based on the federal Animal Welfare Act 
under 50 C.F.R. § 17.3). 
455.  Keim, supra note 246. 
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of persons, such as those with particular illnesses,456 or of a certain 
gender457 or age.458  In finding a violation of the privacy rights of a 
female inmate who was forcibly made naked by a nurse in front of male 
guards, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals explained: 
Persons in prison must surrender many rights of privacy which most 
people may claim in their private homes. Much of the life in prison 
is communal, and many prisoners must be housed in cells with 
openings through which they may be seen by guards. Most people, 
however, have a special sense of privacy in their genitals, and 
involuntary exposure of them in the presence of people of the other 
sex may be especially demeaning and humiliating. When not 
reasonably necessary, that sort of degradation is not to be visited 
upon those confined in our prisons.459 
Medical and mental health research may help the courts determine, in a 
reasonableness analysis, whether differential impacts are based on 
significant biological or cultural differences.  Juvenile brain research, 
for example, has been particularly influential in judicial opinions 
related to restrictive measures in sentencing youth in confinement.460 
One area where mental health or sociological research could be 
beneficial is in determining whether hidden or open surveillance 
produces a greater risk of infringement on autonomy rights.  As 
discussed previously, prison officials have expressed a preference for 
                                                          
456.  E.g., Moore v. Mabus, 976 F.3d 268 (5th Cir. 1992), reh’g denied, 253 
F.3d 707 (finding no equal protection or due process violation for segregating 
prisoners who had tested positive for the Human Immunodeficiency Virus). 
457.  See Murphy, supra note 249 (recommending gender-specific regulations 
for restricting solitary confinement of juvenile girls).  But see Riddick v. Sutton, 794 
F. Supp. 169 (E.D. N.C. 1992) (female guards viewing male inmates using toilet and 
shower only a de minimus infringement on a constitutional right to privacy). 
458.  Tatum v. Arizona, 137 S. Ct. 11, 11-13 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., concurring 
in the decisions to grant certiorari, vacate, and remand) (summarizing the recent 
Supreme Court decisions which hold that children are “constitutionally different” 
from adults for the purpose of proportionate sentencing and punishment, based in part 
on advances in juvenile brain science research).  
459.  Lee v. Downs, 641 F.2d 1117, 1119 (4th Cir. 1981) (emphasis added). 
460.  See, e.g., Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 732-33 (2016) 
(following recent Supreme Court precedent identifying juveniles as generally less 
culpable and more likely to be rehabilitated due to their greater “immaturity, 
recklessness, and impetuosity[,]” which usually lessens with age and development). 
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hidden surveillance,461 while civil institutions have opted for consent 
and transparency where possible.462  If a diner sees a surveillance 
camera in every corner of a restaurant, would the diner be disturbed to 
know that the restaurant owner is actually watching the diner remotely 
in real time or would the diner prefer not to know? 
There are many reasons why hidden surveillance could betray trust 
more than open surveillance.  Surreptitious surveillance increases the 
vulnerability of persons who do not have the information, and therefore 
the choice, to respond accordingly to protect their privacy.463  If the 
surveillance camera is hidden in the restaurant, then the diner has no 
autonomy to choose whether to exercise his or her privacy rights and 
eat somewhere else in peace.  As the Texas attorney and rancher stated 
in his claim regarding unlawful government surveillance cameras 
placed on private property: 
The prevalence of inexpensive technology increasingly eliminates 
the distinction between what private citizens keep private and what 
they display in public. All the government needs to do, as it did in 
the present case, is sneak a camera in some place where nobody 
knows. Thus, the decreasing cost of technology leaves us all 
vulnerable to government spying.464 
Therefore, on a larger scale, the act of secrecy may be one of tyranny.  
Marxist philosopher Ernst Bloch argued: “Visible powers are feared 
less than invisible ones . . . . It shows itself in supreme clarity in police, 
prisons, and soldiers . . . .”465 
While this suggests that hidden state surveillance should be more 
heavily scrutinized than open surveillance, the question is more 
                                                          
461.  Florer, supra note 337 and accompanying text. 
462.  See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
463.  See LINOWES, supra note 3, at 172 (arguing that the unobtrusive nature of 
surveillance makes it difficult to detect when one’s rights are violated); REGAN, supra 
note 3, at 29 (explaining theorist Charles Fried’s view that privacy is integral to 
healthy social relationships “which we would hardly be human if we had to do without 
– the relationships of love, friendship, and trust”).  
464.  Sidney Fussell, Man Sues Feds After Finding Spy Camera on His Property 
and Refusing to Give It Back, GIZMODO (Feb. 22, 2018, 12:05 PM), 
https://gizmodo.com/man-sues-feds-after-finding-spy-camera-on-his-property-
1823229134. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.  
465.  BLOCH, supra note 3, at 267. 
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complicated with respect to incompetent persons with particularly 
challenging needs.  For example, some current AI technology merely 
provides an enhanced form of existing technology, such as a companion 
pet that reminds a person to take medication,466 medical delivery 
systems,467 or autonomous swarms of bionic insects for commercial use 
in manufacturing.468  Other forms increasingly provide sophisticated 
applications, such as medical diagnostic assessments with massively 
complex data sets.469  If these technologies were used knowingly in the 
context of informed consent to achieve a beneficial purpose, many 
would be grateful for the advantages. 
However, when these artificial tools enter the arena of social 
engagement or observation, they are not presumptively beneficial.  
More medical and mental health research is needed to determine 
whether attempts at AI social innovation ultimately serve to disturb or 
demean the vulnerable humans they are meant to help.  For example, 
one humorist noted that she purchased a robo-cat for her 90 year-old 
mother who has dementia and lives in a nursing home that does not 
                                                          
466.  See Talty, supra note 282 (discussing the Hasbro companion pet). 
467.  Rachel Becker, I Launched a Blood-Delivery Drone, VERGE (Apr. 13, 
2018, 4:38 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/4/13/17206398/zipline-drones-
delivery-blood-emergency-medical-supplies-startup-rwanda-tanzania.  
468.  See, e.g., BionicANTS, FESTO, https://www.festo.com/group/en/ 
cms/10157.htm (last visited Dec. 3, 2018) (selling ANT (autonomous networking 
technologies) with intelligent cooperative behavior with physical designs inspired by 
nature, such insect legs and octopus tentacles, for commercial use); REPORT FOR THE 
DIRECTOR, NET ASSESSMENT, U.S. OFFICE OF THE SEC. OF DEFENSE, VISION OF 
FUTURE WARFARE: PREPARING FOR A RENAISSANCE IN STRATEGIC WARFARE 30 (July 
2012 revised), available at http://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/FO 
ID/Reading%20Room/Other/Litigation%20Release%20-%20Vision%20of%20 
Future%20Warfare%20201207.pdf (describing military research into the use of 
robotic fire ants “with the battlefield dominated by large numbers of small semi-
autonomous machines, networked together and capable of rendering an area 
impassable to troops”).  But see Alexis C. Madrigal, Drone Swarms are going to be 
Terrifying and Hard to Stop, ATLANTIC (Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.theatlantic. 
com/technology/archive/2018/03/drone-swarms-are-going-to-be-terrifying/555005/.  
469.  See, e.g., Clayton R. Pereira et al., Handwritten Dynamics Assessment 
through Convolutional Neural Networks: An Application to Parkinson’s Disease 
Identification, 87 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN MED. 67 (May 2018) (improving early 
stage detection of Parkinson’s disease with computer-aided diagnosis that assesses 
handwriting features of patients through machine-based convolutional neural 
networks that use deep learning to examine visual imagery). 
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permit real cats as pets.470  Her mother’s initial reaction was terse and 
disturbed, saying, “What the hell is that?” followed by “I think it’s 
stupid,” and “It’s not a real cat,” while glaring at the cat and refusing to 
touch it.471  A social worker at the nursing home later informed the 
daughter, “[the residents] really have to be pretty far gone for those to 
work.”472 
Similarly, a veteran’s hospital in California employed the use of 
Paro baby seal companion bots in hopes of comforting residents and 
reducing the need for anti-anxiety medication.473  One of the hospital’s 
therapists disclosed that the residents “[will] bark at it, they’ll pet it, 
they’ll sing to it.  We find it works better with people with dementia 
because if the residents are aware that it’s not real, we find that 
sometimes they don’t engage with it as much.”474 
Whether deceptive technology is justified at a certain point, 
providing comfort when no reasonable alternatives are available, is a 
fair question.475  But for those with the cognitive ability to live based in 
reality, replacing human contact with an artificial substitute without 
consent is a betrayal of trust in the social compact and a deficient 
approach to care akin to gaslighting.476  Moreover, residents of state 
institutions may be especially vulnerable to being used as test subjects 
                                                          
470.  Joyce Wadler, Loving Robo Cat Needs Home, N.Y. TIMES: I WAS 
MISINFORMED (Mar. 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/30/nyregion/ 
loving-robo-cat-needs-home.html. 
471.  Id. 
472.  Id. 
473.  Angela Johnston, Robotic Seals Comfort Dementia Patients but Raise 
Ethical Concerns, KALW LOC. PUBL. RADIO (Aug. 17, 2015), http://kalw.org/post/ 
robotic-seals-comfort-dementia-patients-raise-ethical-concerns#stream/0.  
474.  Id. 
475.  Robin Hattersley, Preparing for the Silver Tsunami Part 1: Preventing 
Elderly Patient Wandering and Elopement, CAMPUS SAFETY MAG. 16, 19 (Mar. 2018) 
(reporting memory care centers that paint the bedroom doors of facilities to look like 
there is no door in order to prevent elopement), https://www.campussafety 
magazine.com/hospital/elderly-patient-wandering-elopement. 
476.  The classic film Gaslight (1944) is based on the 1938 play by Patrick 
Hamilton, set in the 1870s, a time when new technologies brought about newfound 
suspicions.  See generally Alissa Wilkinson, What is Gaslighting?  The 1944 Film 
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for new AI applications in caregiving, particularly if such technology 
reduces costs.  For example, companion bots, mental health assessment 
kiosks, and robot guards could all provide surveillance capabilities and 
methods of control for state agents. 
Waxing fantastic, these governmental efforts to use technology to 
create a more controlled environment for confined persons could create 
virtual utopia for prisoners and patients, or dystopian Rooms 101.477  
Without an opportunity to be useful, to learn by error, and mediate the 
vagaries of real life, endeavors key to Bentham’s utilitarian 
panopticon,478 the world appears a dismal place.  In 1899, Oliver 
Wendell Holmes wrote in Law and Science and Science in Law, that 
the unattainability of an ideal “so keeps forever before us something 
more to be done, and saves us from the ennui of a monotonous 
perfection.”479  In short, the serendipitous nature of human life, 
including opportunities for social interaction and moments of privacy 
and introspection, make life worth living. 
And yet, most adults have the autonomy to choose whether or not 
to engage with such technology.  Their reasons for doing so are not 
always sanguine.  For example, in Japan, thousands of humanoid 
companion robots fill the need for sex, conversation, and company in a 
nation suffering from a concerning population decline.480  One 
                                                          
477.  In his 1949 novel 1984, George Orwell crafted Room 101 as a punitive 
horror chamber tailored to the fears of specific prisoners. In the television series 
Altered Carbon (Netflix 2018) (Season 1 episode “Force of Evil”), a similar 
penological approach is used with recursive virtual reality. 
478.  See FOUCAULT, supra note 70, at 122. 
479.  Holmes, Law in Science, supra note 99, at 463. 
480.  See Births Sink to Record Low of 946,060 as Deaths Surge and Marriage 
Dims, THE JAPAN TIMES (June 1, 2018), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/ 
2018/06/01/national/births-sank-record-low-946060-2017-deaths-surged-marriage-
dimmed/#.WxFgY-4vzIU (finding from 2017 data that Japanese women will bear an 
average of 1.43 children, lower than the 2.1 children needed to sustain and grow a 
population); Japan’s Population Shrinks for Seventh Consecutive Year as it Falls to 
126.70 Million, THE JAPAN TIMES (Apr. 13, 2018), https://www.japantimes.co.jp 
/news/2018/04/13/national/japans-population-shrinks-seventh-consecutive-year-
falls-126-70-million/#.WxFepu4vzIU (reporting that the World Health Organization 
defines an aging society as one with an older than 65 population exceeding 7%, and 
Japan’s older than 65 population exceeded 27.7% in 2017, defined not only as a super-
aged society but the world’s most-aged society). 
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commentator suggested that “[f]or a population that is literally dying 
out, a little company – even if it is artificial – is better than none.”481 
On a less extreme level, domestic chatbots in the U.S. attempt to 
insert a facsimile of emotional chatter into conversation beyond mere 
informational assistance.482  Woebot, designed to provide constantly 
available personal emotional support for therapeutic mental health 
purposes, was designed with the belief that competent “humans open 
up more when they know they’re talking to a bot,” because human-to-
human conversation is fraught with the risk of stigma and discomfort.483  
Indeed, some evidence indicates that veterans with posttraumatic stress 
disorder have found speaking to a robotic console that reads and 
responds to facial and verbal cues helpful and comforting.484  The 
model is likened to writing in a journal or speaking to a religious 
confessional, providing a degree of anonymity helpful for disclosure of 
painful information.485  However, psychologists make clear that AI-
based mental health assessments are not a replacement for treatment or 
learning how to cope with the greater challenges of real human social 
interaction.486 
For example, while an AI caregiver or mental health kiosk could 
recognize human emotion from physiological cues such as breathing, 
                                                          
481.  Dean Cornish, Love, Intimacy, and Companionship: A Tale of Robots in 
Japan, SBS: DATELINE (June 21, 2017, 5:21 PM), https://www.sbs.com.au/news/ 
dateline/article/2017/04/11/love-intimacy-and-companionship-tale-robots-japan.  See 
Alison Nastasi, Quiet Photos That Capture Japan’s Loneliness Epidemic, 
FLAVORWIRE (Aug. 16, 2017), http://flavorwire.com/609219/quiet-photos-that-
capture-japans-loneliness-epidemic (describing an aging population and a “celibacy 
syndrome” that presents a “looming national catastrophe).  
482.  See Arielle Pardes, The Emotional Chatbots are Here to Probe Our 
Feelings, WIRED (Jan. 31, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/replika-
open-source/?mbid=social_fb (applying a sequence-to-sequence deep learning model 
to mimic and replicate the tones and modulation of human speech and the appearance 
of talking about feelings). 
483.  See id. (emphasis added). 
484.  See Gale M. Lucas et al., Reporting Mental Health Symptoms: Breaking 
Down Barriers to Care with Virtual Human Interviewers, FRONTIERS IN ROBOTICS 
AND AI (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/frobt.2017. 
00051/full.   
485.  Robbie Gonzalez, Virtual Therapists Help Veterans Open Up About 
PTSD, WIRED (Oct. 17, 2017, 10:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/virtual-
therapists-help-veterans-open-up-about-ptsd/. 
486.  Id.  
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verbal cues such as speed and intonation, and visual cues such as facial 
expressions,487 the technology would never be able to use the empathy 
and familiarity with the human experience that a human being would.488  
That is, AI which learns to become sentient will never become 
empathetic with humans if humans have nothing to offer AI.489  Also, 
the reported inherent personal biases in AI programming that favor their 
designers’ demographics would likely ultimately favor AI over 
humanity:  “Technologies are as much products of the context in which 
they are created as they are potential agents of change.”490 In 
                                                          
487.  BODEN, supra note 9, at 73 (discussing the methods of AI interpretation of 
human emotion as “relatively crude”).  “There’s no attempt to make [AI companions] 
use emotions in solving their own problems, nor to illuminate the role that emotions 
play in the functioning of the mind as a whole.  It’s as though emotions are seen by 
these AI researchers as optional extras: to be disregarded unless, in some messily 
human context, they’re unavoidable.”  Id. at 75. 
488.  The human capacity to interpret the needs and feelings of others is also 
subject to inherent limitations, shown by our continued implicit biases and prejudices.  
See generally Michael Selmi, The Paradox of Implicit Bias and a Plea for a New 
Narrative, 50 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 193 (2018) (addressing the legal difficulty in applying 
and defining unconscious implicit bias in discrimination litigation); see also ALEX 
CAMPOLO ET AL., AI NOW 2017 ANNUAL REPORT 4 (2017) (“training data, algorithms, 
and other design choices that shape AI systems may reflect and amplify existing 
cultural assumptions and inequalities”). 
489.  The film Ex Machina (A24 Films 2015) reflects this concern through the 
AI humanoid Ava, who asks her human creator the following rhetorical question: 
“Isn’t it strange to create something that hates you?”  However, in the film A.I. 
Artificial Intelligence (Warner Bros./Dreamworks Pictures 2001), adult actor Jude 
Law, an AI humanoid, tells the AI child, “They hate us, you know, the humans.”  The 
child protests and insists his human mother loves him, but Law responds, “She loves 
what you do for her, as my customers love what it is I do for them.”  Cf. Steven 
Goldberg, The Changing Face of Death: Computers, Consciousness, and Nancy 
Cruzan, 43 STAN. L. REV. 659 (1991) (discussing the growing legal and research focus 
on human self-awareness, as shown in the evolving definition of brain death, a 
movement which purportedly attempts to distinguish humanity from other animals 
and from AI). 
490.  CAMPOLO ET AL., supra note 488, at 4, 18 (“AI is not impartial or 
neutral.”).  See also Jason P. Nance, Student Surveillance, Racial Inequalities, and 
Implicit Racial Bias, 66 EMORY L.J. 765 (2017) (addressing the uneven racialized 
application of public school video surveillance to combat school violence and 
maintain order and control); Piccone, supra note 14 (discussing the difficulty of 
constraining inherent biases in military applications of AI due to “inherent biases in 
how visual and audio recognition features operate in real time”); How We are Not 
Like Robots After All, SPIRITUALITY & HEALTH 32 (Jan./Feb. 2012) (addressing the 
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discussions identifying the lack of diversity among technology leaders, 
some have argued that autonomous programming bias inherently 
emerges due to the programmer’s own isolated view of the world, 
which has a tendency to create modern surveillance that is decidedly 
privileged in its luxury to focus on the other, never on itself.491 
In the 1990s, as judicial and legislative attention to technology’s 
impact on personal privacy began to gain traction, Priscilla Regan 
warned of the commodification of privacy protections, where relegating 
human control of personal privacy through the private sector would 
result in the “privacy haves” and the “privacy have-nots” based largely 
on wealth.492  In her vision, the poor and the marginalized would be 
more likely to be subject to state surveillance.493  The wealthy, by 
contrast, would likely live relatively peaceful, private lives, able to 
afford the security technology necessary to keep clear of the masses and 
mass surveillance. 
With historically disproportionate numbers of racial minorities in 
prison,494 and low-income families whose only option is a state-funded 
                                                          
human emotions research of psychologist Lisa Feldman Barrett of Northeastern 
University, Massachusetts General Hospital, and Harvard School of Medicine, which 
finds that recognizing human emotions requires context, memory, and the ability to 
anticipate unexpressed emotions, much more than facial recognition or physiological 
indicators). 
491.  See CAMPOLO ET AL., supra note 488, at 4; LEWIS, supra note 87, at 25.  
Lewis, a professor of American Studies, remarked that “middle-class white men are 
finally getting a taste of what women, poor people, and racial and sexual minorities 
have long known about the burden of living under supervision.”  LEWIS, supra note 
87, at 51. 
492.  REGAN, supra note 3, at 237. 
493.  See Jeffrey Gilleran, Why Should We Trust Baltimore Police with Aerial 
Surveillance Technology?, THE BALT. SUN (Feb. 26, 2018, 10:30 AM), 
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/oped/bs-ed-op-0227-aerial-
surveillance-20180226-story.html (“New surveillance capabilities raise concerns 
about how powerful investigatory tools typically reserved for military purposes may 
now be turned against certain communities.”). 
494.  See John Gramlich, The Gap Between the Numbers of Blacks and Whites 
in Prison is Shrinking, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 12, 2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/ 
fact-tank/2018/01/12/shrinking-gap-between-number-of-blacks-and-whites-in-
prison/ (noting a narrowing of the gap between incarcerated African-Americans as 
compared to white or Hispanic Americans, but explaining that there are still more 
African-Americans imprisoned in state and federal prison in the U.S. than any other 
racial group). 
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facility for medical and mental health care,495 clearly some members of 
society would be more at risk of infringements on autonomy through 
surveillance technology.  The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment provides some protection against biased applications of 
surveillance and isolation measures, but the applied uniformity of 
institutional settings and structures does not raise these issues 
frequently.496 
Scientific and medical research have much to offer the courts in 
realigning the balance of interests regarding restrictive measures 
imposed on persons in state confinement.  In an age of innovation in 
surveillance and AI technologies, courts will need to express clear 
principles and draw on improved understandings of the psychological 
impact of such innovation.  Specifically, the courts should address the 
fact that these methods of constant surveillance could facilitate safer 
and more rehabilitative confinement, but they could also represent a 
failure to develop more humane approaches respecting the basic human 
need for autonomy in navigating both privacy and social contact.  
Ultimately, the court must consider what is reasonable when examining 
restrictive measures, but not by the standards of a pre-digital age and 
not willfully blind to advances in psychological research. 
C.  Key Factors to Determine the Reasonableness of Restrictive 
Measures 
As previously discussed, in constitutional claims the use of 
restrictive measures to surveil persons in confinement generally 
requires a showing of necessity and a measure of the impact on 
                                                          
495.  From 1990-2017, enrollment nearly doubled in the Medicaid, a state and 
federal program providing assistance to low-income families to receive medical and 
long-term care.  Total Medicaid Enrollment from 1966-2017 (in millions), STATISTA, 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/245347/total-medicaid-enrollment-since-1966/ 
(last visited Dec. 3, 2018).   
496.  Cf. Bullock v. Sheahan, 568 F. Supp. 2d 965, 973-74 (N.D. Ill. 2008) 
(holding that a blanket strip search policy for discharged male prisoners, but not 
female prisoners, was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause), with Timm v. 
Gunter, 917 F.2d 1093 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1209 (1991) (identifying 
differences in male and female prison institutions including number and age of 
prisoners, types of crimes committed, length of sentence, and frequency of incidents 
involving violence, escapes, or contraband, when holding that differential gender 
practices in strip searches did not violate equal protection). 
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individual autonomy.  Also, courts should consider that any state 
surveillance, particularly of persons who are confined without consent, 
has a potential detrimental social and psychological impact.  To better 
outline which additional balancing test factors may be relevant when 
addressing surveillance technology as a restrictive measure, identifying 
trends in case law is critical, particularly in the absence of statutory 
protections. 
Certain factors are generally recognized.  If there is an opportunity 
for individual consent to surveillance, as shown in contractual 
agreements for cameras in nursing home bedrooms, then due 
consideration must be given to the resident’s contractual right.497  This 
comports with the primacy of individual autonomy rights regarding 
privacy.  If there is statutory authorization for consent,498  regulatory 
restriction on surveillance,499 or mandates for restrictive measures,500 
the courts will show deference to the other branches of government, 
subject to a judicial check enforcing common law doctrines and 
constitutional provisions to ensure the protection of individual 
autonomy rights.  Finally, with respect to state institutions, courts will 
give some deference to state administrators to ensure adequate security 
measures because of the complex nature of maintaining control and 
safety for large and potentially dangerous populations, and for those 
with serious medical or mental health needs.501 
                                                          
497.  See supra note 21. 
498.  E.g., Law Enforcement Officer-Worn Body Camera Act of 2016, 50 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. § 706/10-20(a)(4)(A) (“Cameras must be turned off when . . . the victim 
of a crime requests that the camera be turned off, and unless impractical or impossible, 
that request is made on the recording[.]”).  
499.  E.g., Lopez v. Youngblood, 609 F. Supp. 2d 1125 (E.D. Cal. 2009) 
(upholding the law enforcement practice of giving pre-arraignment arrestees greater 
privacy for body-cavity searches than post-arraignment detainees, notwithstanding 
the equal protection argument that the individual’s privacy interest is the same in both 
cases).  
500.  E.g., 28 C.F.R. § 550.10 (2017) (authorizing disciplinary measures against 
inmates who refuse to comply with inspections and testing for the use of alcohol). 
501.  See, e.g., Timm v. Gunter, 917 F.2d 1093, 1099 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. 
denied, 501 U.S. 1209 (1991) (asserting that prison officials are owed deference in 
choice of restrictive measures due to their “exceedingly complex task” of 
safeguarding institutional security); Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 332-33 
(9th Cir. 1988) (finding justification for elevated security for maximum security 
prisons under a Fourth Amendment analysis). 
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Statutory protections may significantly favor state actors.  For 
example, under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 
“[p]rospective relief in any civil action with respect to prison conditions 
shall extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of the 
Federal right of a particular plaintiff or plaintiffs”; and a court may not 
grant or approve any prospective relief unless it “finds that such relief 
is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the 
violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary 
to correct the violation of the Federal right.”502  Section 1983 civil rights 
actions are not available for negligence claims, and deliberate 
indifference in state institutions must meet the high standard of 
“shocking the conscience.”503 
Statutory and regulatory measures may also apply an internal 
balancing test analysis, similar to a due process liberty interest analysis, 
with less deference to the state.  For example, regulation of the federally 
administered PACE outpatient program for elder care permits physical 
and chemical restraints, but “only when other less restrictive measures 
have been found to be ineffective to protect the participant or others 
from harm.”504 
Below are more specific factors that the courts have and should 
consider when addressing constitutional claims regarding the use of 
technology as a restrictive measure to observe humans in state 
confinement without their consent.  As will be shown, while an 
egregious violation involving one factor may sufficiently support a 
                                                          
502.  18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) (2012) (emphasis added).  See, e.g., Porter v. 
Clarke, 290 F. Supp. 3d 518 (E.D. Va. 2018), appeal filed, Case No. 18-6257 (4th Cir. 
2018) (granting a motion for injunctive relief against solitary confinement under the 
PLRA). 
503.  See, e.g., Smith v. District of Columbia, 306 F. Supp. 3d 223, 242-46 
(D.D.C. 2018) (suggesting that requisite split-second decisions by state actors that 
cause harm do not shock the conscience, relying on County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 
532 U.S. 833 (1998), where the U.S. Supreme Court followed the same rationale 
regarding the disciplinary actions of prison guards). 
504.  42 C.F.R. § 460.114 (2017).  Note that regulations for this program 
(Program for All-Inclusive Care for the Elderly (PACE)) also grant patients the right 
“[t]o be treated with dignity and respect, be afforded privacy and confidentiality in all 
aspects of care, and be provided humane care.” Id. § 460.112(a)(2). 
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claim, a combination of restrictive measures may also create a more 
severe impact on the individual.505 
1.  Intensity of Restrictive Measures 
The reasonableness of observational restrictive measures considers 
the intensity of the impact, such as the length of time imposed and 
whether the measures are based on visual or auditory surveillance or 
tactile contact. 
Constant surveillance is more invasive and therefore more heavily 
scrutinized.  For example, placing a violent male prisoner in a paper 
gown for security measures, who is seen only occasionally by female 
guards, “does not rise to the level of constant surveillance, as might 
occur had a camera been installed in the cell or if the door were barred 
and not solid (thus affording a constant visual from the hall).”506  In 
contrast, regular and close observation of toilet functions of male 
inmates by female guards is distinguishable and warrants a Fourth 
Amendment claim.507  Global positioning system (“GPS”) ankle 
bracelets are lawful tools in home detention, viewed by some as less 
invasive than prison confinement despite their use of constant 
geolocation tracking.508  Recent military research by the U.S. Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (“DARPA”) is designing clothing 
fabrics that can monitor heart and breathing rates, which could also 
serve as a useful form of remotely monitoring the health of persons in 
confinement, particularly those with serious medical needs.509 
                                                          
505.  See Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1246 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (citing 
Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304-05 (1991), when addressing factors in a cruel and 
unusual punishment claim, and noting that “courts may consider conditions in 
combination ‘when they have a mutually enforcing effect that produces the 
deprivation of a single, identifiable human need’”). 
506.  Hickman v. Jackson, No. 2:03CV363, 2005 WL 1862425, at *10 (E.D. 
Va. Aug. 3, 2005). 
507.  Byrd v. Maricopa Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 845 F.3d 919, 922 (9th Cir. 
2017). 
508.  E.g., Gonzalez Fuentes v. E.L.A., 167 D.P.R. 400, 2006 WL 6110919 
(P.R. 2006) (denying prisoners convicted of murder the privilege of release under 
electronic surveillance, which they asserted was an acquired right under the 
Constitution of Puerto Rico to continued liberty under electronic surveillance). 
509.  NET ASSESSMENT, supra note 468, at 36. 
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Litigation has not addressed GPS ankle bracelets that visually 
record images, but some engage in auditory surveillance, which could 
violate attorney-client privilege when defendants meet with their 
defense attorneys.510 Auditory surveillance also arguably constitutes a 
more invasive form of constant surveillance than geolocation.  Others 
have the capability of continuous alcohol intake monitoring, where 
spikes in remotely monitored data from sweat analysis serve as a 
grounds to revoke probation.511  Moreover, in Carpenter v. United 
States, in the context of Fourth Amendment protections against police 
access to geolocation information on cell phones, the Supreme Court 
has recently held that the third-party doctrine does not apply.512  That 
is, disclosure to third party wireless service providers of constant 
physical location information does not diminish the individual’s 
expectation of privacy in the same information with respect to others, 
including the state.  Finally, constant surveillance of confined persons 
need not be merely a silent metal eye in a post-modern panopticon, but 
could instead be an autonomous machine with a constant, persuasive, 
elusive voice reminiscent of historic concerns with subliminal 
messaging in technology.513 
                                                          
510.  See Waldo Covas Quevedo, Caution: Your GPS Ankle Bracelet is 
Listening, THE CRIME REPORT (Oct. 25, 2013), 
https://thecrimereport.org/2013/10/25/2013-10-caution-your-gps-ankle-bracelet-is-
listening/.  
511.  See People v. Buell, 16 Cal. App. 5th 682, 690-91 (2017) (addressing the 
reliability of continuous remote alcohol intake monitoring by a third party company 
contracted by the county probation office); see, e.g., Alcohol Monitoring SCRAM 
Cam®, SCRAM SYSTEMS, https://www.scramsystems.com/products/scram-
continuous-alcohol-monitoring/ (last visited Dec. 3, 2018) (“Standalone alcohol 
monitoring or CAM with home curfew monitoring at the flip of a switch[.]”). 
512.  Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2218 (2018).  
513.  See Waller v. Osbourne, 763 F. Supp. 1144, 1149 (M.D. Ga. 1991), aff’d, 
958 F.2d 1084 (11th Cir. 1992),  reh’g denied, 964 F.2d 1148, 1149 (11th Cir. 1992), 
cert. denied, 506 U.S. 916 (1992) (noting, in addressing a claim against musician 
Ozzy Osbourne for wrongful death due to subliminal suicidal messages, that “[t]he 
most important character of a subliminal message is that it sneaks into the brain while 
the listener is completely unaware that he has heard anything at all”).  See generally 
Victoria Stern, A Short History of the Rise, Fall, and Rise of Subliminal Messaging, 
SCI. AM. (Sept. 1, 2015), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/a-short-history-
of-the-rise-fall-and-rise-of-subliminal-messaging/ (noting continued research 
demonstrating a subtle response from subliminal messaging, including an influence 
on emotions); Richard Gafford, The Operational Potential of Subliminal Perception, 
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Visual observation has been heavily scrutinized, particularly when 
it is indiscriminate and ubiquitous. The detailed information obtained 
by visual images is far more invasive than auditory observation such as 
eavesdropping.514  In both, however, the intrusion is exacerbated when 
the activity is recorded.  The Tenth Circuit explained: 
The showing of necessity needed to justify the use of video 
surveillance is higher than the showing needed to justify other search 
and seizure methods, including bugging. The use of a video camera 
is an extraordinarily intrusive method of searching. Here, the 
incident in which an unidentified individual was observed 
masturbating provides an excellent example of this intrusiveness. No 
other technique would have recorded - at least in graphic visual detail 
- an apparently innocent individual engaging in this very personal 
and private behavior.515 
Also, visual observation is legitimately more intrusive for certain 
individuals.  For example, even if all inmates are equally subject to cells 
with open bars or showers without curtains, the courts have found 
constitutional privacy violations for inmates in settings that involve 
cross-gender observation of nudity, or when they are accompanied by 
religious objections.516  Observation of the difficulties of a person with 
                                                          
U.S. CIA, (Sept. 18, 1995), https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-
intelligence/kent-csi/vol2no2/html/v02i2a07p_0001.htm (describing suggestive 
techniques by operatives to influence behavior, but not including subliminal 
messaging, and concluding “that there are so many elusive variables and so many 
sources of irregularity in the device of directing subliminal messages to a target 
individual that its operational feasibility is exceedingly limited”); LINOWES, supra 
note 3, at 7 (discussing early efforts to impart audio subliminal messaging in 
advertising and public malls). 
514.  See United States v. Mesa-Rincon, 911 F.2d 1433, 1442-43 (10th Cir. 
1990) (“Because of the invasive nature of video surveillance, the government’s 
showing of necessity must be very high to justify its use.”). 
515.  Id. at 1442. 
516.  But see MacDonald v. Angelone, 69 F. Supp. 2d 787 (E.D. Va. 1999) 
(finding that an open toilet serves as a reasonable security measure in prison); Riddick 
v. Sutton, 794 F. Supp. 169 (E.D. N.C. 1992) (finding that female guards viewing 
male inmates using the toilet and shower creates only a de minimus infringement on 
a constitutional right to privacy). 
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a disability using bathroom facilities also warrants greater privacy 
protections.517 
Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit suggested that prisoners 
experience visual observation by guards when using a shower or toilet 
as less invasive than body-cavity searches.518  Tactile contact as a form 
of observation appears to be most heavily scrutinized, thus metal 
detectors would arguably be preferable to body-cavity searches by 
guards.519  The type of physical contact may impact the analysis, with 
strip searches potentially more intrusive than pat-down searches.520  
Medical examinations may warrant different standards of observational 
privacy.521  Gender and biological differences are also key factors in 
the constitutionality of searches, where female inmates may justifiably 
receive more privacy than male inmates during strip searches.522 
As a matter of observational privacy, the manipulation of the body 
to force a more intrusive view, particularly one involving nudity, is 
deemed more dehumanizing than simply having a guard view a prisoner 
naked, even one of a different gender.523  It could be argued that remote 
surveillance or searches by machine eliminate the emotional stigma that 
accompanies observation or contact by human staff.  However, in South 
Korea, one of the concerns raised by prisoners subject to observation 
                                                          
517.  See LaFaut v. Smith, 834 F.2d 389, 394 (4th Cir. 1987) (finding that an 
open but inaccessible toilet for person with a disability violates Eighth Amendment). 
518.  Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144, 146 (7th Cir. 1995). 
519.  Id. at 145.  
520.  United States v. Mesa-Rincon, 911 F.2d 1433, 1442-43 (10th Cir. 1990). 
521.  See Nat’l Comm’n on Corr. Health Care, supra note 446 (providing that 
principles of respect and medical confidentiality are owed to inmates in solitary 
confinement, where privacy should be maintained as much as possible). 
522.  See Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Cty. of Burlington, 566 U.S. 
318, 346 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (identifying the added intrusiveness of 
menstruation or lactation for women during body-cavity searches); Bullock v. Dart, 
599 F. Supp. 2d 947, 956 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (noting menstruation may warrant greater 
privacy for women during strip searches). 
523.  Compare Canedy v. Boardman, 16 F.3d 183 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding a 
constitutional privacy right violation for a male inmate to be regularly strip searched 
by female guards), and Lee v. Downs, 641 F.2d 1117 (4th Cir. 1981) (holding that a 
female inmate who was viewed naked by male guards constituted a violation of her 
constitutional right to privacy), with Hickman v. Jackson, No. 2:03CV363, 2005 WL 
1862425 (E.D. Va. 2005) (holding that a male inmate who was occasionally viewed 
naked by female guards did not constitute a violation of privacy rights). 
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by the first autonomous robotic prison wardens was that the machines 
would handle them roughly and have no capacity to care why this 
matters.524 
The intensity of solitary confinement perhaps best demonstrates the 
heightened impact of combining restrictive measures.  Constant 
surveillance, coupled with the restriction of freedom of movement and 
social contact, facilitates the effectiveness of state control of confined 
persons.  However, with the advent of alarming evidence of the 
detrimental psychological impact of extended solitary confinement, 
such forced, state-sanctioned isolation is now more heavily 
scrutinized.525  Therefore, at minimum, indeterminate social isolation 
in state confinement under federal law should be held unconstitutional. 
With or without psychological harm, the relative lack of consent 
will also impact the intensity of a restrictive measure’s impact, even as 
society is adapting to surveillance in the public sphere.  In a labor-
related survey conducted by the American Management Association, 
55% of employers use video surveillance to monitor the workplace and 
employee performance.526  Other than restrictions on employers 
observing and constraining union or other concerted employee activity 
under the National Labor Relations Act,527 there is no federal law that 
prohibits such workplace surveillance.528 
Examples of web applications available to employers to assess 
employee productivity include automatic tracking of web browsing 
patterns, monitoring of keystrokes, and repeatedly taking webcam 
pictures of employees to produce a “focus score.”529  Such methods are 
                                                          
524.  See articles cited, supra note 10. 
525.  See Valle v. Florida, 564 U.S. 1067 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting from 
denial of stay of execution); supra note 347 and accompanying text. 
526.  More Video Surveillance in the Workplace.  But is it Legal?, GOVDOCS, 
https://www.govdocs.com/can-employers-use-video-surveillance-monitor-workers/ 
(last visited Dec. 3, 2018). 
527.  See Gordon B. Schmidt & Kimberly W. O’Connor, Fired for Facebook: 
Using NLRB Guidance to Craft Appropriate Social Media Policies, 58 BUS. 
HORIZONS 571 (2015), available at http://daneshyari.com/article/preview/101 
3883.pdf.  
528.  More Video Surveillance, supra note 526; Jo Ellen Whitney, Workplace 
Surveillance in a World Where Everyone’s Watching, 22 No. 5 IOWA EMPLOY. L. 
LETTER 1 (2015). 
529.  Big Brother Isn’t Just Watching: Workplace Surveillance Can Track Your 
Every Move, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 6, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/world/ 
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not necessarily productive.  The use of surveillance drones by the Union 
Pacific Corporation to monitor compliance with railyard safety 
guidelines received employee backlash in part because some workers 
became distracted by the drones risking additional hazards.530  
Additionally, union representatives asserted that using the drones to 
identify the need for discipline of workers caused concern among the 
workers.531  Hence, the proliferation of Bentham’s panopticon to other 
sectors in the society at large has functioned according to its design.532  
This employment context is relevant to the present analysis, because as 
in other private spheres, if an employee does not wish to be observed, 
he or she may choose another job.  However, in state institutions, while 
the wardens, physician assistants, and other staff may be subject to 
surveillance technology by consent, the confined persons they subject 
to constant surveillance have no similar opportunity to consent or opt 
out.  Thus, constant surveillance without any ability to avoid it or to opt 
out should be recognized as more harmful psychologically. 
2.  Availability of Less Restrictive Measures 
Judicial interpretation of state interests in security must properly 
consider what type of security is necessary, without assuming that any 
and all security measures are necessary.  For obvious reasons, the levels 
of security and need for surveillance or isolation will be measured, for 
the most part, by the degree of danger posed to the resident or inmate 
and to the community in confinement.  Therefore, employing more 
restrictive means to intrude on the privacy and liberty of confined 
persons is not legally justified if a less restrictive means is available. 
                                                          
2017/nov/06/workplace-surveillance-big-brother-technology (“Over time it can build 
a picture of typical user behaviour and then alert when someone deviates.”).  See also 
Matt Novak, Amazon Patents Wristband to Track Hand Movements of Warehouse 
Employees, GIZMODO (Jan. 31, 2018, 1:30 PM), https://gizmodo.com/amazon-
patents-wristband-to-track-hand-movements-of-war-1822590549 (“It’s becoming 
more and more common for companies to monitor their employees through invasive 
technology, as there are virtually no laws to stop it.”). 
530.  Paul Ziobro, Hovering Drones Irk Rail Workers, WALL STREET J., Mar. 
15, 2018, at B1. 
531.  Id. at B1-B2. 
532.  See BENTHAM, PANOPTICON, supra note 328. 
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For example, a Fourth Amendment analysis would properly 
consider differing privacy intrusions based on technological 
capabilities: 
While the Court understands that a video camera might be necessary 
to monitor Llufrio’s safety and ensure that he did not escape from the 
interview room while under arrest and unattended, the Government 
presents no reason why it would need to record the sounds from the 
room other than for incriminating purposes while Llufrio sat 
alone.533 
Similarly, the National Commission on Correctional Health Care 
adopted new standards for persons in solitary confinement, including a 
provision providing that if visual privacy is not possible during medical 
examinations, then auditory privacy should be assured.534 
Beyond tailoring the restrictive measure to the degree of necessity, 
other considerations such as availability and feasibility must also be 
taken into account.  Various constitutional balancing tests related to 
privacy require that the state consider the technological options 
currently available,535 which suggests that the court can alter its 
determinations of reasonableness as surveillance and privacy 
technology innovate over time.  Even if a restrictive measure is 
relatively severe, if it is warranted and there is no feasible alternative, 
then the court may uphold the constitutionality of the measure.  For 
example, the California CURES database for prescription drug 
monitoring holds information relevant to medical malpractice and 
criminal investigations, but may invade patient privacy when accessed 
for such investigative purposes.536  In balancing state and personal 
                                                          
533.  United States v. Llufrio, 237 F. Supp. 3d 735, 745 (N.D. Ill. 2017). 
534.  Nat’l Comm’n on Corr. Health Care, supra note 446 (Principle 13). 
535.  For example, an airport screening is reasonable as an administrative search 
under the Fourth Amendment if “(1) it is no more extensive or intensive than 
necessary, in light of current technology, to detect weapons or explosives; (2) it is 
confined in good faith to that purpose; and (3) passengers may avoid the search by 
electing not to fly.”  United States v. Marquez, 410 F.3d 612, 616 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(emphasis added) (upholding the governmental use of full-body scanners on 
passengers in airports to protect against acts of terrorism). 
536.  Lewis v. Super. Ct., 3 Cal. 5th 561, 576 (2017).  See also Or. Prescription 
Drug Monitoring Prog. v. U.S. Drug Enforcement Admin., 998 F. Supp. 2d 957, 967 
(D. Ore. 2014) (noting that a district court was persuaded that a reasonable expectation 
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privacy interests, including feasibility and necessity, the court noted in 
dicta that “adequate protections against public disclosure do not obviate 
constitutional concerns as privacy interests are still implicated when the 
government accesses personal information without disseminating it.”537 
Examining the means of technological surveillance is also 
important.  With regard to the potential for disclosure of confidential 
information in a digitized medical database, Justice Brennan stated: 
[T]he Constitution puts limits not only on the type of information the 
state may gather, but also on the means it may use to gather it. The 
central storage and easy accessibility of computerized data vastly 
increase the potential for abuse of that information, and I am not 
prepared to say that future developments will not demonstrate the 
necessity of some curb on such technology.538 
The burden is on the state to prove that available technologies and 
approaches have been considered.539  If an approach would be less 
restrictive, but it is not practically available or financially feasible, it 
will not be deemed an available means.  The Alaska Supreme Court, 
interpreting the state’s constitutional rights of privacy and liberty in 
cases of involuntary medical care, held that “the patient’s best interests 
[must be] considered in light of any available less intrusive 
treatments.”540  In that state, availability requires a showing of 
feasibility and a means that would satisfy the state’s compelling interest 
in requiring treatment.541  Specifically, the court determined that the 
psychiatric services of the Office of Children’s Services in Alaska 
                                                          
of privacy remained, where “the only way to avoid submission of prescription 
information to the PDMP is to forgo medical treatment or to leave the state.  This is 
not a meaningful choice.”), rev’d, 860 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir. 2017) (reversed on the basis 
of standing). 
537.  Lewis at 577. 
538.  See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 607 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
539.  Cf. Matter of United States, 256 F. Supp. 3d 246, 252 (E.D. N.Y. 2017) 
(holding, in an examination of the All Writs Act, that the government did not present 
sufficient evidence that its wiretapping efforts were foiled by discontinuation of cell 
phone technology where “the complete lack of any showing of necessity weighs 
heavily against the government”). 
540.  Kiva O. v. State Dep’t of Health & Soc. Serv., 408 P.3d 1181, 1190 
(Alaska 2018). 
541.  Id. 
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adequately considered family visitation and therapy before requiring a 
child in care to be placed on the antidepressant Lexapro; but that the 
state had acted too quickly in approving the mood stabilizing 
medication Risperdal when the child was depressed but not suicidal.542 
Pragmatic concerns also impact feasibility.  In a claim of cruel and 
unusual punishment, the Seventh Circuit identified a valid privacy 
interest in avoiding cross-gender observation in prison, but not a 
feasible alternative to the practice: “There are too many permutations 
to place guards and prisoners into multiple classes by sex, sexual 
orientation, and perhaps other criteria, allowing each group to be 
observed only by the corresponding groups that occasion the least 
unhappiness.”543  Similarly, budgetary shortfalls are also a valid 
consideration, possibly preventing a claim of cruel and unusual 
punishment for cramped and uncomfortable conditions.544  Courts are 
beginning to take pause and try to recognize when use of technology is 
expedient or a “cheap” replacement for human staffing.  Thus, courts 
have upheld some claims for harm resulting from poor technology 
applications in confined settings.545  Comparably, when inexpensive 
technology is available that would improve state systems and treatment 
of persons in their care and custody, such as effecting the reduction of 
arrestee misidentification, the courts readily suggest that such 
technology should have been adopted.546 
                                                          
542.  Id. at 1192-93. 
543.  Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144, 147 (7th Cir. 1995). 
544.  See id. at 149-50.  But see Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 520 (2011); supra 
note 343. 
545.  See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring) (“And because GPS monitoring is cheap in comparison to conventional 
surveillance techniques and, by design, proceeds surreptitiously, it evades the 
ordinary checks that constrain abusive law enforcement practices: ‘limited police 
resources and community hostility’” (quoting Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 426 
(2004)); see also Teague v. Schimel, 896 N.W.2d 286, 310 (Wis. 2017) (criticizing 
the state fingerprint database procedures and technology as “quick, cheap, and easy” 
and providing an unacceptable risk of error). 
546.  E.g., Smith v. County of Los Angeles, No. CV 11-10666, 2015 WL 
12731913, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2015) (“In a prior order in this case, Judge Feess 
lamented ‘out-of-date Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, which has failed to require 
the use of unique[biometric] identifiers despite the availability of simple 
and cheap technologies that would avoid the kind of repeated mis-identification that 
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In short, the technology must work, which includes the ability for 
sufficient human control to ensure it works.  Interestingly, emerging AI 
technology makes this assessment more difficult.  For example, if the 
surveillance were conducted and assessed only by machines without 
human direction, those harmed would have to seek remedies from 
inventors and manufacturers under existing legal remedies.  Twenty 
years ago, attributing fault to humanity’s creation of unpredictable 
systems such as AI was highly speculative: 
It is not clear what the law will, or should, do when artificial 
intelligences make mistakes, thereby damaging property, causing 
monetary losses or killing people. Perhaps we will blame nature or 
the inchoate forces of the universe. But the legal system is unlikely 
to rest there; we will not long accept equating the damage done by 
an unexpected tornado with the mistakes made by programs that are, 
at some level, human artifacts.547  
Today, with nascent autonomous drone and car industries, lawsuits for 
harm caused by autonomous machines has, as predicted, focused on 
human design defects, criminal recklessness, and negligent 
supervision.548 
Lethal AI weapons have numerous opponents in the scientific 
community concerned about the lack of human control over life and 
death decision-making.  This has drawn the attention of the United 
                                                          
he has endured,’ but ultimately held that Plaintiff could not state a Fourth Amendment 
particularity claim, given the current state of the law.”). 
547.  Curtis E. A. Karnow, Liability for Distributed Artificial Intelligences, 11 
BERK. TECH. L.J. 147, 154 (1996).  
548.  E.g., Tina Bellon, Fatal U.S. Self-Driving Auto Accident Raises Novel 
Legal Question, REUTERS (Mar. 20, 2018, 2:18 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/ 
us-autos-selfdriving-uber-liability-anal/fatal-u-s-self-driving-auto-accident-raises-
novel-legal-questions-idUSKBN1GW2SP (suggesting that liability for autonomous 
vehicle accidents could potentially attach to the transportation service, the car 
manufacturer, the technology and software design companies, and the human “safety” 
driver behind the wheel).  See generally Ryan Calo, Robotics and the Lessons of 
Cyberlaw, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 513, 559 (2015) (“Common law courts look to whether 
a given digital activity is ‘like’ an activity for which there are already rules. Legal, 
policy, and academic debates become battles over the proper analogy or metaphor.”); 
F. Patrick Hubbard, Sophisticated Robots: Balancing Liability, Regulation, and 
Innovation, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1803 (2014) (arguing that existing regulatory and 
common law liability systems adequately provide a balance of fairness in promoting 
safety and innovation with a sophisticated robotics industry). 
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Nations, but has yet to result in an international treaty or consensus.549  
Human soldier-machine symbiosis, coined “centaur warfare,” may 
remove some of the concerns related to uncontrollable autonomous 
technology.550  Military contractors envisioning future warfare propose 
“the synergistic merger of molecular biology, nanotechnology, and 
information technology, pointing to useful new directions in the design 
of mechanical devices.”551  Would prison wardens eventually be 
equipped with the same technology to control prison populations on 
American soil or police officers on American residential streets?552  In 
a state institutional setting, the potential alternatives available for 
controlling persons in confinement raise deep concerns regarding the 
ability of human inmates, patients, or residents to assert their rights to 
autonomy. 
While lack of control of AI surveillance or use of robotic discipline 
in institutions should clearly raise constitutional claims, there is also a 
risk of overreaching by human overseers recklessly adopting new 
technology. Technology is merely a tool for human actors and thus is 
susceptible to humanity’s coercion and bias.  For example: 
AI technologies are also being deployed in the very legal institutions 
designed to safeguard our rights and liberties, with proprietary risk 
assessment algorithms already being used to help judges make 
sentencing and bail decisions, potentially amplifying and 
naturalizing longstanding biases, and rendering them more opaque to 
oversight and scrutiny.553 
                                                          
549.  See UN Reopens Lethal Autonomous Weapons Talks with an Eye on 
Defining ‘Killer Robots’, THEDEFENSEPOST (Apr. 9, 2018), https://thedefensepost. 
com/2018/04/09/un-lethal-autonmous-weapons-killer-robot-talks/; Heather M. Roff, 
The Strategic Robot Problem: Lethal Autonomous Weapons in War, 13 J. MIL. ETHICS 
211 (2014).  
550.  Lester, supra note 14. 
551.  NET ASSESSMENT, supra note 468, at 31. 
552.  See articles cited supra note 10 (discussing South Korea’s first robotic 
prison guards). 
553.  CAMPOLO ET AL., supra note 488, at 4 (2017).  Cf. Blake A. Klinkner, 
Artificial Intelligence and Virtual Law Offices Expected to be Top Technological 
Trends Impacting the Legal Profession in 2017, 40 WYO. LAW. 52 (Feb. 2017) 
(describing the use of predictive analytics to interpret precedent and compose legal 
briefs, interpret opposing counsel’s strategy, and draft contracts); Amanda McAllister, 
Note, Stranger than Science Fiction: The Rise of A.I. Interrogation in the Dawn of 
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However, in 2016, in State v. Loomis, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin 
determined that formally authorized use of predictive analytical tools in 
sentencing did not violate the due process rights of a defendant when 
the sentence was based on accurate information.554 
In contrast, the Iowa Court of Appeals in 2018 distinguished 
Loomis when determining that use of the Iowa Risk Revised tool in 
sentencing was a due process violation, where there was “the use of an 
unspecified algorithm in sentencing (if that is what the IRR is).”555  
Thus, it appears that courts are willing to consider AI assistance in the 
justice system, but wisely require that it be subject to human analysis 
and constraints.  If court systems were readily to approve system 
technology in state institutions without proper restraint and caution, it 
would not bode well for vulnerable claimants subject to constant 
surveillance and dehumanizing social isolation. 
CONCLUSION 
Whether the executive or legislative branches are quick or slow to 
respond to the need for privacy protections as new technologies emerge, 
the judiciary has a crucial role in ensuring the reasonableness of 
surveillance.  The courts continue to acknowledge the basic human 
need for autonomy in navigating privacy and social interactions, which 
has longstanding protections for persons in state confinement in 
common law doctrines of police power and parens patriae, the United 
States Constitution, and a growing number of state constitutions with 
                                                          
Autonomous Robots and the Need for Additional Protocol to the U.N. Convention 
Against Torture, 101 MINN. L. REV. 2527 (2017) (suggesting that as the United 
Nations examines lethal autonomous weapons restrictions, it should also consider 
prohibiting AI interrogation techniques which could use existing facial and physical 
bodily response interpretation software); Melanie Reid, Rethinking the Fourth 
Amendment in the Age of Supercomputers, Artificial Intelligence, and Robots, 119 W. 
VA. L. REV. 863 (2017) (addressing the constitutional implications of autonomous 
investigative robocops). 
554.  State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 757 (Wis. 2016) (noting that the 
COMPAS risk assessment was one of several factors considered by the trial court, 
which had declined to give weight to expert testimony explaining that COMPAS was 
not designed to be used in sentencing and therefore bore a “tremendous risk of over 
estimating an individual’s risk”). 
555.  State v. Guise, No. 17-0589, 2018 WL 2084846, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. May 
2, 2018). 
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express privacy provisions.  Also, recognition of a growing body of 
social science and medical research has better informed the courts 
regarding the impact of new technology on human well-being, 
particularly with regard to surveillance and social isolation in 
confinement.  As the courts carve a more civilized path, indeterminate 
solitary confinement under constant surveillance, now facilitated by AI 
and remote surveillance, may be seen as a substantive due process 
violation, as well as cruel and unusual punishment. 
Protecting the social and privacy rights of prisoners and residential 
patients in state facilities is essential for the protection of the rights of 
all persons.  Institutionalized members of society have the least political 
and social power yet face the greatest potential infringements on their 
privacy and their right to a social existence.  A focus on their specific 
needs best demonstrates the appropriate balance of interests when 
innovation in surveillance may be meted out on this population first 
because it is unable to resist. Some enforced surveillance and social 
isolation are necessary to protect persons in confinement and ensure 
security in facilities, as demonstrated in cases with a high-risk of self-
harm or harm to others.  But all such restrictive measures must be 
subject to a rigorous balance of interests.  The right to autonomy of 
navigating privacy and social contact is too important.  The Seventh 
Circuit aptly stated:  “But where it is reasonable . . . to respect an 
inmate’s constitutional privacy interests, doing so is not just a palliative 
to be doled out at the state’s indulgence. It is a constitutional 
mandate.”556 
Upon a review of precedent focusing on the interplay between the 
Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments’ functions in privacy and 
isolation claims of confined persons, it is clear that the courts continue 
to uphold the primacy of a core individual right to autonomy.  Courts 
in the United States have acknowledged the impact of changing 
technology on privacy for over a century, but in recent years there is a 
newfound judicial understanding of the “seismic shifts”557 in 
technological innovation. 
Moving forward, the judiciary continues to encourage the active 
adoption of state statutory and constitutional privacy provisions, while 
                                                          
556.  Canedy v. Boardman, 16 F.3d 183, 188 (7th Cir. 1994) (emphasis in 
original). 
557.  Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219 (2018). 
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reiterating the importance of the “broad and idealistic concepts of 
dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency”558 for persons in 
state confinement.  The states, in turn, have manifested a willingness to 
do so, seen in the growth of numerous express state constitutional 
privacy provisions in the last two decades, an effort that Congress has 
not been willing or able to achieve as yet.  Nonetheless, both federal 
and state courts have the common law and constitutional legal tools on 
hand to keep a check on state institutions enamored of new forms of 
surveillance technology, including AI surveillance.  Most important of 
all, with respect to confined persons, is that state interests always 
include not only the effective maintenance and control of state 
institutions, but the well-being of persons in state care and the 
protection of their individual rights.  This is the state as parens patriae. 
It is a matter of no small concern that new technologies could 
facilitate confining persons in brightly lit, modern institutions in 
isolation under constant surveillance.  This would transform state 
confinement into a new form of oblivion, a status which the earliest 
prisons and mental hospitals offered the forgotten, condemned in dark, 
unsanitary facilities.559  As the Supreme Court stated in upholding a 
claim for cruel and unusual punishment: “There may be involved no 
physical mistreatment, no primitive torture. There is instead the total 
destruction of the individual’s status in organized society.”560  Such a 
prospect is neither constitutionally permissible nor ethically acceptable.  
Whether one is confined in state custody or care due to mental illness, 
severe disability, or criminal conviction, respecting human autonomy 
                                                          
558.  This declaration is quoted in hundreds of state and federal cases in the 
United States in upholding Eighth Amendment rights. See Mintun v. Corizon Med. 
Serv., No. 1:16-cv-00367-DCN, 2018 WL 1040088 (D. Idaho 2018) (deprivation of 
mental health services); Morris v. Zefferi, 601 F.3d 805 (8th Cir. 2010) (transportation 
in dog cage); Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1245 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (excessive 
force and solitary confinement in a modernized “prison of the future”); LaFaut v. 
Smith, 834 F.2d 389, 394 (4th Cir. 1987) (unusable and exposed toilet facilities for a 
paraplegic inmate); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (deprivation of 
medical care); Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968) (beating with a strap).   
559.  See FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION, supra note 370, at 245. 
560.  Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (laying out the origins of the 
Eighth Amendment based on the English Declaration of Rights of 1688 and the Magna 
Carta – “[Denaturalization] is a form of punishment more primitive than torture, for 
it destroys for the individual the political existence that was centuries in the 
development.”). 
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in navigating core needs for privacy and social contact remain integral 
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